OS OneStream, Inc. Class A Common Stock
XNAS
24.00
Delayed
Stock quote, options chain, IV rank, technicals, AI analysis, and institutional ownership. Iron condor setups Expected move IV rank history Fibonacci levels Insider trading
Market data may be delayed, incomplete, or inaccurate. Not a recommendation to buy, sell, or hold any security. Verify quotes with your broker before trading. See Terms §17.
- 52-Week Range
- $16.91 – $24.04
- YTD
- +35.44%
- IV Rank (30D)
- 46.28
- Straddle Price
- $3.60
- P/C Vol Ratio
- 47.43
- Market Cap
- $4.6B
- Open
- $24.00
- Day Range
- $23.99 – $24.01
- Volume
- 2,715,484
- Prev Close
- $24.00
A blended fair-value estimate combining up to six valuation methods. Each method is weighted by how well it fits the company — DCF down-weights for unprofitable names; DDM only fires for steady dividend payers; comparables down-weight when peer multiples disagree.
- DCF (quality-aware) — projects free cash flow with a horizon that scales to business quality. True compounders (quality 6/6) get 10 years explicit + 10 years fade before terminal; cyclical/struggling names (quality 0-1) get a 5-year terminal cliff. Quality is scored from ROE, gross margin, growth, FCF margin, debt load, and FCF consistency — the same factors that drive market premium for compounders.
- Market-Implied Growth (in Model Inputs) — reverse-DCF that answers "what growth rate is the market pricing in?". Lets you sanity-check the deviation: if implied growth is plausible for the business, the model's bearish flag may be wrong; if implausible, the market may be over-extrapolating.
- DDM (Gordon Growth Dividend Model) — values the stream of future dividends. Only used when trailing yield ≥ 2% and dividend payments are stable — below that the dividend is a token payout and Gordon (which values only the dividend stream) systematically underprices growth names, so those route to DCF + comparables + market anchor instead.
- P/E, EV/EBITDA, P/B, P/S — applies the peer-group median multiple to this company's per-share metric. Peers come from the same set as the "Related symbols" card. Earnings/sales metrics are forward-tilted by the company's recent revenue growth (capped at 25%) so they're comparable to peers' growth-embedded multiples — mimics how analysts use NTM rather than TTM. Per-multiple weights are biased by company quality (e.g. P/B down-weighted for asset-light tech).
- Market Anchor (SMA50) — the 50-day moving average, weighted by recent trading-range stability (tighter Bollinger bands → higher weight). Captures information fundamentals miss (forward consensus, sentiment, supply/demand) — but only when recent trading is steady enough that the market has converged on a view. During wild breakouts or breakdowns the anchor's weight collapses.
- Options Expected (B-L 30d) — the risk-neutral expected stock price at 30-day options expiration, derived from the full implied-volatility surface via Breeden-Litzenberger (second derivative of call price wrt strike → implied PDF, then E[S_T]). Forward-looking, captures all options-implied information (smile, skew, term structure) in one number. Weighted by chain liquidity. SP500-only at present (pre-computed daily). Backtest evidence: adds modest alpha across most bucket × holding combos.
- Blended value — weighted average. Confidence reflects how many methods fired and how tight peer dispersion is.
- Deviation pill — green when blended FV ≥ 10% above current price (undervalued); red when ≥ 10% below; grey otherwise.
| 10-yr Treasury (rf) | 4.00% |
| Beta vs SPY | 1.00 |
| Cost of Equity (CAPM) | 9.50% (VRP-adj) |
| WACC | 9.50% |
| Volatility Risk Premium | +702.6pp (IV − HV30), ERP adj +50bps |
| Effective Tax Rate | 21.0% |
| Rev. Growth (YoY, DCF input) | +20.1% |
| DCF Horizon | 12 years explicit + fade |
| Forward Tilt (NTM/TTM) | ×1.10 (applied to P/E, EV/EBITDA, P/S) |
| Free Cash Flow (TTM) | $0.1B |
| Return on Equity (TTM) | -10.0% |
| Book / Price | 13.8% |
| Gross Margin (TTM) | 68.7% |
| FCF Margin (TTM) | 15.9% |
| Debt / Equity | 0.00 |
| Quality Score | 5/6 — high quality (12y DCF) |
| Market-Implied Growth | +17.6% (reverse-DCF on current price) |
| SMA 50 | $23.64 (Market Anchor value) |
| SMA 20 / Bollinger Mid | $23.76 |
| Bollinger Width / SMA20 | 8.6% (drives anchor stability) |
| Net Debt | $-0.7B |
| Market Cap | $4B |
| Method | Implied Price | Weight | Detail |
|---|---|---|---|
| DCF | $27.49 | 33% | |
| DDM (Gordon) | n/a | 0% | |
| Peer P/E | n/a | 0% | |
| Peer EV/EBITDA | n/a | 0% | |
| Peer P/B | n/a | 0% | |
| Peer P/S | n/a | 0% | |
| Market Anchor (SMA50) | $23.64 | 67% | stability 100% (BB-width) |
| Options Expected (B-L 30d) | n/a | 0% |

- Industry (SIC)
- SERVICES-PREPACKAGED SOFTWARE (7372) · industry map
- Exchange
- XNAS
- Market Cap
- $4.6B
- Employees
- 1,623
- List Date
- 2024-07-24
- CIK
- 0001889956
- Headquarters
- Birmingham, MI
- Homepage
- https://www.onestream.com
OneStream Inc is an AI-enabled and extensible software platform. The company's platform unifies core financial functions and broader operational data and processes within a single platform, with solutions that maintain the integrity of corporate reporting standards for Finance while providing operational insights for business users. The Digital Finance Cloud of the company provides a comprehensive, dynamic, and predictive view of the entire enterprise, providing corporate leaders the control, visibility, and agility required to proactively adjust business and day-to-day execution. Geographical…
Each spoke is this symbol's rank within its sector (0–100; the dotted ring marks the sector median at 50). Higher is more constructive for a long. One spoke — News sentiment — is an absolute reading, not a sector rank. Grayed spokes have no data. A fuller shape is a summary, not a recommendation.
Quick-reference for reading the values below. Indicators combine to confirm a view — no single one is a trade signal on its own.
- SMA 20 / 50 / 200 — price above = uptrend, below = downtrend. SMA 50 crossing SMA 200 is the golden/death cross.
- EMA 12 / 26 — faster-reacting averages; 12 above 26 is short-term bullish.
- MACD — bullish when MACD > signal (green badge), bearish when below. Divergence from price often precedes reversals.
- ADX (14) — trend strength regardless of direction. <20 range, 20–25 weak trend, 25–50 trend, >50 strong trend.
- +DI / −DI — +DI > −DI favors bulls; the reverse favors bears. Read alongside ADX.
- RSI (14) — <30 oversold, >70 overbought. 40–60 is neutral; trending names can stay extreme.
- Stochastic %K / %D — <20 oversold, >80 overbought. %K crossing %D is an early momentum signal.
- Williams %R — inverted scale: <−80 oversold, >−20 overbought.
Oscillators work best in range-bound markets; in strong trends they give premature reversal signals.
- Bollinger Bands — price at upper band = overbought, lower = oversold. Narrow bands (squeeze) often precede expansion.
- OBV — cumulative volume; rising OBV confirms uptrend, falling OBV confirms downtrend. Divergence from price is a warning.
- Vol SMA 20 / Vol ROC — today's volume vs. 20-day average. Positive ROC with price move = conviction.
- ATR / True Range — average daily $ move; sizing and stop-loss reference.
- HV 20 / 30 / 60 — realized (historical) volatility. Compare to IV on the options cards: IV > HV = rich premium.
Confluence matters: trend + momentum + volume agreeing carries far more weight than any single indicator. For how these feed the spread scanner score, see the algorithm docs →
Trend Indicators
Momentum Oscillators
Volume & Volatility
Data Summary
LLM Stock Analysis Report
SYMBOL: OS
Executive Summary: Overall assessment: BEARISH with a confidence level of 6/10 Key drivers and primary risks: * Overbought technical indicators (RSI, Bollinger Bands) * Negative news sentiment from recent headlines * High volatility and beta relative to market Investment thesis: OS is likely to experience a correction due to its overbought technical condition, negative news sentiment, and high volatility. Investors should exercise caution and consider hedging strategies to mitigate potential losses.
Recent news sentiment impact: The recent news headlines have had a bearish impact on the stock price, with three out of four articles having a neutral or negative sentiment. The article about the potential buyout offer has also contributed to the bearish tone, as investors are skeptical about the fairness of the offer.
Technical Analysis: Trend direction: * Short-term: Bearish * Medium-term: Range-bound * Long-term: Bullish
Support/resistance levels: * SMA 20: $23.76 (support) * SMA 50: $23.64 (support) * EMA 12: $23.84 (resistance)
Momentum signals: * RSI interpretation: Overbought (>70), potential sell signal * MACD signal: Bullish, but with a bearish histogram * Bollinger Bands position: Overbought
Volume analysis: * Volume SMA 20: 2190099.40 (normal) * On-Balance Volume (OBV): 10757627.37 (bullish)
News & Sentiment Analysis: Recent headlines summary: The recent news articles have been primarily neutral or negative, with some bearish undertones.
Sentiment assessment: Negative sentiment prevails, with only one article having a positive sentiment.
Catalyst identification: No specific catalysts identified, but the potential buyout offer could be a driving force behind the stock's price movement.
Market narrative: The market is likely to remain cautious due to the negative news sentiment and overbought technical condition of OS.
Risk & Volatility Assessment: Beta interpretation: * Beta: 1.01 (above average), indicating high risk relative to market
Volatility regime: * Current volatility: High * Historical volatility: Average
Options market signals: * IV Rank: 57.9% (Medium) * Put/Call volume ratio: 47.43 (Bearish sentiment)
Downside protection: * Support levels: SMA 20 and SMA 50 * Risk management considerations: Stop-loss levels at $23.00 and position sizing adjustments
Market Context & Positioning: Sector performance: * OS is underperforming its sector peers
Institutional activity: * Volume patterns suggesting institutional interest, but bearish undertones
Correlation analysis: * Correlation with SPY: 0.22 (low)
Relative valuation: * Relative to its historical range: Overvalued
Key Levels & Action Items: Critical price levels: * SMA 20: $23.76 * SMA 50: $23.64
Breakout/breakdown levels: * EMA 12: $23.84 (resistance) * Upper Bollinger Band: $24.00
Time-sensitive catalysts: No specific catalysts identified, but the potential buyout offer could be a driving force behind the stock's price movement.
Risk management: Stop-loss levels at $23.00 and position sizing adjustments to mitigate potential losses.
This analysis provides a comprehensive overview of OS, highlighting its overbought technical condition, negative news sentiment, and high volatility. Investors should exercise caution and consider hedging strategies to mitigate potential losses.
| Earnings Date | Timing | Expected Move | Actual Move | Ratio | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024-09-03 | After-Close | 12.35% | 3.87% | 0.31x | Within |
| 2024-11-07 | After-Close | 4.73% | 3.26% | 0.69x | Within |
| 2025-02-11 | After-Close | 9.44% | 19.91% | 2.11x | Exceeded |
| 2025-05-08 | After-Close | 18.88% | 7.06% | 0.37x | Within |
| 2025-08-07 | After-Close | 13.16% | 9.45% | 0.72x | Within |
| 2025-11-06 | After-Close | 25.55% | 19.18% | 0.75x | Within |
| 2026-02-26 | Pre-Market | 47.39% | 0.08% | 0.00x | Within |
Earnings calendar: this week’s reports with expected vs actual moves →
OS Options Activity & IV Rank
OS IV rank history, 52-week IV rank and IV percentile →
Volatility Metrics
Options Flow
ATM Options Pricing
Chain Summary
Each spread is ranked by a composite score built in three stages. Full documentation →
score = P(profit) × (credit / spread_width)
P(profit) from short leg delta (1 − |delta|), penalised above 85%. Credit uses mid-price to handle illiquid chains fairly.
RR and BF (30-delta) from the persisted per-symbol skew snapshot — wing strikes picked by real greeks.delta, not a moneyness proxy. Put skew boosts bull puts, penalises bear calls. High butterfly boosts iron condors. Calendars are skew-neutral.
- RSI <40 bullish / >60 bearish
- MACD crossover + histogram trend
- Price vs SMA 50 & SMA 200
- Stochastic %K <20 / >80
- Williams %R <−80 / >−20
- Blended ATR + straddle expected-move penalty
- Bollinger Band signal (+ counter-trend penalty)
- BB width — vol contraction boost for ICs
- IV rank ≥ 75 → strong boost for credit spreads
- IV rank < 25 → penalty (selling cheap vol)
- Min open interest across all legs
- OI < 100 → −0.10 · OI < 500 → −0.05
score = base_score × skew_multiplier × tech_multiplier
Both multipliers are shown per spread. Beta is informational only — ATR already captures realized vol. Full algorithm documentation →
Enter a ticker to scan for optimal spread opportunities.
Evaluates all bull put, bear call, iron condor, and calendar spread combinations using GPU-accelerated analysis.
Estimated net dealer gamma is at the 81st percentile of this name's own daily history, near the high end of its range. This describes current positioning; it is not a forecast or a trading signal.
Net dealer gamma is an estimate of the aggregate gamma held by options market makers across this name's option chain, weighted by open interest. Dealer positions aren't public, so it uses a standard simplifying assumption: dealers are treated as long the calls and short the puts that are open. Actual dealer books can differ.
Gamma percentile ranks today's estimate against this name's own daily history, from 0% (the lowest reading on record) to 100% (the highest). Raw gamma scales with how much open interest a chain carries, so it isn't comparable across names; the percentile is. The badge marks the bottom 20% as low and the top 20% as high.
Tilts run from −1 to +1 and show how lopsided the estimated dealer exposure is. GEX tilt compares call gamma with put gamma. Vanna tilt describes how the hedge would shift if implied volatility changed, and charm tilt how it would shift with the passage of time.
This card describes estimated positioning and where it sits historically. It is not a forecast of price direction or volatility and not a trading signal. Market-wide view: Dealer positioning screener.
IV(put wing) − IV(ATM), in vol pointsHow much the OTM put trades above (or below) the at-the-money strike. Measures the height of the put-side tail relative to ATM — i.e. how expensive crash insurance is on this name.
- Positive (typical) — wing IV > ATM IV. Standard equity put skew: portfolios bid up crash protection, so OTM puts trade richer than ATM.
- Near zero or negative (unusual) — wing IV ≤ ATM IV. Flat or inverted put side. Common when there's no fear demand, in tightly mean-reverting names, or right after an earnings catalyst clears.
- Percentile vs own 3-yr history: high = wings rich (good time to sell wing premium); low = wings cheap (good time to buy protection).
- Not directional — high or low wings don't predict up or down moves. It's a price tag on tail insurance, not a forecast.
IV(call wing) − IV(put wing), equal delta on each sideWhich side of the smile is the market paying up for? Measures the tilt of the surface — call skew vs put skew at matched deltas.
- Negative (typical) — puts richer than calls. Standard equity behavior: hedging demand makes puts carry a premium. Most large-caps sit in the −1 to −5 vol-point range.
- Strongly negative (< −5 pts) — heavy downside hedging, elevated fear, or an upcoming catalyst (earnings, FDA, macro event). Worth flagging.
- Positive — calls richer than puts. Unusual for equities; signals bullish momentum, short-squeeze positioning, or takeover/M&A speculation.
- Near zero — symmetric surface. Market sees roughly equal up/down risk. Rare for large-caps; more common in commodities and FX.
Wing-vs-ATM tells you how expensive the tails are. Risk Reversal tells you which side is favored. Combined:
- High wing percentile + deeply negative RR → strong put bid; stress or major event priced in. Owning protection costs a premium; selling put premium is dangerous.
- Low wing percentile + near-zero RR → complacency; insurance cheap and balanced. Good environment to add cheap downside hedges.
- Positive RR + elevated wings → call-side fear-of-missing-out; common in squeeze setups. Upside calls expensive, downside puts not bid.
Percentile is the rank of today's reading within ~3 years of this symbol's own history. High percentile = wings are rich relative to history; not a directional signal. Skew is read off the chain in real time, not from CBOE SKEW.
Enter a ticker to render the implied volatility surface.
Enter a ticker to render the implied volatility smile.
OS Institutional Ownership (13F)
Latest filings — 2026-03-31Institutional managers with $100M+ AUM file Form 13F-HR quarterly, due 45 days after quarter end. Holdings are reported gross at quarter-end market value — they are a snapshot, not a real-time position.
- Shares — long equity positions in this name, aggregated across share classes.
- Calls / Puts — notional value of long call / put exposure where this ticker is the underlying.
- % of Float — holder's reported shares divided by the latest diluted shares outstanding. Sums above 100% indicate large custodian / prime broker positions where the same shares are reported by multiple filers.
- Custodian badge — filers with more than 5,000 holdings are typically broker-dealers / custodians reporting customer-held shares, not active managers.
Each filer is counted once at its latest 13F-HR filing. New filings are ingested on a weekly cadence.
| # | Filer | Notional Value | % of Total | Period |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Wolverine Trading, LLC Custodian | $505.43K | 100.00% | 2025-09-30 |
| # | Filer | Notional Value | % of Total | Period |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Wolverine Trading, LLC Custodian | $372.92K | 100.00% | 2025-09-30 |
OS Insider Trading (Form 4)
Latest: 2026-04-02| Filed | Reporter | Role | Action | Shares | Avg Price | Net $ | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-04-02 | Kara Wilson | Director | Disp (D) | −7,130 | — | EDGAR | |
| 2026-04-02 | Michael Burkland | Director | Disp (D) | −7,130 | — | EDGAR | |
| 2026-04-02 | Jonathan D Mariner | Director | Disp (D) | −7,130 | — | EDGAR | |
| 2026-04-02 | Pamela McIntyre | Chief Accounting Officer | Disp (D) | −100,800 | — | EDGAR | |
| 2026-04-02 | Ken Hohenstein | Chief Revenue Officer | Disp (D) | −1,820,850 | — | EDGAR | |
| 2026-04-02 | John Kinzer | See Remarks | Disp (D) | −131,737 | — | EDGAR | |
| 2026-04-02 | Scott Leshinski | President | Disp (D) | −378,458 | — | EDGAR | |
| 2026-04-02 | Baskar Sridharan | Director | Disp (D) | −21,609 | — | EDGAR | |
| 2026-04-02 | Thomas Anthony Shea | CEO | Disp (D) | −459,986 | — | EDGAR | |
| 2026-03-26 | Thomas Anthony Shea | CEO | Gift (G) | — | — | EDGAR | |
| 2026-03-20 | Pamela McIntyre | Chief Accounting Officer | Award (A) | +45,000 | — | EDGAR | |
| 2026-03-20 | Scott Leshinski | President | Award (A) | +100,000 | — | EDGAR | |
| 2026-03-20 | Ken Hohenstein | Chief Revenue Officer | Award (A) | +45,000 | — | EDGAR | |
| 2026-03-18 | Ken Hohenstein | Chief Revenue Officer | Mixed | — | $18.42 | -$611.5K | EDGAR |
| 2026-03-12 | Thomas Anthony Shea | CEO | Tax (F) | −9,258 | $23.70 | -$219.4K | EDGAR |
OS Insider Holdings
6 insiders · @ $24.00| # | Insider | Role | Shares | Disclosed Exposure | Lifetime OM Net | Filings | Last Filed |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Craig Colby | President | 388,010 | $9.31M | -$19.41M | 6 | 2025-06-12 |
| 2 | William A Koefoed | Chief Financial Officer | 206,127 | $4.95M | -$4.10M | 14 | 2025-12-16 |
| 3 | Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. L.P. | 10%+ Owner | 104,100 | $2.50M | -$286.87M | 1 | 2024-11-29 |
| 4 | Michael Burkland | Director | 9,541 | $229.0K | -$2.27M | 4 | 2026-04-02 |
| 5 | KKR Associates NGT L.P. | 10%+ Owner | 1,704 | $40.9K | -$286.87M | 1 | 2024-11-29 |
| 6 | Jonathan D Mariner | Director | 787 | $18.9K | -$2.46M | 12 | 2026-04-02 |
OS Board & Officers
As of SEC filings through Apr 7, 2026Directors 1
- Bradley Scott Brown · since Jul 24, 2024
Changes in the last 10 years (124)
| Apr 7, 2026 | Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. L.P. reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Apr 7, 2026 | KKR-Milton Strategic Partners L.P. reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Apr 7, 2026 | KKR Wolverine I Ltd. reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Apr 7, 2026 | KKR TFO Partners L.P. reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Apr 7, 2026 | KKR TFO GP Ltd reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Apr 7, 2026 | KKR Next Gen Tech Growth Ltd reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Apr 7, 2026 | KKR NGT (Dream) Blocker Parent L.P. reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Apr 7, 2026 | KKR NGT (Dream) Blocker Parent (EEA) L.P. reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Apr 7, 2026 | KKR Milton Strategic Ltd reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Apr 7, 2026 | KKR Management LLP reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Apr 7, 2026 | KKR Holdco LLC reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Apr 7, 2026 | KKR Group Partnership L.P. reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Apr 7, 2026 | KKR Group Holdings Corp. reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Apr 7, 2026 | KKR Group Co. Inc. reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Apr 7, 2026 | KKR Financial Management LLC reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Apr 7, 2026 | KKR Dream Holdings LLC reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Apr 7, 2026 | KKR Dream Aggregator L.P. reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Apr 7, 2026 | KKR Dream Aggregator GP LLC reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Apr 7, 2026 | KKR Custom Equity Opportunities Ltd reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Apr 7, 2026 | KKR Custom Equity Opportunities Fund L.P. reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Apr 7, 2026 | KKR Associates TFO L.P. reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Apr 7, 2026 | KKR Associates NGT L.P. reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Apr 7, 2026 | KKR Associates Milton Strategic L.P. reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Apr 7, 2026 | KKR Associates Group L.P. reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Apr 7, 2026 | KKR Associates Group GP LLC reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Apr 7, 2026 | KKR Associates Custom Equity Opportunities L.P. reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Apr 7, 2026 | KKR Associates Americas XII AIV L.P. reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Apr 7, 2026 | KKR Americas XII EEA (Dream) Blocker Parent L.P. reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Apr 7, 2026 | KKR Americas XII AIV GP LLC reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Apr 7, 2026 | KKR Americas XII (Dream) Blocker Parent L.P. reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Apr 7, 2026 | KKR Americas XII (Dream II) Blocker Parent L.P. reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Apr 7, 2026 | KKR Americas Fund XII (Dream) L.P. reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Apr 7, 2026 | KKR & Co. Inc. reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Apr 7, 2026 | KKR & Co. GP LLC reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Apr 7, 2026 | K-PRIME Hedge-Finance GP Ltd reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Apr 7, 2026 | K-PRIME Aggregator L.P. reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Apr 7, 2026 | K-PRIME AG Financing LP reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Apr 7, 2026 | Henry R Kravis reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Apr 7, 2026 | George R Roberts reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Apr 2, 2026 | Thomas Anthony Shea reported in an SEC filing no longer being a director |
| Apr 2, 2026 | Thomas Anthony Shea reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Apr 2, 2026 | Thomas Anthony Shea reported in an SEC filing no longer being CEO |
| Apr 2, 2026 | Scott Leshinski reported in an SEC filing no longer being President |
| Apr 2, 2026 | Pamela McIntyre reported in an SEC filing no longer being Chief Accounting Officer |
| Apr 2, 2026 | Michael Burkland reported in an SEC filing no longer being a director |
| Apr 2, 2026 | Ken Hohenstein reported in an SEC filing no longer being Chief Revenue Officer |
| Apr 2, 2026 | Kara Wilson reported in an SEC filing no longer being a director |
| Apr 2, 2026 | Jonathan D Mariner reported in an SEC filing no longer being a director |
| Apr 2, 2026 | John Kinzer reported in an SEC filing no longer being a director |
| Apr 2, 2026 | Baskar Sridharan reported in an SEC filing no longer being a director |
| Mar 12, 2026 | Thomas Anthony Shea listed as CEO (previously CEO and President) in SEC filings |
| Jan 1, 2026 | Scott Leshinski became President |
| Jan 1, 2026 | Pamela McIntyre became Chief Accounting Officer |
| Dec 31, 2025 | William A Koefoed left as Chief Financial Officer, per their own SEC filing |
| Oct 3, 2025 | Baskar Sridharan became a director |
| Jun 12, 2025 | Thomas Anthony Shea listed as CEO and President (previously Chief Executive Officer) in SEC filings |
| Jun 12, 2025 | Craig Colby reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Jun 12, 2025 | Craig Colby reported in an SEC filing no longer being President |
| May 6, 2025 | Ken Hohenstein first listed as Chief Revenue Officer in an SEC filing |
| Mar 12, 2025 | Thomas Anthony Shea first listed as a 10% owner in an SEC filing |
| Dec 17, 2024 | Craig Colby first listed as a 10% owner in an SEC filing |
| Jul 29, 2024 | Terrance Shea reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Jul 29, 2024 | Robert Allan Powers Jr. reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Jul 29, 2024 | Peter Fugere reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Jul 29, 2024 | Ken Hohenstein reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Jul 29, 2024 | John Von Allmen reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Jul 29, 2024 | Eric Davidson reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Jul 24, 2024 | William A Koefoed became Chief Financial Officer |
| Jul 24, 2024 | Thomas Anthony Shea became a director |
| Jul 24, 2024 | Thomas Anthony Shea became Chief Executive Officer |
| Jul 24, 2024 | Terrance Shea became a 10% owner |
| Jul 24, 2024 | Robert Allan Powers Jr. became a 10% owner |
| Jul 24, 2024 | Peter Fugere became a 10% owner |
| Jul 24, 2024 | Michael Burkland became a director |
| Jul 24, 2024 | Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. L.P. became a 10% owner |
| Jul 24, 2024 | Ken Hohenstein became a 10% owner |
| Jul 24, 2024 | Kara Wilson became a director |
| Jul 24, 2024 | KKR-Milton Strategic Partners L.P. became a 10% owner |
| Jul 24, 2024 | KKR Wolverine I Ltd. became a 10% owner |
| Jul 24, 2024 | KKR TFO Partners L.P. became a 10% owner |
| Jul 24, 2024 | KKR TFO GP Ltd became a 10% owner |
| Jul 24, 2024 | KKR Next Gen Tech Growth Ltd became a 10% owner |
| Jul 24, 2024 | KKR NGT (Dream) Blocker Parent L.P. became a 10% owner |
| Jul 24, 2024 | KKR NGT (Dream) Blocker Parent (EEA) L.P. became a 10% owner |
| Jul 24, 2024 | KKR Milton Strategic Ltd became a 10% owner |
| Jul 24, 2024 | KKR Management LLP became a 10% owner |
| Jul 24, 2024 | KKR Holdco LLC became a 10% owner |
| Jul 24, 2024 | KKR Group Partnership L.P. became a 10% owner |
| Jul 24, 2024 | KKR Group Holdings Corp. became a 10% owner |
| Jul 24, 2024 | KKR Group Co. Inc. became a 10% owner |
| Jul 24, 2024 | KKR Financial Management LLC became a 10% owner |
| Jul 24, 2024 | KKR Dream Holdings LLC became a 10% owner |
| Jul 24, 2024 | KKR Dream Aggregator L.P. became a 10% owner |
| Jul 24, 2024 | KKR Dream Aggregator GP LLC became a 10% owner |
| Jul 24, 2024 | KKR Custom Equity Opportunities Ltd became a 10% owner |
| Jul 24, 2024 | KKR Custom Equity Opportunities Fund L.P. became a 10% owner |
| Jul 24, 2024 | KKR Associates TFO L.P. became a 10% owner |
| Jul 24, 2024 | KKR Associates NGT L.P. became a 10% owner |
| Jul 24, 2024 | KKR Associates Milton Strategic L.P. became a 10% owner |
| Jul 24, 2024 | KKR Associates Group L.P. became a 10% owner |
| Jul 24, 2024 | KKR Associates Group GP LLC became a 10% owner |
| Jul 24, 2024 | KKR Associates Custom Equity Opportunities L.P. became a 10% owner |
| Jul 24, 2024 | KKR Associates Americas XII AIV L.P. became a 10% owner |
| Jul 24, 2024 | KKR Americas XII EEA (Dream) Blocker Parent L.P. became a 10% owner |
| Jul 24, 2024 | KKR Americas XII AIV GP LLC became a 10% owner |
| Jul 24, 2024 | KKR Americas XII (Dream) Blocker Parent L.P. became a 10% owner |
| Jul 24, 2024 | KKR Americas XII (Dream II) Blocker Parent L.P. became a 10% owner |
| Jul 24, 2024 | KKR Americas Fund XII (Dream) L.P. became a 10% owner |
| Jul 24, 2024 | KKR & Co. Inc. became a 10% owner |
| Jul 24, 2024 | KKR & Co. GP LLC became a 10% owner |
| Jul 24, 2024 | K-Prime Gp LLC became a 10% owner |
| Jul 24, 2024 | K-PRIME Hedge-Finance GP Ltd became a 10% owner |
| Jul 24, 2024 | K-PRIME Aggregator L.P. became a 10% owner |
| Jul 24, 2024 | K-PRIME AG Financing LP became a 10% owner |
| Jul 24, 2024 | Jonathan D Mariner became a director |
| Jul 24, 2024 | John Von Allmen became a 10% owner |
| Jul 24, 2024 | John Kinzer became a director |
| Jul 24, 2024 | Henry R Kravis became a 10% owner |
| Jul 24, 2024 | George R Roberts became a 10% owner |
| Jul 24, 2024 | Eric Davidson became a 10% owner |
| Jul 24, 2024 | David S. Welsh became a director |
| Jul 24, 2024 | David Petraeus became a director |
| Jul 24, 2024 | Craig Colby became President |
| Jul 24, 2024 | Bradley Scott Brown became a director |
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Not reported recently (3)
- K-Prime Gp LLC · Last reported as a 10% owner in an SEC filing dated Nov 29, 2024
- David Petraeus · Last reported as a director in an SEC filing dated Jul 24, 2024
- David S. Welsh · Last reported as a director in an SEC filing dated Jul 24, 2024
OS Proposed Insider Sales (Form 144)
Latest: 2026-03-17What is Form 144? A notice of intent to sell restricted or control stock under Rule 144. Affiliates (officers, directors, 10%+ owners) and holders of restricted shares must file Form 144 when planning to sell more than 5,000 shares or $50,000 in any 3-month rolling window.
How it relates to Form 4: Form 144 is filed before the trade (up to 90 days in advance); Form 4 is filed within 2 business days after the trade executes. Not every Form 144 results in a sale — the filer may cancel or delay. Look for the corresponding Form 4 on the Insider Activity card to confirm a sale actually happened.
10b5-1 plans: Trades made under a pre-scheduled Rule 10b5-1 plan are not discretionary — they execute automatically on dates set months earlier, regardless of news. High 10b5-1 percentages mean less per-filing signal value, though cumulative selling volume still matters.
"Notice value": Aggregate market value the filer wrote into the Form 144 — i.e. the size of the planned sale, not necessarily the executed dollars. An amended notice (Form 144/A) replaces the original it amends, and cancelled notices are dropped, so neither is double-counted above. A filed value that is clearly inconsistent with the share count at the stock's price (a filer typo) shows as a dash and is left out of the totals.
Source & freshness: Sourced from public Form 144 filings. Refreshed daily; new filings typically appear here the morning after they are filed.
| Filed | Filer | Role | Shares | Notice Value | Planned Sale | Broker | Plan | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-03-17 | Hohenstein Ken | Officer | 10,000 | $236.2K | 2026-03-17 | Fidelity Brokerage Services LLC | 10b5-1 | EDGAR |
| 2026-03-16 | Hohenstein Ken | Officer | 49,204 | $1.16M | 2026-03-16 | Fidelity Brokerage Services LLC | 10b5-1 | EDGAR |
| 2026-03-11 | Leshinski Scott | Officer | 7,412 | $175.5K | 2026-03-11 | Fidelity Brokerage Services LLC | 10b5-1 | EDGAR |
| 2026-02-17 | Hohenstein Ken | Officer | 60,000 | $1.41M | 2026-02-17 | Fidelity Brokerage Services LLC | 10b5-1 | EDGAR |
| 2026-01-16 | Hohenstein Ken | Officer | 120,000 | $2.84M | 2026-01-16 | Fidelity Brokerage Services LLC | 10b5-1 | EDGAR |
| 2026-01-06 | Jonathan Mariner | Director | 7,956 | $187.8K | 2026-01-06 | Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC | 10b5-1 | EDGAR |
| 2025-12-16 | Hohenstein Ken | Officer | 40,000 | $688.3K | 2025-12-16 | Fidelity Brokerage Services LLC | 10b5-1 | EDGAR |
| 2025-12-15 | Koefoed William A | Officer | 9,571 | $169.7K | 2025-12-15 | Fidelity Brokerage Services LLC | 10b5-1 | EDGAR |
| 2025-11-17 | Hohenstein Ken | Officer | 40,000 | $860.0K | 2025-11-17 | Fidelity Brokerage Services LLC | 10b5-1 | EDGAR |
| 2025-10-16 | Hohenstein Ken | Officer | 40,000 | $673.9K | 2025-10-16 | Fidelity Brokerage Services LLC | 10b5-1 | EDGAR |
| # | ETF | Provider | Weight | $ Exposure | ETF AUM | As Of |
|---|
Quarterly filings sourced from SEC 10-Q / 10-K reports. TTM tiles aggregate the most recent four quarters; bars show the last ~12 quarters oldest → newest.
- Revenue — top-line sales. Look for consistent YoY growth; seasonal businesses need same-quarter comparisons (Q4 '24 vs Q4 '23).
- Net Income — bottom-line profit after all expenses. Can be volatile from one-time items; red bars = net loss.
- Diluted EPS — net income per share assuming options/converts are exercised. Direct input to the P/E ratio.
- Operating Cash Flow — cash generated from core operations, before capex and financing. Harder to manipulate than net income; growing OCF is a quality signal.
- Sequential growth — quarter-over-quarter trend. Accelerating bars are a momentum signal.
- YoY growth — compare to the same quarter a year earlier to remove seasonality.
- Quality — OCF should roughly track Net Income over time. Large divergence (net income ≫ OCF) flags accruals risk.
- Margins — scan the bar ratios: Net Income / Revenue tells you margin trend without needing a separate chart.
TTM (trailing-twelve-month) smooths seasonality and is used for the P/E calculation. Filings appear 30–90 days after the period closes.
Quarterly figures (6 quarters)
| Quarter | Period End | Revenue | Net Income | Diluted EPS | Op. Cash Flow |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Q4 '25 | 2025-12-31 | $163.73M | $999.00K | $0.01 | $25.77M |
| Q3 '25 | 2025-09-30 | $154.30M | $-8.85M | $-0.05 | $4.97M |
| Q2 '25 | 2025-06-30 | $147.59M | $-18.43M | $-0.10 | $29.74M |
| Q1 '25 | 2025-03-31 | $136.31M | $-24.02M | $-0.14 | $36.20M |
| Q4 '24 | 2024-12-31 | $132.47M | $-16.80M | $-0.19 | $25.14M |
| Q3 '24 | 2024-09-30 | $129.14M | $-171.94M | $-1.06 | $2.36M |
Ratios derived from TTM financials and the current market price, sampled daily. History chart shows how expensive the stock is today relative to its own recent past.
- P/E — price / TTM earnings. Rough market rule: 10–15 value, 15–25 market, >30 growth/premium. Negative when earnings are negative.
- P/B — price / book value. Useful for financials and asset-heavy names; meaningless for asset-light software.
- P/S — price / TTM revenue. Useful when earnings are negative or noisy (early-stage growth).
- EV/EBITDA — capital-structure-neutral. <10 cheap, 10–15 reasonable, >20 rich. Good for comparing across leverage profiles.
- EV/Sales — like P/S but accounts for debt + cash. Compare within sector.
- ROE — return on equity. >15% strong, >25% exceptional. Caution: high leverage inflates ROE.
- ROA — return on assets. Leverage-neutral; >5% solid, >10% exceptional.
- Div Yield — annual dividend / price. Compare to 10Y Treasury; sustained yield >6% often signals distress.
- FCF Yield — free cash flow / market cap. >5% is attractive; negative means burning cash.
- Debt/Equity — leverage. <1 conservative, >2 aggressive. Sector-dependent (utilities naturally high, tech low).
- Current Ratio — short-term liquidity. >1.5 comfortable, <1 raises short-term solvency flags.
- Compare current level to the 3-year band: near the high end = relatively expensive; near the low = relatively cheap.
- Multiples expanding while earnings are flat = sentiment-driven rally.
- Multiples compressing while earnings grow = value coming from fundamentals.
Regulatory short-interest reports publish on a bi-weekly settlement cadence; short-volume is reported daily by the trade-reporting facilities. Float is derived from insider-ownership filings.
- Short Interest — total shares currently sold short as of the settlement date. Lags real time by ~8 business days.
- SI % of Float — short interest / free float. The key crowding metric.
- Days to Cover — short interest / avg daily volume. How many full trading days it would take shorts to buy back. High DTC + catalyst = squeeze fuel.
- Short Vol Ratio — today's short-sale volume / total volume. Intraday selling pressure proxy (not the same as short interest).
- Free Float — shares available for public trading (total shares minus insider / restricted).
- Float % — free float / shares outstanding. <50% = tightly held, more prone to squeezes.
- SI % of Float < 5% — typical, no particular signal.
- 5–15% — elevated; watch for catalysts (earnings, guidance, macro).
- 15–30% — heavily shorted; tight-float names in this range have produced notable squeezes historically.
- >30% — extreme; borrow is likely expensive and squeeze risk is material.
- Days to Cover > 5 combined with high SI% amplifies squeeze potential.
- Trend matters more than level. Rapidly rising short interest often precedes negative catalysts or heavy hedging.
- A sudden drop in SI after a rally may indicate a squeeze in progress.
Short interest is reported mid-month and end-of-month; short volume is daily.