MODG Topgolf Callaway Brands Corp.
XNYS 14.79 DelayedStock quote, options chain, IV rank, technicals, AI analysis, and institutional ownership. Iron condor setups Fibonacci levels Insider trading
Market data may be delayed, incomplete, or inaccurate. Not a recommendation to buy, sell, or hold any security. Verify quotes with your broker before trading. See Terms §17.
- 52-Week Range
- $8.71 – $15.02
- YTD
- +26.24%
- Straddle Price
- $1.88
- P/C Vol Ratio
- 0.05
- Market Cap
- $2.7B
- Open
- $14.68
- Day Range
- $14.68 – $14.68
- Prev Close
- $14.68
A blended fair-value estimate combining up to six valuation methods. Each method is weighted by how well it fits the company — DCF down-weights for unprofitable names; DDM only fires for steady dividend payers; comparables down-weight when peer multiples disagree.
- DCF (quality-aware) — projects free cash flow with a horizon that scales to business quality. True compounders (quality 6/6) get 10 years explicit + 10 years fade before terminal; cyclical/struggling names (quality 0-1) get a 5-year terminal cliff. Quality is scored from ROE, gross margin, growth, FCF margin, debt load, and FCF consistency — the same factors that drive market premium for compounders.
- Market-Implied Growth (in Model Inputs) — reverse-DCF that answers "what growth rate is the market pricing in?". Lets you sanity-check the deviation: if implied growth is plausible for the business, the model's bearish flag may be wrong; if implausible, the market may be over-extrapolating.
- DDM (Gordon Growth Dividend Model) — values the stream of future dividends. Only used when trailing yield ≥ 2% and dividend payments are stable — below that the dividend is a token payout and Gordon (which values only the dividend stream) systematically underprices growth names, so those route to DCF + comparables + market anchor instead.
- P/E, EV/EBITDA, P/B, P/S — applies the peer-group median multiple to this company's per-share metric. Peers come from the same set as the "Related symbols" card. Earnings/sales metrics are forward-tilted by the company's recent revenue growth (capped at 25%) so they're comparable to peers' growth-embedded multiples — mimics how analysts use NTM rather than TTM. Per-multiple weights are biased by company quality (e.g. P/B down-weighted for asset-light tech).
- Market Anchor (SMA50) — the 50-day moving average, weighted by recent trading-range stability (tighter Bollinger bands → higher weight). Captures information fundamentals miss (forward consensus, sentiment, supply/demand) — but only when recent trading is steady enough that the market has converged on a view. During wild breakouts or breakdowns the anchor's weight collapses.
- Options Expected (B-L 30d) — the risk-neutral expected stock price at 30-day options expiration, derived from the full implied-volatility surface via Breeden-Litzenberger (second derivative of call price wrt strike → implied PDF, then E[S_T]). Forward-looking, captures all options-implied information (smile, skew, term structure) in one number. Weighted by chain liquidity. SP500-only at present (pre-computed daily). Backtest evidence: adds modest alpha across most bucket × holding combos.
- Blended value — weighted average. Confidence reflects how many methods fired and how tight peer dispersion is.
- Deviation pill — green when blended FV ≥ 10% above current price (undervalued); red when ≥ 10% below; grey otherwise.
| 10-yr Treasury (rf) | 4.00% |
| Beta vs SPY | 1.00 |
| Cost of Equity (CAPM) | 9.50% (VRP-adj) |
| WACC | 8.40% |
| Volatility Risk Premium | +99.0pp (IV − HV30), ERP adj +50bps |
| Effective Tax Rate | 32.6% |
| Rev. Growth (YoY, DCF input) | -10.0% |
| DCF Horizon | 10 years explicit + fade |
| Free Cash Flow (TTM) | $0.3B |
| Return on Equity (TTM) | 0.4% |
| Book / Price | 74.9% — banking bias active (P/B is primary) |
| Gross Margin (TTM) | 59.6% |
| FCF Margin (TTM) | 11.4% |
| Debt / Equity | 0.31 |
| Quality Score | 2/6 — normal (10y DCF) |
| Market-Implied Growth | -9.8% (reverse-DCF on current price) |
| SMA 50 | $12.59 (Market Anchor value) |
| SMA 20 / Bollinger Mid | $14.14 |
| Bollinger Width / SMA20 | 162.4% (drives anchor stability) |
| Net Debt | $-0.3B |
| Market Cap | $3B |
| Method | Implied Price | Weight | Detail |
|---|---|---|---|
| DCF | $14.49 | 37% | |
| DDM (Gordon) | n/a | 0% | |
| Peer P/E | n/a | 0% | |
| Peer EV/EBITDA | n/a | 0% | |
| Peer P/B | n/a | 0% | |
| Peer P/S | n/a | 0% | |
| Market Anchor (SMA50) | $12.59 | 63% | stability 85% (BB-width) |
| Options Expected (B-L 30d) | n/a | 0% |
- Industry (SIC)
- SPORTING & ATHLETIC GOODS, NEC (3949) · industry map
- Exchange
- XNYS
- Market Cap
- $2.7B
- Employees
- 30,000
- List Date
- 1992-02-28
- CIK
- 0000837465
- Headquarters
- Carlsbad, CA
- Homepage
- https://www.topgolfcallawaybrands.com
Topgolf Callaway Brands Corp is a modern golf and active lifestyle company that provides world-class golf entertainment experiences, designs and manufactures premium golf equipment, and sells golf and active lifestyle apparel and other accessories through brands such as, Topgolf, Callaway Golf, Odyssey, TravisMathew, Jack Wolfskin, OGIO and Toptracer. The company's reportable segments are; Topgolf, Golf Equipment and Active Lifestyle. Majority of the revenue is generated from its Topgolf segment which is predominantly comprised of service revenues and expenses from the company operated Topgolf…
Each spoke is this symbol's rank within its sector (0–100; the dotted ring marks the sector median at 50). Higher is more constructive for a long. One spoke — News sentiment — is an absolute reading, not a sector rank. Grayed spokes have no data. A fuller shape is a summary, not a recommendation.
Quick-reference for reading the values below. Indicators combine to confirm a view — no single one is a trade signal on its own.
- SMA 20 / 50 / 200 — price above = uptrend, below = downtrend. SMA 50 crossing SMA 200 is the golden/death cross.
- EMA 12 / 26 — faster-reacting averages; 12 above 26 is short-term bullish.
- MACD — bullish when MACD > signal (green badge), bearish when below. Divergence from price often precedes reversals.
- ADX (14) — trend strength regardless of direction. <20 range, 20–25 weak trend, 25–50 trend, >50 strong trend.
- +DI / −DI — +DI > −DI favors bulls; the reverse favors bears. Read alongside ADX.
- RSI (14) — <30 oversold, >70 overbought. 40–60 is neutral; trending names can stay extreme.
- Stochastic %K / %D — <20 oversold, >80 overbought. %K crossing %D is an early momentum signal.
- Williams %R — inverted scale: <−80 oversold, >−20 overbought.
Oscillators work best in range-bound markets; in strong trends they give premature reversal signals.
- Bollinger Bands — price at upper band = overbought, lower = oversold. Narrow bands (squeeze) often precede expansion.
- OBV — cumulative volume; rising OBV confirms uptrend, falling OBV confirms downtrend. Divergence from price is a warning.
- Vol SMA 20 / Vol ROC — today's volume vs. 20-day average. Positive ROC with price move = conviction.
- ATR / True Range — average daily $ move; sizing and stop-loss reference.
- HV 20 / 30 / 60 — realized (historical) volatility. Compare to IV on the options cards: IV > HV = rich premium.
Confluence matters: trend + momentum + volume agreeing carries far more weight than any single indicator. For how these feed the spread scanner score, see the algorithm docs →
Trend Indicators
Momentum Oscillators
Volume & Volatility
Data Summary
Click Frenzy-Pro™ for an AI analysis of this ticker.
Analysis includes technical indicators, news sentiment, risk assessment, and specific price levels to watch.
| Earnings Date | Timing | Expected Move | Actual Move | Ratio | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022-11-03 | After-Close | 11.19% | 7.86% | 0.70x | Within |
| 2023-02-09 | After-Close | 8.20% | 2.61% | 0.32x | Within |
| 2023-05-09 | After-Close | 7.99% | 13.12% | 1.64x | Exceeded |
| 2023-08-08 | After-Close | 11.23% | 7.07% | 0.63x | Within |
| 2023-11-08 | After-Close | 11.73% | 16.87% | 1.44x | Exceeded |
| 2024-02-13 | After-Close | 14.49% | 11.60% | 0.80x | Within |
| 2024-05-08 | After-Close | 11.50% | 6.73% | 0.59x | Within |
| 2024-08-07 | unknown | 13.30% | 9.73% | 0.73x | Within |
| 2024-11-12 | After-Close | 19.86% | 9.22% | 0.46x | Within |
| 2025-02-24 | After-Close | 27.24% | 0.30% | 0.01x | Within |
| 2025-05-12 | After-Close | 13.92% | 17.09% | 1.23x | Exceeded |
| 2025-08-06 | After-Close | 17.06% | 8.76% | 0.51x | Within |
| 2025-11-06 | After-Close | 18.88% | 14.35% | 0.76x | Within |
Earnings calendar: this week’s reports with expected vs actual moves →
MODG Options Activity & IV Rank
Volatility Metrics
Options Flow
ATM Options Pricing
Chain Summary
Each spread is ranked by a composite score built in three stages. Full documentation →
score = P(profit) × (credit / spread_width)
P(profit) from short leg delta (1 − |delta|), penalised above 85%. Credit uses mid-price to handle illiquid chains fairly.
RR and BF (30-delta) from the persisted per-symbol skew snapshot — wing strikes picked by real greeks.delta, not a moneyness proxy. Put skew boosts bull puts, penalises bear calls. High butterfly boosts iron condors. Calendars are skew-neutral.
- RSI <40 bullish / >60 bearish
- MACD crossover + histogram trend
- Price vs SMA 50 & SMA 200
- Stochastic %K <20 / >80
- Williams %R <−80 / >−20
- Blended ATR + straddle expected-move penalty
- Bollinger Band signal (+ counter-trend penalty)
- BB width — vol contraction boost for ICs
- IV rank ≥ 75 → strong boost for credit spreads
- IV rank < 25 → penalty (selling cheap vol)
- Min open interest across all legs
- OI < 100 → −0.10 · OI < 500 → −0.05
score = base_score × skew_multiplier × tech_multiplier
Both multipliers are shown per spread. Beta is informational only — ATR already captures realized vol. Full algorithm documentation →
Enter a ticker to scan for optimal spread opportunities.
Evaluates all bull put, bear call, iron condor, and calendar spread combinations using GPU-accelerated analysis.
Estimated net dealer gamma is at the 0th percentile of this name's own daily history, near the low end of its range. This describes current positioning; it is not a forecast or a trading signal.
Net dealer gamma is an estimate of the aggregate gamma held by options market makers across this name's option chain, weighted by open interest. Dealer positions aren't public, so it uses a standard simplifying assumption: dealers are treated as long the calls and short the puts that are open. Actual dealer books can differ.
Gamma percentile ranks today's estimate against this name's own daily history, from 0% (the lowest reading on record) to 100% (the highest). Raw gamma scales with how much open interest a chain carries, so it isn't comparable across names; the percentile is. The badge marks the bottom 20% as low and the top 20% as high.
Tilts run from −1 to +1 and show how lopsided the estimated dealer exposure is. GEX tilt compares call gamma with put gamma. Vanna tilt describes how the hedge would shift if implied volatility changed, and charm tilt how it would shift with the passage of time.
This card describes estimated positioning and where it sits historically. It is not a forecast of price direction or volatility and not a trading signal. Market-wide view: Dealer positioning screener.
IV(put wing) − IV(ATM), in vol pointsHow much the OTM put trades above (or below) the at-the-money strike. Measures the height of the put-side tail relative to ATM — i.e. how expensive crash insurance is on this name.
- Positive (typical) — wing IV > ATM IV. Standard equity put skew: portfolios bid up crash protection, so OTM puts trade richer than ATM.
- Near zero or negative (unusual) — wing IV ≤ ATM IV. Flat or inverted put side. Common when there's no fear demand, in tightly mean-reverting names, or right after an earnings catalyst clears.
- Percentile vs own 3-yr history: high = wings rich (good time to sell wing premium); low = wings cheap (good time to buy protection).
- Not directional — high or low wings don't predict up or down moves. It's a price tag on tail insurance, not a forecast.
IV(call wing) − IV(put wing), equal delta on each sideWhich side of the smile is the market paying up for? Measures the tilt of the surface — call skew vs put skew at matched deltas.
- Negative (typical) — puts richer than calls. Standard equity behavior: hedging demand makes puts carry a premium. Most large-caps sit in the −1 to −5 vol-point range.
- Strongly negative (< −5 pts) — heavy downside hedging, elevated fear, or an upcoming catalyst (earnings, FDA, macro event). Worth flagging.
- Positive — calls richer than puts. Unusual for equities; signals bullish momentum, short-squeeze positioning, or takeover/M&A speculation.
- Near zero — symmetric surface. Market sees roughly equal up/down risk. Rare for large-caps; more common in commodities and FX.
Wing-vs-ATM tells you how expensive the tails are. Risk Reversal tells you which side is favored. Combined:
- High wing percentile + deeply negative RR → strong put bid; stress or major event priced in. Owning protection costs a premium; selling put premium is dangerous.
- Low wing percentile + near-zero RR → complacency; insurance cheap and balanced. Good environment to add cheap downside hedges.
- Positive RR + elevated wings → call-side fear-of-missing-out; common in squeeze setups. Upside calls expensive, downside puts not bid.
Percentile is the rank of today's reading within ~3 years of this symbol's own history. High percentile = wings are rich relative to history; not a directional signal. Skew is read off the chain in real time, not from CBOE SKEW.
Enter a ticker to render the implied volatility surface.
Enter a ticker to render the implied volatility smile.
MODG Institutional Ownership (13F)
Institutional managers with $100M+ AUM file Form 13F-HR quarterly, due 45 days after quarter end. Holdings are reported gross at quarter-end market value — they are a snapshot, not a real-time position.
- Shares — long equity positions in this name, aggregated across share classes.
- Calls / Puts — notional value of long call / put exposure where this ticker is the underlying.
- % of Float — holder's reported shares divided by the latest diluted shares outstanding. Sums above 100% indicate large custodian / prime broker positions where the same shares are reported by multiple filers.
- Custodian badge — filers with more than 5,000 holdings are typically broker-dealers / custodians reporting customer-held shares, not active managers.
Each filer is counted once at its latest 13F-HR filing. New filings are ingested on a weekly cadence.
| # | Filer | Notional Value | % of Total | Period |
|---|
| # | Filer | Notional Value | % of Total | Period |
|---|
MODG Insider Trading (Form 4)
Latest: 2026-01-02| Filed | Reporter | Role | Action | Shares | Avg Price | Net $ | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-01-02 | Rebecca Fine | EVP, Global CPO | Mixed | +49,104 | $11.67 | -$266.2K | EDGAR |
| 2025-12-16 | Varsha Rajendra Rao | Director | Award (A) | +2,169 | — | EDGAR | |
| 2025-12-16 | Adebayo O. Ogunlesi | Director | Award (A) | +2,386 | — | EDGAR | |
| 2025-12-16 | Russell L Fleischer | Director | Award (A) | +2,494 | — | EDGAR | |
| 2025-09-15 | Adebayo O. Ogunlesi | Director | Award (A) | +2,862 | — | EDGAR | |
| 2025-09-15 | Russell L Fleischer | Director | Award (A) | +2,992 | — | EDGAR | |
| 2025-09-15 | Varsha Rajendra Rao | Director | Award (A) | +2,602 | — | EDGAR | |
| 2025-08-28 | Mark F Leposky | EVP,Chief Supply Chain Officer | Grant (A) | +37,879 RSU | — | EDGAR | |
| 2025-08-28 | Oliver G Brewer III | President and CEO | Grant (A) | +216,451 RSU | — | EDGAR | |
| 2025-08-28 | Glenn F. Hickey | EVP & Pres., Callaway Golf | Grant (A) | +37,879 RSU | — | EDGAR | |
| 2025-08-28 | Brian P. Lynch | EVP, CFO | Grant (A) | +54,113 RSU | — | EDGAR | |
| 2025-08-28 | Rebecca Fine | EVP, Global CPO | Grant (A) | +17,317 RSU | — | EDGAR | |
| 2025-08-28 | Jennifer L. Thomas | SVP, Chief Accounting Officer | Grant (A) | +6,494 RSU | — | EDGAR | |
| 2025-08-12 | Artie Starrs | CEO, Topgolf | Sell (S) | −106,734 | $8.64 | -$921.8K | EDGAR |
| 2025-08-12 | Erik J Anderson | Director | Sell (S) | −25,704 | $9.25 | -$237.8K | EDGAR |
MODG Insider Holdings
18 insiders · @ $14.68| # | Insider | Role | Shares | Disclosed Exposure | Lifetime OM Net | Filings | Last Filed |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Adebayo O. Ogunlesi | Director | 982,006 | $14.42M | $7.48M | 22 | 2025-12-16 |
| 2 | Erik J Anderson | Director | 781,066 | $11.47M | -$3.19M | 14 | 2025-08-12 |
| 3 | Mark F Leposky | EVP,Chief Supply Chain Officer | 323,496 | $4.75M | $0 | 12 | 2025-08-28 |
| 4 | Brian P. Lynch | EVP, CFO | 289,735 | $4.25M | $494.7K | 15 | 2025-08-28 |
| 5 | Oliver G Brewer III | President and CEO | 189,653 | $2.78M | $1.33M | 24 | 2025-08-28 |
| 6 | Artie Starrs | CEO, Topgolf | 152,356 | $2.24M | -$921.8K | 13 | 2025-08-12 |
| 7 | Russell L Fleischer | Director | 133,484 | $1.96M | $292.8K | 21 | 2025-12-16 |
| 8 | John F Lundgren | Director | 102,410 | $1.50M | $0 | 5 | 2025-05-30 |
| 9 | Glenn F. Hickey | EVP & Pres., Callaway Golf | 93,367 | $1.37M | $68.6K | 12 | 2025-08-28 |
| 10 | Anthony S Thornley | Director | 88,784 | $1.30M | $0 | 5 | 2025-05-30 |
MODG Board & Officers
As of SEC filings through Sep 16, 2026Directors 8
- Anthony S Thornley · on file since May 2006
- John F Lundgren · since Mar 4, 2009
- Adebayo O. Ogunlesi · since Jan 25, 2010
- Oliver G Brewer III · listed since Nov 2012
- Linda B Segre · since Aug 4, 2015
- Russell L Fleischer · since May 8, 2018
- Bavan Holloway · since Dec 6, 2021
- Mark D. Mandel · since May 21, 2026
Officers 7
- Oliver G Brewer III · President and CEO · since Mar 5, 2012
- Brian P. Lynch · EVP, CFO · listed since Feb 2019
- Jennifer L. Thomas · SVP, Chief Accounting Officer · listed since Mar 2022
- Mark F Leposky · EVP,Chief Supply Chain Officer · listed since Apr 2024
- Angela J. Deskins · EVP, Chief People Officer · since Feb 25, 2026
- Glenn F. Hickey · EVP & Pres., Callaway Sales · listed since Feb 2026
- Timothy R. Reed · EVP, R&D and Tour · since Feb 25, 2026
10% owners 1
- Thomas G. Dundon · listed since Jun 2023
Changes in the last 10 years (62)
| May 21, 2026 | Varsha Rajendra Rao reported in an SEC filing no longer being a director |
| May 21, 2026 | Mark D. Mandel became a director |
| May 21, 2026 | Erik J Anderson reported in an SEC filing no longer being a director |
| Feb 25, 2026 | Timothy R. Reed became EVP, R&D and Tour |
| Feb 25, 2026 | Angela J. Deskins became EVP, Chief People Officer |
| Feb 23, 2026 | Glenn F. Hickey listed as EVP & Pres., Callaway Sales (previously EVP & Pres., Callaway Golf) in SEC filings |
| Jan 28, 2026 | PEP TG Investments GP LLC reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Jan 28, 2026 | Michael J Dominguez reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Jan 2, 2026 | Rebecca Fine reported in an SEC filing no longer being EVP, Global CPO |
| Dec 2, 2025 | The company announced the departure of C. Matthew Turney from the board in an SEC filing |
| Aug 25, 2025 | The company announced the departure of Scott M. Marimow from the board in an SEC filing |
| Jul 29, 2025 | The company announced the departure of Artie Starrs as CEO, Topgolf in an SEC filing |
| May 30, 2025 | Laura Jean Flanagan reported in an SEC filing no longer being a director |
| Jun 4, 2024 | Glenn F. Hickey listed as EVP & Pres., Callaway Golf (previously EVP, Callaway Golf) in SEC filings |
| Apr 24, 2024 | Mark F Leposky listed as EVP,Chief Supply Chain Officer (previously EVP, Global Operations) in SEC filings |
| Jun 15, 2023 | Thomas G. Dundon first listed as a 10% owner in an SEC filing |
| Jun 6, 2023 | C. Matthew Turney became a director |
| May 22, 2023 | Rebecca Fine listed as EVP, Global CPO (previously EVP, Chief People Officer) in SEC filings |
| Mar 28, 2023 | The company announced the departure of Thomas G. Dundon from the board in an SEC filing |
| Feb 21, 2023 | The company announced the departure of Scott H Baxter from the board in an SEC filing |
| Feb 21, 2023 | The company announced the departure of Samuel H Armacost from the board in an SEC filing |
| Mar 15, 2022 | Varsha Rajendra Rao became a director |
| Mar 10, 2022 | Jennifer L. Thomas listed as SVP, Chief Accounting Officer (previously Chief Accounting Officer) in SEC filings |
| Feb 25, 2022 | Rebecca Fine became EVP, Chief People Officer |
| Dec 6, 2021 | Bavan Holloway became a director |
| May 19, 2021 | Erik J Anderson no longer listed as a 10% owner in SEC filings |
| Apr 5, 2021 | Artie Starrs became CEO, Topgolf |
| Mar 18, 2021 | WestRiver Management, LLC reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Mar 18, 2021 | Tgp Investors, LLC reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Mar 18, 2021 | Tgp Investors II, LLC reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Mar 18, 2021 | TGP Manager, LLC reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Mar 18, 2021 | TGP Advisors, LLC reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Mar 9, 2021 | Erik J Anderson first on file as a 10% owner |
| Mar 8, 2021 | WestRiver Management, LLC became a 10% owner |
| Mar 8, 2021 | Thomas G. Dundon became a director |
| Mar 8, 2021 | Tgp Investors, LLC became a 10% owner |
| Mar 8, 2021 | Tgp Investors II, LLC became a 10% owner |
| Mar 8, 2021 | TGP Manager, LLC became a 10% owner |
| Mar 8, 2021 | TGP Advisors, LLC became a 10% owner |
| Mar 8, 2021 | Scott M. Marimow became a director |
| Mar 8, 2021 | PEP TG Investments LP became a 10% owner |
| Mar 8, 2021 | PEP TG Investments GP LLC became a 10% owner |
| Mar 8, 2021 | Michael J Dominguez became a 10% owner |
| Mar 8, 2021 | Erik J Anderson became a director |
| Mar 8, 2021 | DDFS Partnership LP became a 10% owner |
| Mar 8, 2021 | DDFS Management Co LLC became a 10% owner |
| Feb 21, 2020 | Joseph B. Flannery became EVP, Apparel & Soft Goods |
| Nov 21, 2019 | Scott H Baxter became a director |
| Feb 7, 2019 | Brian P. Lynch listed as EVP, CFO (previously SVP, CF0, GC & Corp. Secretary) in SEC filings |
| Feb 1, 2019 | Richard H. Arnett listed as EVP, Glb. Mktg. & CGC Brands (previously SVP, Glb. Mktg. & Pres., OGIO) in SEC filings |
| Feb 1, 2019 | Neil Howie reported in an SEC filing no longer being Managing Director, EMEA |
| Feb 1, 2019 | Mark F Leposky listed as EVP, Global Operations (previously Sr. VP of Global Operations) in SEC filings |
| Feb 1, 2019 | Alex Mitchell Boezeman reported in an SEC filing no longer being Managing Director, East Asia |
| Feb 1, 2019 | Alan Hocknell reported in an SEC filing no longer being SVP, Research & Development |
| Jan 7, 2019 | Melody Harris-Jensbach became CEO, Jack Wolfskin |
| Jan 7, 2019 | Glenn F. Hickey became EVP, Callaway Golf |
| Nov 6, 2018 | Laura Jean Flanagan became a director |
| May 8, 2018 | Russell L Fleischer became a director |
| Aug 3, 2017 | Brian P. Lynch listed as SVP, CF0, GC & Corp. Secretary (previously SVP, G.C. & Corp Secretary) in SEC filings |
| May 3, 2017 | Richard L Rosenfield reported in an SEC filing no longer being a director |
| Apr 25, 2017 | Robert K. Julian left as SVP, C.f.o., per their own SEC filing |
| Feb 6, 2017 | Richard H. Arnett became SVP, Glb. Mktg. & Pres., OGIO |
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Not reported recently (8)
- Joseph B. Flannery · Last reported as EVP, Apparel & Soft Goods in an SEC filing dated Feb 8, 2024
- PEP TG Investments LP · Last reported as a 10% owner in an SEC filing dated Nov 17, 2021
- John C Cushman III · Last reported as a director in an SEC filing dated May 12, 2021
- DDFS Partnership LP · Last reported as a 10% owner in an SEC filing dated Mar 9, 2021
- DDFS Management Co LLC · Last reported as a 10% owner in an SEC filing dated Mar 9, 2021
- Ronald S Beard · Last reported as a director in an SEC filing dated May 8, 2020
- Richard H. Arnett · Last reported as EVP, Glb. Mktg. & CGC Brands in an SEC filing dated Aug 9, 2019
- Melody Harris-Jensbach · Last reported as CEO, Jack Wolfskin in an SEC filing dated Feb 12, 2019
| # | ETF | Provider | Weight | $ Exposure | ETF AUM | As Of |
|---|
Quarterly filings sourced from SEC 10-Q / 10-K reports. TTM tiles aggregate the most recent four quarters; bars show the last ~12 quarters oldest → newest.
- Revenue — top-line sales. Look for consistent YoY growth; seasonal businesses need same-quarter comparisons (Q4 '24 vs Q4 '23).
- Net Income — bottom-line profit after all expenses. Can be volatile from one-time items; red bars = net loss.
- Diluted EPS — net income per share assuming options/converts are exercised. Direct input to the P/E ratio.
- Operating Cash Flow — cash generated from core operations, before capex and financing. Harder to manipulate than net income; growing OCF is a quality signal.
- Sequential growth — quarter-over-quarter trend. Accelerating bars are a momentum signal.
- YoY growth — compare to the same quarter a year earlier to remove seasonality.
- Quality — OCF should roughly track Net Income over time. Large divergence (net income ≫ OCF) flags accruals risk.
- Margins — scan the bar ratios: Net Income / Revenue tells you margin trend without needing a separate chart.
TTM (trailing-twelve-month) smooths seasonality and is used for the P/E calculation. Filings appear 30–90 days after the period closes.
Quarterly figures (12 quarters)
| Quarter | Period End | Revenue | Net Income | Diluted EPS | Op. Cash Flow |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Q4 '25 | 2025-12-31 | $-1.08B | $-417.00M | $-2.24 | $63.90M |
| Q3 '25 | 2025-09-30 | $934.00M | $-14.70M | $-0.08 | $228.40M |
| Q2 '25 | 2025-06-30 | $1.11B | $20.30M | $0.11 | $126.90M |
| Q1 '25 | 2025-03-31 | $629.60M | $2.10M | $0.02 | $-85.20M |
| Q4 '24 | 2024-12-31 | $924.40M | $-1.51B | $-8.23 | $43.30M |
| Q3 '24 | 2024-09-30 | $1.01B | $-3.60M | $-0.02 | $187.30M |
| Q2 '24 | 2024-06-30 | $1.16B | $62.10M | $0.32 | $224.70M |
| Q1 '24 | 2024-03-31 | $1.14B | $6.50M | $0.04 | $-73.30M |
| Q4 '23 | 2023-12-31 | $897.10M | $-77.10M | $-0.38 | $137.00M |
| Q3 '23 | 2023-09-30 | $1.04B | $29.70M | $0.16 | $249.50M |
| Q2 '23 | 2023-06-30 | $1.18B | $117.40M | $0.59 | $130.30M |
| Q1 '23 | 2023-03-31 | $1.17B | $25.00M | $0.13 | $-152.10M |
Ratios derived from TTM financials and the current market price, sampled daily. History chart shows how expensive the stock is today relative to its own recent past.
- P/E — price / TTM earnings. Rough market rule: 10–15 value, 15–25 market, >30 growth/premium. Negative when earnings are negative.
- P/B — price / book value. Useful for financials and asset-heavy names; meaningless for asset-light software.
- P/S — price / TTM revenue. Useful when earnings are negative or noisy (early-stage growth).
- EV/EBITDA — capital-structure-neutral. <10 cheap, 10–15 reasonable, >20 rich. Good for comparing across leverage profiles.
- EV/Sales — like P/S but accounts for debt + cash. Compare within sector.
- ROE — return on equity. >15% strong, >25% exceptional. Caution: high leverage inflates ROE.
- ROA — return on assets. Leverage-neutral; >5% solid, >10% exceptional.
- Div Yield — annual dividend / price. Compare to 10Y Treasury; sustained yield >6% often signals distress.
- FCF Yield — free cash flow / market cap. >5% is attractive; negative means burning cash.
- Debt/Equity — leverage. <1 conservative, >2 aggressive. Sector-dependent (utilities naturally high, tech low).
- Current Ratio — short-term liquidity. >1.5 comfortable, <1 raises short-term solvency flags.
- Compare current level to the 3-year band: near the high end = relatively expensive; near the low = relatively cheap.
- Multiples expanding while earnings are flat = sentiment-driven rally.
- Multiples compressing while earnings grow = value coming from fundamentals.
Regulatory short-interest reports publish on a bi-weekly settlement cadence; short-volume is reported daily by the trade-reporting facilities. Float is derived from insider-ownership filings.
- Short Interest — total shares currently sold short as of the settlement date. Lags real time by ~8 business days.
- SI % of Float — short interest / free float. The key crowding metric.
- Days to Cover — short interest / avg daily volume. How many full trading days it would take shorts to buy back. High DTC + catalyst = squeeze fuel.
- Short Vol Ratio — today's short-sale volume / total volume. Intraday selling pressure proxy (not the same as short interest).
- Free Float — shares available for public trading (total shares minus insider / restricted).
- Float % — free float / shares outstanding. <50% = tightly held, more prone to squeezes.
- SI % of Float < 5% — typical, no particular signal.
- 5–15% — elevated; watch for catalysts (earnings, guidance, macro).
- 15–30% — heavily shorted; tight-float names in this range have produced notable squeezes historically.
- >30% — extreme; borrow is likely expensive and squeeze risk is material.
- Days to Cover > 5 combined with high SI% amplifies squeeze potential.
- Trend matters more than level. Rapidly rising short interest often precedes negative catalysts or heavy hedging.
- A sudden drop in SI after a rally may indicate a squeeze in progress.
Short interest is reported mid-month and end-of-month; short volume is daily.