LSEA Landsea Homes Corporation Common Stock
XNAS
11.31
Delayed
Stock quote, options chain, IV rank, technicals, AI analysis, and institutional ownership. Iron condor setups Expected move IV rank history Fibonacci levels Insider trading
Market data may be delayed, incomplete, or inaccurate. Not a recommendation to buy, sell, or hold any security. Verify quotes with your broker before trading. See Terms §17.
What changed
Recent filings, trades and moves- IV Rank (30D)
- 10.41
- Straddle Price
- $0.00
- P/C Vol Ratio (Jul 18 expiry)
- 0.46
- Market Cap
- $0.4B
- Industry (SIC)
- OPERATIVE BUILDERS (1531) · industry map
- Exchange
- XNAS
- Market Cap
- $0.4B
- Employees
- 556
- List Date
- 2021-01-08
- CIK
- 0001721386
- Last Earnings
- May 13 before open · +60.8% vs ±12.5% expected
- Headquarters
- Dallas, TX
- Homepage
- https://www.landseahomes.com
Landsea Homes Corp is a growth-oriented homebuilder focused on providing High-Performance Homes that deliver energy-efficient living in attractive geographies. It is engaged in the design, construction, marketing and sale of suburban and urban single-family detached and attached homes in Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Texas, and Metro New York. While It offers a wide range of housing options, it focuses on entry-level and first-time move-up homes and believes its markets are characterized by attractive long-term housing fundamentals. The company's segments include Arizona, California,…
Each spoke is this symbol's rank within its sector (0–100; the dotted ring marks the sector median at 50). Higher is more constructive for a long. One spoke — News sentiment — is an absolute reading, not a sector rank. Grayed spokes have no data. A fuller shape is a summary, not a recommendation.
Quick-reference for reading the values below. Indicators combine to confirm a view — no single one is a trade signal on its own.
- SMA 20 / 50 / 200 — price above = uptrend, below = downtrend. SMA 50 crossing SMA 200 is the golden/death cross.
- EMA 12 / 26 — faster-reacting averages; 12 above 26 is short-term bullish.
- MACD — bullish when MACD > signal (green badge), bearish when below. Divergence from price often precedes reversals.
- ADX (14) — trend strength regardless of direction. <20 range, 20–25 weak trend, 25–50 trend, >50 strong trend.
- +DI / −DI — +DI > −DI favors bulls; the reverse favors bears. Read alongside ADX.
- RSI (14) — <30 oversold, >70 overbought. 40–60 is neutral; trending names can stay extreme.
- Stochastic %K / %D — <20 oversold, >80 overbought. %K crossing %D is an early momentum signal.
- Williams %R — inverted scale: <−80 oversold, >−20 overbought.
Oscillators work best in range-bound markets; in strong trends they give premature reversal signals.
- Bollinger Bands — price at upper band = overbought, lower = oversold. Narrow bands (squeeze) often precede expansion.
- OBV — cumulative volume; rising OBV confirms uptrend, falling OBV confirms downtrend. Divergence from price is a warning.
- Vol SMA 20 / Vol ROC — today's volume vs. 20-day average. Positive ROC with price move = conviction.
- ATR / True Range — average daily $ move; sizing and stop-loss reference.
- HV 20 / 30 / 60 — realized (historical) volatility. Compare to IV on the options cards: IV > HV = rich premium.
Confluence matters: trend + momentum + volume agreeing carries far more weight than any single indicator. For how these feed the spread scanner score, see the algorithm docs →
Trend Indicators
Momentum Oscillators
Volume & Volatility
Data Summary
Click Frenzy-Pro™ for an AI analysis of this ticker.
Analysis includes technical indicators, news sentiment, risk assessment, and specific price levels to watch.
| Earnings Date | Timing | Expected Move | Actual Move | Ratio | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2023-08-01 | After-Close | 14.19% | 4.60% | 0.32x | Within |
| 2023-11-02 | After-Close | 10.73% | 4.80% | 0.45x | Within |
| 2024-02-29 | After-Close | 41.85% | 3.38% | 0.08x | Within |
| 2024-05-01 | After-Close | 10.94% | 3.05% | 0.28x | Within |
| 2024-08-01 | After-Close | 10.92% | 6.75% | 0.62x | Within |
| 2024-11-04 | After-Close | 9.16% | 2.04% | 0.22x | Within |
| 2025-02-27 | After-Close | 22.45% | 8.37% | 0.37x | Within |
| 2025-05-13 | Pre-Market | 12.47% | 60.66% | 4.86x | Exceeded |
Earnings calendar: this week’s reports with expected vs actual moves →
LSEA Options Activity & IV Rank
LSEA IV rank history, 52-week IV rank and IV percentile →
Volatility Metrics
Options Flow · Jul 18 expiry
ATM Options Pricing
Chain Summary
Each spread is ranked by a composite score built in three stages. Full documentation →
score = P(profit) × (credit / spread_width)
P(profit) from short leg delta (1 − |delta|), penalised above 85%. Credit uses mid-price to handle illiquid chains fairly.
Calendars: the long leg is valued at the short leg’s expiration (Black-Scholes at its current IV) across the range of prices the short leg’s IV implies, giving the best-case profit (R/R = that over the debit) and P(profit).
RR and BF (30-delta) from the persisted per-symbol skew snapshot — wing strikes picked by real greeks.delta, not a moneyness proxy. Put skew boosts bull puts, penalises bear calls. High butterfly boosts iron condors. Calendars are skew-neutral.
- RSI <40 bullish / >60 bearish
- MACD crossover + histogram trend
- Price vs SMA 50 & SMA 200
- Stochastic %K <20 / >80
- Williams %R <−80 / >−20
- Blended ATR + straddle expected-move penalty
- Bollinger Band signal (+ counter-trend penalty)
- BB width — vol contraction boost for ICs
- IV rank ≥ 75 → strong boost for credit spreads
- IV rank < 25 → penalty (selling cheap vol)
- Min open interest across all legs
- OI < 100 → −0.10 · OI < 500 → −0.05
score = base_score × skew_multiplier × tech_multiplier
Both multipliers are shown per spread. Beta is informational only — ATR already captures realized vol. Full algorithm documentation →
Scanning bull put, bear call, iron condor and calendar spreads…
Estimated net dealer gamma is at the 32nd percentile of this name's own daily history, within its typical range. This describes current positioning; it is not a forecast or a trading signal.
Net dealer gamma is an estimate of the aggregate gamma held by options market makers across this name's option chain, weighted by open interest. Dealer positions aren't public, so it uses a standard simplifying assumption: dealers are treated as long the calls and short the puts that are open. Actual dealer books can differ.
Gamma percentile ranks today's estimate against this name's own daily history, from 0% (the lowest reading on record) to 100% (the highest). Raw gamma scales with how much open interest a chain carries, so it isn't comparable across names; the percentile is. The badge marks the bottom 20% as low and the top 20% as high.
Tilts run from −1 to +1 and show how lopsided the estimated dealer exposure is. GEX tilt compares call gamma with put gamma. Vanna tilt describes how the hedge would shift if implied volatility changed, and charm tilt how it would shift with the passage of time.
This card describes estimated positioning and where it sits historically. It is not a forecast of price direction or volatility and not a trading signal. Market-wide view: Dealer positioning screener.
IV(put wing) − IV(ATM), in vol pointsHow much the OTM put trades above (or below) the at-the-money strike. Measures the height of the put-side tail relative to ATM — i.e. how expensive crash insurance is on this name.
- Positive (typical) — wing IV > ATM IV. Standard equity put skew: portfolios bid up crash protection, so OTM puts trade richer than ATM.
- Near zero or negative (unusual) — wing IV ≤ ATM IV. Flat or inverted put side. Common when there's no fear demand, in tightly mean-reverting names, or right after an earnings catalyst clears.
- Percentile vs own 3-yr history: high = wings rich (good time to sell wing premium); low = wings cheap (good time to buy protection).
- Not directional — high or low wings don't predict up or down moves. It's a price tag on tail insurance, not a forecast.
IV(call wing) − IV(put wing), equal delta on each sideWhich side of the smile is the market paying up for? Measures the tilt of the surface — call skew vs put skew at matched deltas.
- Negative (typical) — puts richer than calls. Standard equity behavior: hedging demand makes puts carry a premium. Most large-caps sit in the −1 to −5 vol-point range.
- Strongly negative (< −5 pts) — heavy downside hedging, elevated fear, or an upcoming catalyst (earnings, FDA, macro event). Worth flagging.
- Positive — calls richer than puts. Unusual for equities; signals bullish momentum, short-squeeze positioning, or takeover/M&A speculation.
- Near zero — symmetric surface. Market sees roughly equal up/down risk. Rare for large-caps; more common in commodities and FX.
Wing-vs-ATM tells you how expensive the tails are. Risk Reversal tells you which side is favored. Combined:
- High wing percentile + deeply negative RR → strong put bid; stress or major event priced in. Owning protection costs a premium; selling put premium is dangerous.
- Low wing percentile + near-zero RR → complacency; insurance cheap and balanced. Good environment to add cheap downside hedges.
- Positive RR + elevated wings → call-side fear-of-missing-out; common in squeeze setups. Upside calls expensive, downside puts not bid.
Percentile is the rank of today's reading within ~3 years of this symbol's own history. High percentile = wings are rich relative to history; not a directional signal. Skew is read off the chain in real time, not from CBOE SKEW.
Loading the implied volatility surface…
Loading the implied volatility smile…
LSEA Institutional Ownership (13F)
Institutional managers with $100M+ AUM file Form 13F-HR quarterly, due 45 days after quarter end. Holdings are reported gross at quarter-end market value — they are a snapshot, not a real-time position.
- Shares — long equity positions in this name, aggregated across share classes.
- Calls / Puts — notional value of long call / put exposure where this ticker is the underlying.
- % of Float — holder's reported shares divided by the latest diluted shares outstanding. Sums above 100% indicate large custodian / prime broker positions where the same shares are reported by multiple filers.
- Custodian badge — filers with more than 5,000 holdings are typically broker-dealers / custodians reporting customer-held shares, not active managers.
Each filer is counted once at its latest 13F-HR filing. New filings are ingested on a weekly cadence.
| # | Filer | Notional Value | % of Total | Period |
|---|
| # | Filer | Notional Value | % of Total | Period |
|---|
LSEA Board & Officers
As of SEC filings through Jun 25, 2025Directors 9
- Baudouin Prot · since Jun 19, 2018
- Djemi Traboulsi · since Jun 19, 2018
- Gregory P Wilson · since Jun 19, 2018
- James R Erwin · since Jun 19, 2018
- Karen Wendel · since Jun 19, 2018
- Philippe De Backer · since Jun 19, 2018
- Scott A. Reed · since Jun 19, 2018
- Robert S Miller · since Jan 7, 2021
- Tim T Chang · since Jan 7, 2021
Officers 4
- Philippe De Backer · Chief Executive Officer · since Jun 19, 2018
- Alberto Bianchinotti · Chief Financial Officer · since Jul 23, 2020
- Dilliana Stewart · Chief Accounting Officer · since Jun 29, 2022
- Franco Tenerelli · EVP, CLO & Secretary · since Jan 7, 2021
10% owners 2
- Landsea Holdings Corp (entity) · since Jan 7, 2021
- Ming Tian · since Jan 7, 2021
Changes in the last 10 years (61)
| Jun 25, 2025 | Thomas Hartfield reported in an SEC filing no longer being a director |
| Jun 25, 2025 | The company announced the departure of Qin Zhou from the board in an SEC filing |
| Jun 25, 2025 | Susan E. Lattmann reported in an SEC filing no longer being a director |
| Jun 25, 2025 | Rajinder Singh reported in an SEC filing no longer being a director |
| Jun 25, 2025 | Mollie Fadule reported in an SEC filing no longer being a director |
| Jun 25, 2025 | Michael Forsum reported in an SEC filing no longer being President and COO |
| Jun 25, 2025 | John Ho reported in an SEC filing no longer being a director |
| Jun 25, 2025 | John Ho reported in an SEC filing no longer being Chief Executive Officer |
| Jun 25, 2025 | Elias Farhat reported in an SEC filing no longer being a director |
| Jun 25, 2025 | Christopher T Porter reported in an SEC filing no longer being Chief Financial Officer |
| Jun 25, 2025 | Catharine Kelly Rentzel reported in an SEC filing no longer being General Counsel |
| Jun 25, 2025 | Bruce D Frank reported in an SEC filing no longer being a director |
| Dec 11, 2024 | Huaijun Chen reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Dec 9, 2024 | Rajinder Singh became a director |
| Oct 26, 2024 | The company announced the departure of Ming Tian from the board in an SEC filing |
| May 15, 2024 | Huaijun Chen became a 10% owner |
| Feb 28, 2024 | Catharine Kelly Rentzel became General Counsel |
| Sep 7, 2023 | Green Investment Alpha Ltd reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Mar 3, 2023 | Michael Forsum no longer listed as a director in SEC filings |
| Jun 29, 2022 | The company announced the departure of Trent Schreiner as SVP of Accounting and CAO in an SEC filing |
| Jun 29, 2022 | Dilliana Stewart became Chief Accounting Officer |
| Jun 16, 2022 | Level Field Capital, LLC reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Jun 14, 2022 | Landsea Holdings Corp no longer listed as Chief Executive Officer in SEC filings |
| Jun 2, 2022 | Landsea Holdings Corp first listed as Chief Executive Officer in an SEC filing |
| Jun 1, 2022 | Green Investment Alpha Ltd became a 10% owner |
| Apr 27, 2022 | Michael Forsum first listed as a director in an SEC filing |
| Dec 31, 2021 | Susan E. Lattmann became a director |
| Dec 31, 2021 | Mollie Fadule became a director |
| Dec 7, 2021 | Christopher T Porter became Chief Financial Officer |
| May 12, 2021 | Scott A. Reed no longer listed as Chief Financial Officer in SEC filings |
| May 12, 2021 | Elias Farhat no longer listed as a 10% owner in SEC filings |
| Jan 21, 2021 | Trent Schreiner became SVP of Accounting and CAO |
| Jan 11, 2021 | Elias Farhat first listed as a 10% owner in an SEC filing |
| Jan 7, 2021 | Tim T Chang became a director |
| Jan 7, 2021 | Thomas Hartfield became a director |
| Jan 7, 2021 | Robert S Miller became a director |
| Jan 7, 2021 | Qin Zhou became a director |
| Jan 7, 2021 | Ming Tian became a director |
| Jan 7, 2021 | Ming Tian became a 10% owner |
| Jan 7, 2021 | Michael Forsum became President and COO |
| Jan 7, 2021 | Landsea Holdings Corp became a 10% owner |
| Jan 7, 2021 | John Ho became a director |
| Jan 7, 2021 | John Ho became Chief Executive Officer |
| Jan 7, 2021 | Franco Tenerelli became EVP, CLO & Secretary |
| Jan 7, 2021 | Bruce D Frank became a director |
| Jul 23, 2020 | Alberto Bianchinotti became Chief Financial Officer |
| Jul 9, 2020 | Paul J Glazer reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Jul 9, 2020 | Glazer Capital, LLC reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Mar 9, 2020 | Paul J Glazer became a 10% owner |
| Mar 9, 2020 | Glazer Capital, LLC became a 10% owner |
| Jun 19, 2018 | Scott A. Reed became a director |
| Jun 19, 2018 | Scott A. Reed became Chief Financial Officer |
| Jun 19, 2018 | Philippe De Backer became a director |
| Jun 19, 2018 | Philippe De Backer became Chief Executive Officer |
| Jun 19, 2018 | Level Field Capital, LLC became a 10% owner |
| Jun 19, 2018 | Karen Wendel became a director |
| Jun 19, 2018 | James R Erwin became a director |
| Jun 19, 2018 | Gregory P Wilson became a director |
| Jun 19, 2018 | Elias Farhat became a director |
| Jun 19, 2018 | Djemi Traboulsi became a director |
| Jun 19, 2018 | Baudouin Prot became a director |
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LSEA Proposed Insider Sales (Form 144)
Latest: 2024-08-23What is Form 144? A notice of intent to sell restricted or control stock under Rule 144. Affiliates (officers, directors, 10%+ owners) and holders of restricted shares must file Form 144 when planning to sell more than 5,000 shares or $50,000 in any 3-month rolling window.
How it relates to Form 4: Form 144 is filed before the trade (up to 90 days in advance); Form 4 is filed within 2 business days after the trade executes. Not every Form 144 results in a sale — the filer may cancel or delay. Look for the corresponding Form 4 on the Insider Activity card to confirm a sale actually happened.
10b5-1 plans: Trades made under a pre-scheduled Rule 10b5-1 plan are not discretionary — they execute automatically on dates set months earlier, regardless of news. High 10b5-1 percentages mean less per-filing signal value, though cumulative selling volume still matters.
"Notice value": Aggregate market value the filer wrote into the Form 144 — i.e. the size of the planned sale, not necessarily the executed dollars. An amended notice (Form 144/A) replaces the original it amends, and cancelled notices are dropped, so neither is double-counted above. A filed value that is clearly inconsistent with the share count at the stock's price (a filer typo) shows as a dash and is left out of the totals.
Source & freshness: Sourced from public Form 144 filings. Refreshed daily; new filings typically appear here the morning after they are filed.
| Filed | Filer | Role | Shares | Notice Value | Planned Sale | Broker | Plan | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024-08-23 | Elias Farhat | Director | 60,000 | $724.1K | 2024-08-23 | UBS Financial Services Inc | — | EDGAR |
| 2024-08-08 | JOHN AND JOANNE HO FOUNDATION C/O JOANNE HO & JOHN HO | Officer | 100,935 | $1.11M | 2024-08-08 | Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC … | — | EDGAR |
| 2023-12-12 | Elias Farhat | Director | 7,840 | $93.3K | 2023-12-12 | UBS Financial Services Inc | — | EDGAR |
| 2023-12-11 | Elias Farhat | Director | 18,943 | $224.8K | 2023-12-11 | UBS Financial Services Inc | — | EDGAR |
| 2023-12-08 | Elias Farhat | Director | 8,394 | $99.9K | 2023-12-08 | UBS Financial Services Inc | — | EDGAR |
| 2023-08-08 | Elias Farhat | Director | 14,802 | $174.1K | 2023-08-08 | UBS Financial Services Inc | — | EDGAR |
| 2023-08-07 | Elias Farhar | Director | 4,992 | $60.6K | 2023-08-07 | UBS Financial Services Inc | — | EDGAR |
| # | ETF | Provider | Weight | $ Exposure | ETF AUM | As Of |
|---|
Quarterly filings sourced from SEC 10-Q / 10-K reports. TTM tiles aggregate the most recent four quarters; bars show the last ~12 quarters oldest → newest.
- Revenue — top-line sales. Look for consistent YoY growth; seasonal businesses need same-quarter comparisons (Q4 '24 vs Q4 '23).
- Net Income — bottom-line profit after all expenses. Can be volatile from one-time items; red bars = net loss.
- Diluted EPS — net income per share assuming options/converts are exercised. Direct input to the P/E ratio.
- Operating Cash Flow — cash generated from core operations, before capex and financing. Harder to manipulate than net income; growing OCF is a quality signal.
- Sequential growth — quarter-over-quarter trend. Accelerating bars are a momentum signal.
- YoY growth — compare to the same quarter a year earlier to remove seasonality.
- Quality — OCF should roughly track Net Income over time. Large divergence (net income ≫ OCF) flags accruals risk.
- Margins — scan the bar ratios: Net Income / Revenue tells you margin trend without needing a separate chart.
TTM (trailing-twelve-month) smooths seasonality and is used for the P/E calculation. Filings appear 30–90 days after the period closes.
Quarterly figures (12 quarters)
| Quarter | Period End | Revenue | Net Income | Diluted EPS | Op. Cash Flow |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Q1 '25 | 2025-03-31 | $310.81M | $-7.25M | $-0.20 | $-10.08M |
| Q4 '24 | 2024-12-31 | $486.68M | $3.05M | $0.08 | $47.82M |
| Q3 '24 | 2024-09-30 | $338.47M | $11.11M | $0.30 | $-18.61M |
| Q2 '24 | 2024-06-30 | $431.14M | $2.88M | $0.08 | $33.64M |
| Q1 '24 | 2024-03-31 | $294.04M | $190.00K | $0.01 | $-33.23M |
| Q4 '23 | 2023-12-31 | $397.62M | $12.47M | $0.33 | $25.05M |
| Q3 '23 | 2023-09-30 | $277.35M | $8.60M | $0.22 | $13.53M |
| Q2 '23 | 2023-06-30 | $293.24M | $4.95M | $0.12 | $-16.89M |
| Q1 '23 | 2023-03-31 | $241.74M | $3.22M | $0.08 | $5.48M |
| Q4 '22 | 2022-12-31 | $425.96M | $23.88M | $0.61 | $99.19M |
| Q3 '22 | 2022-09-30 | $335.58M | $19.97M | $0.49 | $-35.24M |
| Q2 '22 | 2022-06-30 | $368.68M | $14.94M | $0.34 | $-15.81M |
Ratios derived from TTM financials and the current market price, sampled daily. History chart shows how expensive the stock is today relative to its own recent past.
- P/E — price / TTM earnings. Rough market rule: 10–15 value, 15–25 market, >30 growth/premium. Negative when earnings are negative.
- P/B — price / book value. Useful for financials and asset-heavy names; meaningless for asset-light software.
- P/S — price / TTM revenue. Useful when earnings are negative or noisy (early-stage growth).
- EV/EBITDA — capital-structure-neutral. <10 cheap, 10–15 reasonable, >20 rich. Good for comparing across leverage profiles.
- EV/Sales — like P/S but accounts for debt + cash. Compare within sector.
- ROE — return on equity. >15% strong, >25% exceptional. Caution: high leverage inflates ROE.
- ROA — return on assets. Leverage-neutral; >5% solid, >10% exceptional.
- Div Yield — annual dividend / price. Compare to 10Y Treasury; sustained yield >6% often signals distress.
- FCF Yield — free cash flow / market cap. >5% is attractive; negative means burning cash.
- Debt/Equity — leverage. <1 conservative, >2 aggressive. Sector-dependent (utilities naturally high, tech low).
- Current Ratio — short-term liquidity. >1.5 comfortable, <1 raises short-term solvency flags.
- Compare current level to the 3-year band: near the high end = relatively expensive; near the low = relatively cheap.
- Multiples expanding while earnings are flat = sentiment-driven rally.
- Multiples compressing while earnings grow = value coming from fundamentals.
LSEA vs Peers
Related companies, largest first| Company | Market cap | P/E | Revenue growth | YTD | IV rank |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DHI D.R. Horton Inc. | $41.3B | 14.7 | −5.6% | +7.8% | 41 |
| PHM Pultegroup, Inc. | $25.2B | 14.0 | −7.3% | +15.1% | 43 |
| NVR NVR, Inc. | $16.7B | — | — | −12.2% | — |
| TOL Toll Brothers, Inc. | $14.1B | 12.0 | +3.6% | +16.5% | 70 |
| TMHC Taylor Morrison Home Corporation Common | $6.7B | 10.8 | −9.0% | +23.2% | — |
| MTH Meritage Homes Corporation | $4.4B | 15.9 | −14.9% | +6.5% | 28 |
| TPH Tri Pointe Homes, Inc. | $4.0B | 22.4 | −24.3% | +48.7% | — |
| ECG Everus Construction Group, Inc. | $3.9B | 17.0 | +30.5% | −5.0% | 56 |
| LSEA Landsea Homes Corporation Common Stock | $411M | 43.5 | — | +36.6% | — |
| Peer median | $10.4B | 14.7 | −7.3% | +11.5% | 43 |
P/E uses the latest reported trailing-12-month diluted EPS; "—" means no positive earnings or no data.
Regulatory short-interest reports publish on a bi-weekly settlement cadence; short-volume is reported daily by the trade-reporting facilities. Float is derived from insider-ownership filings.
- Short Interest — total shares currently sold short as of the settlement date. Lags real time by ~8 business days.
- SI % of Float — short interest / free float. The key crowding metric.
- Days to Cover — short interest / avg daily volume. How many full trading days it would take shorts to buy back. High DTC + catalyst = squeeze fuel.
- Short Vol Ratio — today's short-sale volume / total volume. Intraday selling pressure proxy (not the same as short interest).
- Free Float — shares available for public trading (total shares minus insider / restricted).
- Float % — free float / shares outstanding. <50% = tightly held, more prone to squeezes.
- SI % of Float < 5% — typical, no particular signal.
- 5–15% — elevated; watch for catalysts (earnings, guidance, macro).
- 15–30% — heavily shorted; tight-float names in this range have produced notable squeezes historically.
- >30% — extreme; borrow is likely expensive and squeeze risk is material.
- Days to Cover > 5 combined with high SI% amplifies squeeze potential.
- Trend matters more than level. Rapidly rising short interest often precedes negative catalysts or heavy hedging.
- A sudden drop in SI after a rally may indicate a squeeze in progress.
Short interest is reported mid-month and end-of-month; short volume is daily.