GORV Lazydays Holdings, Inc.
XNAS
0.42
Delayed
Stock quote, options chain, IV rank, technicals, AI analysis, and institutional ownership. Iron condor setups Fibonacci levels Insider trading
Market data may be delayed, incomplete, or inaccurate. Not a recommendation to buy, sell, or hold any security. Verify quotes with your broker before trading. See Terms §17.
- 52-Week Range
- $0.41 – $1.14
- Straddle Price
- $2.52
- P/C Vol Ratio (Dec 19 expiry)
- 0.00
- Market Cap
- $0.0B
- Open
- $0.64
- Day Range
- $0.41 – $0.66
- Volume
- 1,740,935
- Prev Close
- $0.77
A blended fair-value estimate combining up to six valuation methods. Each method is weighted by how well it fits the company — DCF down-weights for unprofitable names; DDM only fires for steady dividend payers; comparables down-weight when peer multiples disagree.
- DCF (quality-aware) — projects free cash flow with a horizon that scales to business quality. True compounders (quality 6/6) get 10 years explicit + 10 years fade before terminal; cyclical/struggling names (quality 0-1) get a 5-year terminal cliff. Quality is scored from ROE, gross margin, growth, FCF margin, debt load, and FCF consistency — the same factors that drive market premium for compounders.
- Market-Implied Growth (in Model Inputs) — reverse-DCF that answers "what growth rate is the market pricing in?". Lets you sanity-check the deviation: if implied growth is plausible for the business, the model's bearish flag may be wrong; if implausible, the market may be over-extrapolating.
- DDM (Gordon Growth Dividend Model) — values the stream of future dividends. Only used when trailing yield ≥ 2% and dividend payments are stable — below that the dividend is a token payout and Gordon (which values only the dividend stream) systematically underprices growth names, so those route to DCF + comparables + market anchor instead.
- P/E, EV/EBITDA, P/B, P/S — applies the peer-group median multiple to this company's per-share metric. Peers come from the same set as the "Related symbols" card. Earnings/sales metrics are forward-tilted by the company's recent revenue growth (capped at 25%) so they're comparable to peers' growth-embedded multiples — mimics how analysts use NTM rather than TTM. Per-multiple weights are biased by company quality (e.g. P/B down-weighted for asset-light tech).
- Market Anchor (SMA50) — the 50-day moving average, weighted by recent trading-range stability (tighter Bollinger bands → higher weight). Captures information fundamentals miss (forward consensus, sentiment, supply/demand) — but only when recent trading is steady enough that the market has converged on a view. During wild breakouts or breakdowns the anchor's weight collapses.
- Options Expected (B-L 30d) — the risk-neutral expected stock price at 30-day options expiration, derived from the full implied-volatility surface via Breeden-Litzenberger (second derivative of call price wrt strike → implied PDF, then E[S_T]). Forward-looking, captures all options-implied information (smile, skew, term structure) in one number. Weighted by chain liquidity. SP500-only at present (pre-computed daily). Backtest evidence: adds modest alpha across most bucket × holding combos.
- Blended value — weighted average. Confidence reflects how many methods fired and how tight peer dispersion is.
- Deviation pill — green when blended FV ≥ 10% above current price (undervalued); red when ≥ 10% below; grey otherwise.
| 10-yr Treasury (rf) | 4.00% |
| Beta vs SPY | 1.00 |
| Cost of Equity (CAPM) | 9.50% (VRP-adj) |
| WACC | 4.57% |
| Volatility Risk Premium | +1573.9pp (IV − HV30), ERP adj +50bps |
| Effective Tax Rate | 21.0% |
| Rev. Growth (YoY, DCF input) | -10.0% |
| DCF Horizon | 5 years explicit + fade |
| Free Cash Flow (TTM) | $-0.0B |
| Book / Price | -2117.9% |
| Gross Margin (TTM) | 23.4% |
| FCF Margin (TTM) | -3.7% |
| Quality Score | 0/6 — cyclical/struggling (5y DCF) |
| SMA 50 | $1.91 (Market Anchor value) |
| SMA 20 / Bollinger Mid | $1.32 |
| Bollinger Width / SMA20 | 11182.3% (drives anchor stability) |
| Net Debt | $0.0B |
| Market Cap | $0B |
| Method | Implied Price | Weight | Detail |
|---|---|---|---|
| DCF | n/a | 0% | |
| DDM (Gordon) | n/a | 0% | |
| Peer P/E | n/a | 0% | |
| Peer EV/EBITDA | n/a | 0% | |
| Peer P/B | n/a | 0% | |
| Peer P/S | n/a | 0% | |
| Market Anchor (SMA50) | $1.91 | 100% | stability 71% (BB-width) |
| Options Expected (B-L 30d) | n/a | 0% |
- Industry (SIC)
- RETAIL-AUTO DEALERS & GASOLINE STATIONS (5500) · industry map
- Exchange
- XNAS
- Market Cap
- $0.0B
- Employees
- 1,100
- List Date
- 2015-11-24
- CIK
- 0001721741
- Last Earnings
- Aug 14 after close · −7.7% vs ±383.9% expected
- Headquarters
- Tampa, FL
- Homepage
- https://www.lazydays.com
Lazydays Holdings Inc operates recreational vehicle dealerships. It provides products and services for RV owners and outdoor enthusiasts. The company generates revenue by providing a full spectrum of RV products: New and pre-owned RV sales, RV parts and services, financing and insurance products, third-party protection plans, after-market parts and accessories, and RV camping facilities.
Each spoke is this symbol's rank within its sector (0–100; the dotted ring marks the sector median at 50). Higher is more constructive for a long. One spoke — News sentiment — is an absolute reading, not a sector rank. Grayed spokes have no data. A fuller shape is a summary, not a recommendation.
Quick-reference for reading the values below. Indicators combine to confirm a view — no single one is a trade signal on its own.
- SMA 20 / 50 / 200 — price above = uptrend, below = downtrend. SMA 50 crossing SMA 200 is the golden/death cross.
- EMA 12 / 26 — faster-reacting averages; 12 above 26 is short-term bullish.
- MACD — bullish when MACD > signal (green badge), bearish when below. Divergence from price often precedes reversals.
- ADX (14) — trend strength regardless of direction. <20 range, 20–25 weak trend, 25–50 trend, >50 strong trend.
- +DI / −DI — +DI > −DI favors bulls; the reverse favors bears. Read alongside ADX.
- RSI (14) — <30 oversold, >70 overbought. 40–60 is neutral; trending names can stay extreme.
- Stochastic %K / %D — <20 oversold, >80 overbought. %K crossing %D is an early momentum signal.
- Williams %R — inverted scale: <−80 oversold, >−20 overbought.
Oscillators work best in range-bound markets; in strong trends they give premature reversal signals.
- Bollinger Bands — price at upper band = overbought, lower = oversold. Narrow bands (squeeze) often precede expansion.
- OBV — cumulative volume; rising OBV confirms uptrend, falling OBV confirms downtrend. Divergence from price is a warning.
- Vol SMA 20 / Vol ROC — today's volume vs. 20-day average. Positive ROC with price move = conviction.
- ATR / True Range — average daily $ move; sizing and stop-loss reference.
- HV 20 / 30 / 60 — realized (historical) volatility. Compare to IV on the options cards: IV > HV = rich premium.
Confluence matters: trend + momentum + volume agreeing carries far more weight than any single indicator. For how these feed the spread scanner score, see the algorithm docs →
Trend Indicators
Momentum Oscillators
Volume & Volatility
Data Summary
Click Frenzy-Pro™ for an AI analysis of this ticker.
Analysis includes technical indicators, news sentiment, risk assessment, and specific price levels to watch.
| Earnings Date | Timing | Expected Move | Actual Move | Ratio | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024-03-08 | After-Close | 26.25% | 4.43% | 0.17x | Within |
| 2024-08-16 | After-Close | 120.37% | 5.05% | 0.04x | Within |
| 2024-11-19 | After-Close | 335.11% | 3.32% | 0.01x | Within |
| 2025-03-31 | Pre-Market | 150.00% | 30.83% | 0.21x | Within |
| 2025-05-15 | After-Close | 384.62% | 56.50% | 0.15x | Within |
| 2025-08-14 | After-Close | 383.87% | 7.66% | 0.02x | Within |
Earnings calendar: this week’s reports with expected vs actual moves →
GORV Options Activity & IV Rank
Volatility Metrics
Options Flow · Dec 19 expiry
ATM Options Pricing
Chain Summary
GORV Implied Volatility
Loading implied volatility…
The 30-day IV is the at-the-money implied volatility of options 30 days out, the blue line. The band is its 20-session average, 2 standard deviations either side. Realized volatility is how much GORV actually moved over the last 20 sessions, from closing prices, on the same yearly scale. Without earnings takes each earnings report out of the 30-day IV, sized from what options paid for past reports, so it shows whether options are expensive or cheap apart from the report. Click a name above the chart to show or hide it.
Each spread is ranked by a composite score built in three stages. Full documentation →
score = P(profit) × (credit / spread_width)
P(profit) from short leg delta (1 − |delta|), penalised above 85%. Credit uses mid-price to handle illiquid chains fairly.
Calendars: the long leg is valued at the short leg’s expiration (Black-Scholes at its current IV) across the range of prices the short leg’s IV implies, giving the best-case profit (R/R = that over the debit) and P(profit).
RR and BF (30-delta) from the persisted per-symbol skew snapshot — wing strikes picked by real greeks.delta, not a moneyness proxy. Put skew boosts bull puts, penalises bear calls. High butterfly boosts iron condors. Calendars are skew-neutral.
- RSI <40 bullish / >60 bearish
- MACD crossover + histogram trend
- Price vs SMA 50 & SMA 200
- Stochastic %K <20 / >80
- Williams %R <−80 / >−20
- Blended ATR + straddle expected-move penalty
- Bollinger Band signal (+ counter-trend penalty)
- BB width — vol contraction boost for ICs
- IV rank ≥ 75 → strong boost for credit spreads
- IV rank < 25 → penalty (selling cheap vol)
- Min open interest across all legs
- OI < 100 → −0.10 · OI < 500 → −0.05
score = base_score × skew_multiplier × tech_multiplier
Both multipliers are shown per spread. Beta is informational only — ATR already captures realized vol. Full algorithm documentation →
Scanning bull put, bear call, iron condor and calendar spreads…
IV(put wing) − IV(ATM), in vol pointsHow much the OTM put trades above (or below) the at-the-money strike. Measures the height of the put-side tail relative to ATM — i.e. how expensive crash insurance is on this name.
- Positive (typical) — wing IV > ATM IV. Standard equity put skew: portfolios bid up crash protection, so OTM puts trade richer than ATM.
- Near zero or negative (unusual) — wing IV ≤ ATM IV. Flat or inverted put side. Common when there's no fear demand, in tightly mean-reverting names, or right after an earnings catalyst clears.
- Percentile vs own 3-yr history: high = wings rich (good time to sell wing premium); low = wings cheap (good time to buy protection).
- Not directional — high or low wings don't predict up or down moves. It's a price tag on tail insurance, not a forecast.
IV(call wing) − IV(put wing), equal delta on each sideWhich side of the smile is the market paying up for? Measures the tilt of the surface — call skew vs put skew at matched deltas.
- Negative (typical) — puts richer than calls. Standard equity behavior: hedging demand makes puts carry a premium. Most large-caps sit in the −1 to −5 vol-point range.
- Strongly negative (< −5 pts) — heavy downside hedging, elevated fear, or an upcoming catalyst (earnings, FDA, macro event). Worth flagging.
- Positive — calls richer than puts. Unusual for equities; signals bullish momentum, short-squeeze positioning, or takeover/M&A speculation.
- Near zero — symmetric surface. Market sees roughly equal up/down risk. Rare for large-caps; more common in commodities and FX.
IV(call wing) − IV(ATM), in vol pointsThe same measure on the upside: how the OTM call is priced against the at-the-money strike.
- Negative (typical) — calls trade below ATM for most stocks and indices, so the sign alone says little.
- Percentile vs own history: high = upside calls unusually rich for this name (squeezes, takeover talk, commodity supply scares); low = calls cheaper than usual.
Put or call vs ATM tells you how expensive that tail is. Risk Reversal tells you which side is favored. Combined:
- High wing percentile + deeply negative RR → strong put bid; stress or major event priced in. Owning protection costs a premium; selling put premium is dangerous.
- Low wing percentile + near-zero RR → complacency; insurance cheap and balanced. Good environment to add cheap downside hedges.
- Positive RR + elevated wings → call-side fear-of-missing-out; common in squeeze setups. Upside calls expensive, downside puts not bid.
Percentile is the rank of today's reading within ~3 years of this symbol's own history. High percentile = wings are rich relative to history; not a directional signal. Skew is read off the chain in real time, not from CBOE SKEW.
Loading the implied volatility surface…
Loading the implied volatility smile…
GORV Institutional Ownership (13F)
Institutional managers with $100M+ AUM file Form 13F-HR quarterly, due 45 days after quarter end. Holdings are reported gross at quarter-end market value — they are a snapshot, not a real-time position.
- Shares — long equity positions in this name, aggregated across share classes.
- Calls / Puts — notional value of long call / put exposure where this ticker is the underlying.
- % of Float — holder's reported shares divided by the latest diluted shares outstanding. Sums above 100% indicate large custodian / prime broker positions where the same shares are reported by multiple filers.
- Custodian badge — filers with more than 5,000 holdings are typically broker-dealers / custodians reporting customer-held shares, not active managers.
Each filer is counted once at its latest 13F-HR filing. New filings are ingested on a weekly cadence.
| # | Filer | Notional Value | % of Total | Period |
|---|
| # | Filer | Notional Value | % of Total | Period |
|---|
GORV Board & Officers
As of SEC filings through Nov 28, 2025Changes in the last 10 years (82)
| Nov 28, 2025 | The company announced the departure of Susan Scarola from the board in an SEC filing |
| Nov 28, 2025 | The company announced the departure of Ronald Fleming from the board in an SEC filing |
| Nov 28, 2025 | The company announced the departure of Ronald Fleming as Interim CEO in an SEC filing |
| Nov 28, 2025 | The company announced the departure of Robert Thomas Devincenzi from the board in an SEC filing |
| Nov 28, 2025 | The company announced the departure of Kyle Richter as Chief Administrative Officer in an SEC filing |
| Nov 28, 2025 | The company announced the departure of Jerry M. Comstock JR from the board in an SEC filing |
| Nov 28, 2025 | The company announced the departure of James J. Fredlake from the board in an SEC filing |
| Nov 28, 2025 | The company announced the departure of Amber Dillard as Chief Operating Officer in an SEC filing |
| Nov 28, 2025 | The company announced the departure of Alexandre Zyngier from the board in an SEC filing |
| Nov 26, 2025 | The company announced the departure of Jeffrey Needles as Chief Financial Officer in an SEC filing |
| Jul 7, 2025 | Alexandre Zyngier became a director |
| May 14, 2025 | The company announced the departure of Suzanne Tager from the board in an SEC filing |
| May 14, 2025 | The company announced the departure of Jordan Gnat from the board in an SEC filing |
| May 14, 2025 | Kyle Richter became Chief Administrative Officer |
| Jan 6, 2025 | Jeffrey Needles became Chief Financial Officer |
| Sep 25, 2024 | Jeff Huddleston became Interim CFO |
| Sep 17, 2024 | Ronald Fleming listed as Interim CEO (previously VP and National GM) in SEC filings |
| Sep 17, 2024 | Ronald Fleming first listed as a director in an SEC filing |
| Sep 17, 2024 | Amber Dillard became Chief Operating Officer |
| Sep 13, 2024 | The company announced the departure of Kelly Porter as Chief Financial Officer in an SEC filing |
| Sep 13, 2024 | John F North left the board, per their own SEC filing |
| Sep 13, 2024 | John F North left as Chief Executive Officer, per their own SEC filing |
| Jun 9, 2024 | The company announced the departure of Christopher S Shackelton from the board in an SEC filing |
| Sep 30, 2023 | Suzanne Tager became a director |
| Sep 30, 2023 | Susan Scarola became a director |
| Sep 1, 2023 | The company announced the departure of Erika Serow from the board in an SEC filing |
| Jun 13, 2023 | James J. Fredlake first listed as a director in an SEC filing |
| May 2, 2023 | Robert Thomas Devincenzi no longer listed as Interim CEO in SEC filings |
| Jan 17, 2023 | Kanen Wealth Management LLC reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Jan 17, 2023 | David Kanen reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Nov 14, 2022 | Bryant R Riley reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Nov 14, 2022 | BRF Investments, LLC reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Nov 14, 2022 | B. Riley Securities, Inc. reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Nov 14, 2022 | B. Riley Principal Investments, LLC reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Nov 14, 2022 | B. Riley Financial, Inc. reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Oct 31, 2022 | Kelly Porter became Chief Financial Officer |
| Oct 25, 2022 | Kanen Wealth Management LLC became a 10% owner |
| Oct 25, 2022 | David Kanen became a 10% owner |
| Oct 7, 2022 | The company announced the departure of Nicholas J Tomashot as Chief Financial Officer in an SEC filing |
| Sep 6, 2022 | John F North became a director |
| Sep 6, 2022 | John F North became Chief Executive Officer |
| Jun 6, 2022 | Bryant R Riley became a 10% owner |
| Jun 6, 2022 | BRF Investments, LLC became a 10% owner |
| Jun 6, 2022 | B. Riley Securities, Inc. became a 10% owner |
| Jun 6, 2022 | B. Riley Principal Investments, LLC became a 10% owner |
| Jun 6, 2022 | B. Riley Financial, Inc. became a 10% owner |
| Jan 12, 2022 | Robert Thomas Devincenzi first on file as Interim CEO |
| Dec 20, 2021 | James J. Fredlake reported in an SEC filing no longer being a director |
| Dec 17, 2021 | The company announced the departure of William P Murnane as Chief Executive Officer in an SEC filing |
| Dec 8, 2021 | William P Murnane no longer listed as a director in SEC filings |
| Dec 6, 2021 | William P Murnane first listed as a director in an SEC filing |
| Oct 21, 2021 | Robert Thomas Devincenzi became a director |
| Oct 20, 2021 | William P Murnane no longer listed as a director in SEC filings |
| Sep 22, 2021 | Wayzata Opportunities Fund Offshore II, L.P. reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Sep 22, 2021 | Wayzata Opportunities Fund II, L.p. reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Sep 22, 2021 | Wayzata Investment Partners LLC reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Sep 22, 2021 | Patrick J. Halloran reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| May 11, 2018 | Nicholas J Tomashot became Chief Financial Officer |
| Mar 15, 2018 | William P Murnane became a director |
| Mar 15, 2018 | William P Murnane became Chief Executive Officer |
| Mar 15, 2018 | Wayzata Opportunities Fund Offshore II, L.P. became a 10% owner |
| Mar 15, 2018 | Wayzata Opportunities Fund II, L.p. became a 10% owner |
| Mar 15, 2018 | Wayzata Investment Partners LLC became a 10% owner |
| Mar 15, 2018 | Ronald Fleming became VP and National GM |
| Mar 15, 2018 | Patrick J. Halloran became a 10% owner |
| Mar 15, 2018 | Maura Berney became Chief Financial Officer |
| Mar 15, 2018 | Jordan Gnat became a director |
| Mar 15, 2018 | Jerry M. Comstock JR became a director |
| Mar 15, 2018 | James J. Fredlake became a director |
| Mar 15, 2018 | Erika Serow became a director |
| Mar 15, 2018 | Coliseum Capital, LLC became a director |
| Mar 15, 2018 | Coliseum Capital, LLC became a 10% owner |
| Mar 15, 2018 | Coliseum Capital Partners, L.p. became a director |
| Mar 15, 2018 | Coliseum Capital Partners, L.p. became a 10% owner |
| Mar 15, 2018 | Coliseum Capital Management, LLC became a director |
| Mar 15, 2018 | Coliseum Capital Management, LLC became a 10% owner |
| Mar 15, 2018 | Christopher S Shackelton became a director |
| Mar 15, 2018 | Christopher S Shackelton became a 10% owner |
| Mar 15, 2018 | Bryan T Rich JR became a director |
| Mar 15, 2018 | B. Luke Weil became a director |
| Mar 15, 2018 | Adam Gray became a director |
| Mar 15, 2018 | Adam Gray became a 10% owner |
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Not reported recently (9)
- Coliseum Capital Partners, L.p. · Last reported as a 10% owner in an SEC filing dated Nov 19, 2024
- Coliseum Capital, LLC · Last reported as a 10% owner in an SEC filing dated Nov 19, 2024
- Coliseum Capital Management, LLC · Last reported as a 10% owner in an SEC filing dated Nov 19, 2024
- Adam Gray · Last reported as a 10% owner in an SEC filing dated Nov 19, 2024
- Christopher S Shackelton · Last reported as a 10% owner in an SEC filing dated Nov 19, 2024
- Jeff Huddleston · Last reported as Interim CFO in an SEC filing dated Oct 7, 2024
- B. Luke Weil · Last reported as a director in an SEC filing dated May 18, 2020
- Bryan T Rich JR · Last reported as a director in an SEC filing dated Mar 27, 2018
- Maura Berney · Last reported as Chief Financial Officer in an SEC filing dated Mar 20, 2018
GORV Proposed Insider Sales (Form 144)
Latest: 2025-11-26What is Form 144? A notice of intent to sell restricted or control stock under Rule 144. Affiliates (officers, directors, 10%+ owners) and holders of restricted shares must file Form 144 when planning to sell more than 5,000 shares or $50,000 in any 3-month rolling window.
How it relates to Form 4: Form 144 is filed before the trade (up to 90 days in advance); Form 4 is filed within 2 business days after the trade executes. Not every Form 144 results in a sale — the filer may cancel or delay. Look for the corresponding Form 4 on the Insider Activity card to confirm a sale actually happened.
10b5-1 plans: Trades made under a pre-scheduled Rule 10b5-1 plan are not discretionary — they execute automatically on dates set months earlier, regardless of news. High 10b5-1 percentages mean less per-filing signal value, though cumulative selling volume still matters.
"Notice value": Aggregate market value the filer wrote into the Form 144 — i.e. the size of the planned sale, not necessarily the executed dollars. An amended notice (Form 144/A) replaces the original it amends, and cancelled notices are dropped, so neither is double-counted above. A filed value that is clearly inconsistent with the share count at the stock's price (a filer typo) shows as a dash and is left out of the totals.
Source & freshness: Sourced from public Form 144 filings. Refreshed daily; new filings typically appear here the morning after they are filed.
| Filed | Filer | Role | Shares | Notice Value | Planned Sale | Broker | Plan | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025-11-26 | James J. Fredlake | Director | 1,154 | $889 | 2025-11-26 | J.P. Morgan Securities LLC | — | EDGAR |
| 2025-11-19 | ROBERT T DEVINCENZI | Director | 1,714 | $1.9K | 2025-11-19 | Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC … | — | EDGAR |
| # | ETF | Provider | Weight | $ Exposure | ETF AUM | As Of |
|---|
Quarterly filings sourced from SEC 10-Q / 10-K reports. TTM tiles aggregate the most recent four quarters; bars show the last ~12 quarters oldest → newest.
- Revenue — top-line sales. Look for consistent YoY growth; seasonal businesses need same-quarter comparisons (Q4 '24 vs Q4 '23).
- Net Income — bottom-line profit after all expenses. Can be volatile from one-time items; red bars = net loss.
- Diluted EPS — net income per share assuming options/converts are exercised. Direct input to the P/E ratio.
- Operating Cash Flow — cash generated from core operations, before capex and financing. Harder to manipulate than net income; growing OCF is a quality signal.
- Sequential growth — quarter-over-quarter trend. Accelerating bars are a momentum signal.
- YoY growth — compare to the same quarter a year earlier to remove seasonality.
- Quality — OCF should roughly track Net Income over time. Large divergence (net income ≫ OCF) flags accruals risk.
- Margins — scan the bar ratios: Net Income / Revenue tells you margin trend without needing a separate chart.
TTM (trailing-twelve-month) smooths seasonality and is used for the P/E calculation. Filings appear 30–90 days after the period closes.
Quarterly figures (7 quarters)
| Quarter | Period End | Revenue | Net Income | Diluted EPS | Op. Cash Flow |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Q3 '25 | 2025-09-30 | $101.43M | $-82.38M | $-21.99 | $-23.39M |
| Q2 '25 | 2025-06-30 | $131.30M | $-24.59M | $-6.67 | $-18.67M |
| Q1 '25 | 2025-03-31 | $165.81M | $-9.53M | $-2.70 | $26.03M |
| Q4 '24 | 2024-12-31 | $148.82M | $-78.11M | $-56.40 | $-4.21M |
| Q3 '24 | 2024-09-30 | $205.96M | $-19.82M | $-41.19 | $-2.75M |
| Q2 '24 | 2024-06-30 | $235.60M | $-46.25M | $-96.53 | $21.07M |
| Q1 '24 | 2024-03-31 | $270.12M | $-23.96M | $-50.10 | $80.24M |
Ratios derived from TTM financials and the current market price, sampled daily. History chart shows how expensive the stock is today relative to its own recent past.
- P/E — price / TTM earnings. Rough market rule: 10–15 value, 15–25 market, >30 growth/premium. Negative when earnings are negative.
- P/B — price / book value. Useful for financials and asset-heavy names; meaningless for asset-light software.
- P/S — price / TTM revenue. Useful when earnings are negative or noisy (early-stage growth).
- EV/EBITDA — capital-structure-neutral. <10 cheap, 10–15 reasonable, >20 rich. Good for comparing across leverage profiles.
- EV/Sales — like P/S but accounts for debt + cash. Compare within sector.
- ROE — return on equity. >15% strong, >25% exceptional. Caution: high leverage inflates ROE.
- ROA — return on assets. Leverage-neutral; >5% solid, >10% exceptional.
- Div Yield — annual dividend / price. Compare to 10Y Treasury; sustained yield >6% often signals distress.
- FCF Yield — free cash flow / market cap. >5% is attractive; negative means burning cash.
- Debt/Equity — leverage. <1 conservative, >2 aggressive. Sector-dependent (utilities naturally high, tech low).
- Current Ratio — short-term liquidity. >1.5 comfortable, <1 raises short-term solvency flags.
- Compare current level to the 3-year band: near the high end = relatively expensive; near the low = relatively cheap.
- Multiples expanding while earnings are flat = sentiment-driven rally.
- Multiples compressing while earnings grow = value coming from fundamentals.
GORV vs Peers
Related companies, largest first| Company | Market cap | P/E | Revenue growth | YTD | IV rank |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVNA Carvana Co. | $79.2B | 44.9 | +50.3% | −14.7% | 22 |
| CPRT Copart Inc | $29.1B | 20.0 | +0.4% | −18.1% | 64 |
| CASY Casey's General Stores Inc | $25.8B | 33.0 | +13.8% | +23.0% | 91 |
| PAG Penske Automotive Group, Inc. | $13.9B | 14.8 | +1.4% | +34.1% | 5 |
| MUSA MURPHY USA INC. | $9.3B | 14.4 | +20.2% | +26.2% | 30 |
| KMX CarMax Inc. | $7.2B | 24.5 | +4.8% | +28.0% | 86 |
| RUSHB Rush Enterprises Inc | $7.0B | — | — | +55.9% | — |
| LAD Lithia Motors, Inc. | $6.4B | 8.3 | +1.6% | −12.8% | 51 |
| GORV Lazydays Holdings, Inc. Common Stock | $2M | — | −39.8% | −98.5% | — |
| Peer median | $11.6B | 20.0 | +4.8% | +24.6% | 51 |
P/E uses the latest reported trailing-12-month diluted EPS; "—" means no positive earnings or no data.
Regulatory short-interest reports publish on a bi-weekly settlement cadence; short-volume is reported daily by the trade-reporting facilities. Float is derived from insider-ownership filings.
- Short Interest — total shares currently sold short as of the settlement date. Lags real time by ~8 business days.
- SI % of Float — short interest / free float. The key crowding metric.
- Days to Cover — short interest / avg daily volume. How many full trading days it would take shorts to buy back. High DTC + catalyst = squeeze fuel.
- Short Vol Ratio — today's short-sale volume / total volume. Intraday selling pressure proxy (not the same as short interest).
- Free Float — shares available for public trading (total shares minus insider / restricted).
- Float % — free float / shares outstanding. <50% = tightly held, more prone to squeezes.
- SI % of Float < 5% — typical, no particular signal.
- 5–15% — elevated; watch for catalysts (earnings, guidance, macro).
- 15–30% — heavily shorted; tight-float names in this range have produced notable squeezes historically.
- >30% — extreme; borrow is likely expensive and squeeze risk is material.
- Days to Cover > 5 combined with high SI% amplifies squeeze potential.
- Trend matters more than level. Rapidly rising short interest often precedes negative catalysts or heavy hedging.
- A sudden drop in SI after a rally may indicate a squeeze in progress.
Short interest is reported mid-month and end-of-month; short volume is daily.