COO The Cooper Companies, Inc. Common Stock
XNAS
57.94
Delayed
Stock quote, options chain, IV rank, technicals, AI analysis, and institutional ownership. Iron condor setups Expected move IV rank history Fibonacci levels Insider trading
Market data may be delayed, incomplete, or inaccurate. Not a recommendation to buy, sell, or hold any security. Verify quotes with your broker before trading. See Terms §17.
- 52-Week Range
- $51.01 – $89.83
- YTD
- -28.57%
- IV Rank (30D)
- 24.06
- Straddle Price
- $4.83
- P/C Vol Ratio
- 0.72
- Market Cap
- $10.9B
- Open
- $58.00
- Day Range
- $57.37 – $58.25
- Volume
- 3,774,075
- Prev Close
- $57.40
A blended fair-value estimate combining up to six valuation methods. Each method is weighted by how well it fits the company — DCF down-weights for unprofitable names; DDM only fires for steady dividend payers; comparables down-weight when peer multiples disagree.
- DCF (quality-aware) — projects free cash flow with a horizon that scales to business quality. True compounders (quality 6/6) get 10 years explicit + 10 years fade before terminal; cyclical/struggling names (quality 0-1) get a 5-year terminal cliff. Quality is scored from ROE, gross margin, growth, FCF margin, debt load, and FCF consistency — the same factors that drive market premium for compounders.
- Market-Implied Growth (in Model Inputs) — reverse-DCF that answers "what growth rate is the market pricing in?". Lets you sanity-check the deviation: if implied growth is plausible for the business, the model's bearish flag may be wrong; if implausible, the market may be over-extrapolating.
- DDM (Gordon Growth Dividend Model) — values the stream of future dividends. Only used when trailing yield ≥ 2% and dividend payments are stable — below that the dividend is a token payout and Gordon (which values only the dividend stream) systematically underprices growth names, so those route to DCF + comparables + market anchor instead.
- P/E, EV/EBITDA, P/B, P/S — applies the peer-group median multiple to this company's per-share metric. Peers come from the same set as the "Related symbols" card. Earnings/sales metrics are forward-tilted by the company's recent revenue growth (capped at 25%) so they're comparable to peers' growth-embedded multiples — mimics how analysts use NTM rather than TTM. Per-multiple weights are biased by company quality (e.g. P/B down-weighted for asset-light tech).
- Market Anchor (SMA50) — the 50-day moving average, weighted by recent trading-range stability (tighter Bollinger bands → higher weight). Captures information fundamentals miss (forward consensus, sentiment, supply/demand) — but only when recent trading is steady enough that the market has converged on a view. During wild breakouts or breakdowns the anchor's weight collapses.
- Options Expected (B-L 30d) — the risk-neutral expected stock price at 30-day options expiration, derived from the full implied-volatility surface via Breeden-Litzenberger (second derivative of call price wrt strike → implied PDF, then E[S_T]). Forward-looking, captures all options-implied information (smile, skew, term structure) in one number. Weighted by chain liquidity. SP500-only at present (pre-computed daily). Backtest evidence: adds modest alpha across most bucket × holding combos.
- Blended value — weighted average. Confidence reflects how many methods fired and how tight peer dispersion is.
- Deviation pill — green when blended FV ≥ 10% above current price (undervalued); red when ≥ 10% below; grey otherwise.
| 10-yr Treasury (rf) | 5.21% |
| Beta vs SPY | 0.98 |
| Cost of Equity (CAPM) | 10.09% (VRP-adj) |
| WACC | 9.40% |
| Volatility Risk Premium | +6.7pp (IV − HV30) |
| Effective Tax Rate | 21.0% |
| Rev. Growth (YoY, DCF input) | +0.1% |
| DCF Horizon | 12 years explicit + fade |
| Forward Tilt (NTM/TTM) | ×1.00 (applied to P/E, EV/EBITDA, P/S) |
| Free Cash Flow (TTM) | $0.7B |
| Return on Equity (TTM) | 6.9% |
| Book / Price | 74.1% — banking bias active (P/B is primary) |
| Gross Margin (TTM) | 65.9% |
| FCF Margin (TTM) | 16.0% |
| Debt / Equity | 0.23 |
| Quality Score | 4/6 — high quality (12y DCF) |
| Market-Implied Growth | +6.5% (reverse-DCF on current price) |
| SMA 50 | $63.86 (Market Anchor value) |
| SMA 20 / Bollinger Mid | $55.73 |
| Bollinger Width / SMA20 | 13.2% (drives anchor stability) |
| Net Debt | $1.8B |
| Market Cap | $11B |
| Method | Implied Price | Weight | Detail |
|---|---|---|---|
| DCF | $35.19 | 22% | |
| DDM (Gordon) | n/a | 0% | |
| Peer P/E | $160.38 | 7% | median 54.7× · 3 peers |
| Peer EV/EBITDA | $48.99 | 7% | median 12.2× · 3 peers |
| Peer P/B | $102.94 | 7% | median 2.4× · 3 peers |
| Peer P/S | $53.72 | 7% | median 2.5× · 3 peers |
| Market Anchor (SMA50) | $63.86 | 38% | stability 85% (BB-width) |
| Options Expected (B-L 30d) | $57.34 | 12% | 11 strikes · skew +0.62 |

- Industry (SIC)
- OPHTHALMIC GOODS (3851) · industry map
- Exchange
- XNAS
- Market Cap
- $10.9B
- Employees
- 15,000
- List Date
- 1983-01-21
- CIK
- 0000711404
- Next Earnings
- 2026-12-03 (After-Close)
- EPS Forecast
- $1.07 (7 est.)
- Headquarters
- San Ramon, CA
- Homepage
- https://www.coopercos.com
CooperCompanies is one of the largest eyecare companies in the US. It operates in two segments: CooperVision and CooperSurgical. CooperVision is a pure-play contact lens business with a suite of spherical, multifocal, and toric contact lenses. The company also has one of the most comprehensive specialty lens portfolios in the world. With brands including Proclear, Biofinity, MyDay, and Clariti, Cooper controls roughly one fourth of the US contact lens market. CooperSurgical, founded in 1990, is made up of equipment related to reproductive care, fertility, and women's care. Cooper has the broad…
Each spoke is this symbol's rank within its sector (0–100; the dotted ring marks the sector median at 50). Higher is more constructive for a long. One spoke — News sentiment — is an absolute reading, not a sector rank. Grayed spokes have no data. A fuller shape is a summary, not a recommendation.
| Month | '21 | '22 | '23 | '24 | '25 | '26 | Avg |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jan | 1.90% | -5.53% | 4.88% | -0.01% | 6.50% | 0.33% | 1.34% |
| Feb | 5.76% | 3.11% | -8.30% | -1.87% | -5.20% | 3.74% | -0.46% |
| Mar | -1.73% | 1.53% | 15.39% | -0.71% | -7.97% | -14.80% | -1.38% |
| Apr | 6.59% | -15.73% | 3.55% | -10.26% | 0.49% | -11.94% | -4.55% |
| May | -4.52% | -1.76% | -3.19% | 5.19% | -15.85% | -1.84% | -3.66% |
| Jun | 1.51% | -8.77% | 2.47% | -7.83% | 6.21% | 19.14% | 2.12% |
| Jul | 4.66% | 2.67% | 3.67% | 8.03% | -2.91% | 0.43% | 2.76% |
| Aug | 6.40% | -11.66% | -5.13% | 12.24% | -4.90% | -5.58% | -1.44% |
| Sep | -8.35% | -12.07% | -12.80% | 4.04% | 4.94% | -18.40% | -7.11% |
| Oct | 0.01% | 0.05% | -0.05% | -3.40% | 2.70% | 0.92%* | 0.04% |
| Nov | -10.78% | 13.39% | 6.31% | -1.31% | 11.62% | -- | 3.85% |
| Dec | 12.16% | 1.24% | 10.95% | -10.75% | 5.88% | -- | 3.90% |
| Total | 11.75% | -31.58% | 15.26% | -9.02% | -1.86% | -28.68% | -7.35% |
Quick-reference for reading the values below. Indicators combine to confirm a view — no single one is a trade signal on its own.
- SMA 20 / 50 / 200 — price above = uptrend, below = downtrend. SMA 50 crossing SMA 200 is the golden/death cross.
- EMA 12 / 26 — faster-reacting averages; 12 above 26 is short-term bullish.
- MACD — bullish when MACD > signal (green badge), bearish when below. Divergence from price often precedes reversals.
- ADX (14) — trend strength regardless of direction. <20 range, 20–25 weak trend, 25–50 trend, >50 strong trend.
- +DI / −DI — +DI > −DI favors bulls; the reverse favors bears. Read alongside ADX.
- RSI (14) — <30 oversold, >70 overbought. 40–60 is neutral; trending names can stay extreme.
- Stochastic %K / %D — <20 oversold, >80 overbought. %K crossing %D is an early momentum signal.
- Williams %R — inverted scale: <−80 oversold, >−20 overbought.
Oscillators work best in range-bound markets; in strong trends they give premature reversal signals.
- Bollinger Bands — price at upper band = overbought, lower = oversold. Narrow bands (squeeze) often precede expansion.
- OBV — cumulative volume; rising OBV confirms uptrend, falling OBV confirms downtrend. Divergence from price is a warning.
- Vol SMA 20 / Vol ROC — today's volume vs. 20-day average. Positive ROC with price move = conviction.
- ATR / True Range — average daily $ move; sizing and stop-loss reference.
- HV 20 / 30 / 60 — realized (historical) volatility. Compare to IV on the options cards: IV > HV = rich premium.
Confluence matters: trend + momentum + volume agreeing carries far more weight than any single indicator. For how these feed the spread scanner score, see the algorithm docs →
Trend Indicators
Momentum Oscillators
Volume & Volatility
Data Summary
LLM Stock Analysis Report
Executive Summary
Overall assessment: BEARISH with confidence level (6/10)
Key drivers:
- Bearish MACD signal and momentum indicators
- Oversold RSI and stochastic oscillators
- Recent negative news headlines from Zacks Investment Research
Primary risks:
- Potential for further price decline if market sentiment continues to deteriorate
- Lack of catalysts to drive a near-term reversal
Investment thesis: The stock is in a downtrend, with bearish momentum indicators and oversold technical readings. While there are some positive news headlines, the negative sentiment from Zacks Investment Research may continue to weigh on the stock.
Recent news sentiment impact: The recent negative headline from Zacks Investment Research has likely contributed to the stock's decline.
Technical Analysis
Trend direction: Short-term (1-4 weeks) downtrend
Support/resistance levels:
- Lower Bollinger Band: $65.33 (strong support)
- Previous low: $63.00 (support)
- Upper Bollinger Band: $80.01 (resistance)
Momentum signals:
- RSI interpretation: Oversold (<30), indicating potential for a short-term bounce
- MACD signal: Bearish, indicating further downside momentum
- Bollinger Bands position: Oversold, indicating potential for a mean reversion
Volume analysis:
- Volume trends: Low volume on the recent decline, suggesting a lack of institutional interest
- Institutional interest signals: None evident from options activity
News & Sentiment Analysis
Recent headlines summary: Two negative news headlines and one neutral headline have contributed to the stock's decline.
Sentiment assessment: Negative sentiment dominates, with two out of three recent headlines having a negative tone.
Catalyst identification: None evident from recent news or technical indicators.
Market narrative: The market is currently bearish, with a focus on interest rates and inflation. This has led to a downtrend in the stock.
Risk & Volatility Assessment
Risk assessment:
- Beta: 0.54 (low risk relative to market)
- Volatility regime: Low volatility, indicating a lack of market movement
Options market signals:
- IV rank: 26.0% (medium), suggesting historically average volatility
- Put/call ratios: Bullish sentiment, with more calls than puts
- Unusual activity: None evident from options trading activity
Downside protection: Support levels and risk management considerations suggest a potential bounce to the lower Bollinger Band or previous low.
Market Context & Positioning
Market context:
- Sector performance: The healthcare sector has been under pressure, with some stocks experiencing significant declines.
- Institutional activity: None evident from recent volume trends or options activity.
- Correlation analysis: The stock is negatively correlated with the market (R-squared interpretation).
Relative valuation: The stock is trading within its historical range, suggesting a potential reversal if market sentiment improves.
Key Levels & Action Items
Critical price levels:
- Support: $65.33 (lower Bollinger Band)
- Resistance: $80.01 (upper Bollinger Band)
Breakout/breakdown levels:
- Breakout above resistance: $85.00 (strong buy signal)
- Breakdown below support: $60.00 (strong sell signal)
Time-sensitive catalysts: None evident from recent news or technical indicators.
Risk management: A stop-loss level could be set at the lower Bollinger Band ($65.33) to limit potential losses. Position sizing considerations suggest a cautious approach, with a focus on managing risk rather than seeking returns.
| Earnings Date | Timing | Expected Move | Actual Move | Ratio | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021-03-04 | After-Close | 54.59% | 4.47% | 0.08x | Within |
| 2021-06-03 | After-Close | 6.01% | 0.55% | 0.09x | Within |
| 2021-09-02 | After-Close | 5.10% | 1.23% | 0.24x | Within |
| 2021-12-02 | After-Close | 7.13% | 3.60% | 0.50x | Within |
| 2022-03-03 | After-Close | 6.16% | 1.77% | 0.29x | Within |
| 2022-06-02 | After-Close | 6.06% | 2.99% | 0.49x | Within |
| 2022-08-31 | After-Close | 23.17% | 4.41% | 0.19x | Within |
| 2022-12-08 | After-Close | 18.41% | 3.12% | 0.17x | Within |
| 2023-03-02 | After-Close | 18.48% | 7.30% | 0.40x | Within |
| 2023-06-01 | After-Close | 6.08% | 4.74% | 0.78x | Within |
| 2023-08-30 | After-Close | 5.36% | 2.85% | 0.53x | Within |
| 2023-12-07 | After-Close | 5.88% | 2.88% | 0.49x | Within |
| 2024-02-29 | After-Close | 6.25% | 9.18% | 1.47x | Exceeded |
| 2024-05-30 | After-Close | 8.26% | 4.52% | 0.55x | Within |
| 2024-08-28 | After-Close | 8.67% | 11.84% | 1.37x | Exceeded |
| 2024-12-05 | After-Close | 7.44% | 4.39% | 0.59x | Within |
| 2025-05-29 | After-Close | 8.82% | 14.61% | 1.66x | Exceeded |
| 2025-08-27 | After-Close | 9.07% | 12.85% | 1.42x | Exceeded |
| 2025-12-04 | After-Close | 10.52% | 5.67% | 0.54x | Within |
| 2026-03-05 | After-Close | 9.79% | 4.55% | 0.46x | Within |
| 2026-06-04 | After-Close | 9.47% | 8.58% | 0.91x | Within |
| 2026-09-09 | After-Close | 11.50% | 14.67% | 1.28x | Exceeded |
Earnings calendar: this week’s reports with expected vs actual moves →
COO Options Activity & IV Rank
COO IV rank history, 52-week IV rank and IV percentile →
Volatility Metrics
Options Flow
ATM Options Pricing
Chain Summary
Each spread is ranked by a composite score built in three stages. Full documentation →
score = P(profit) × (credit / spread_width)
P(profit) from short leg delta (1 − |delta|), penalised above 85%. Credit uses mid-price to handle illiquid chains fairly.
RR and BF (30-delta) from the persisted per-symbol skew snapshot — wing strikes picked by real greeks.delta, not a moneyness proxy. Put skew boosts bull puts, penalises bear calls. High butterfly boosts iron condors. Calendars are skew-neutral.
- RSI <40 bullish / >60 bearish
- MACD crossover + histogram trend
- Price vs SMA 50 & SMA 200
- Stochastic %K <20 / >80
- Williams %R <−80 / >−20
- Blended ATR + straddle expected-move penalty
- Bollinger Band signal (+ counter-trend penalty)
- BB width — vol contraction boost for ICs
- IV rank ≥ 75 → strong boost for credit spreads
- IV rank < 25 → penalty (selling cheap vol)
- Min open interest across all legs
- OI < 100 → −0.10 · OI < 500 → −0.05
score = base_score × skew_multiplier × tech_multiplier
Both multipliers are shown per spread. Beta is informational only — ATR already captures realized vol. Full algorithm documentation →
Enter a ticker to scan for optimal spread opportunities.
Evaluates all bull put, bear call, iron condor, and calendar spread combinations using GPU-accelerated analysis.
Estimated net dealer gamma is at the 53rd percentile of this name's own daily history, within its typical range. This describes current positioning; it is not a forecast or a trading signal.
Net dealer gamma is an estimate of the aggregate gamma held by options market makers across this name's option chain, weighted by open interest. Dealer positions aren't public, so it uses a standard simplifying assumption: dealers are treated as long the calls and short the puts that are open. Actual dealer books can differ.
Gamma percentile ranks today's estimate against this name's own daily history, from 0% (the lowest reading on record) to 100% (the highest). Raw gamma scales with how much open interest a chain carries, so it isn't comparable across names; the percentile is. The badge marks the bottom 20% as low and the top 20% as high.
Tilts run from −1 to +1 and show how lopsided the estimated dealer exposure is. GEX tilt compares call gamma with put gamma. Vanna tilt describes how the hedge would shift if implied volatility changed, and charm tilt how it would shift with the passage of time.
This card describes estimated positioning and where it sits historically. It is not a forecast of price direction or volatility and not a trading signal. Market-wide view: Dealer positioning screener.
IV(put wing) − IV(ATM), in vol pointsHow much the OTM put trades above (or below) the at-the-money strike. Measures the height of the put-side tail relative to ATM — i.e. how expensive crash insurance is on this name.
- Positive (typical) — wing IV > ATM IV. Standard equity put skew: portfolios bid up crash protection, so OTM puts trade richer than ATM.
- Near zero or negative (unusual) — wing IV ≤ ATM IV. Flat or inverted put side. Common when there's no fear demand, in tightly mean-reverting names, or right after an earnings catalyst clears.
- Percentile vs own 3-yr history: high = wings rich (good time to sell wing premium); low = wings cheap (good time to buy protection).
- Not directional — high or low wings don't predict up or down moves. It's a price tag on tail insurance, not a forecast.
IV(call wing) − IV(put wing), equal delta on each sideWhich side of the smile is the market paying up for? Measures the tilt of the surface — call skew vs put skew at matched deltas.
- Negative (typical) — puts richer than calls. Standard equity behavior: hedging demand makes puts carry a premium. Most large-caps sit in the −1 to −5 vol-point range.
- Strongly negative (< −5 pts) — heavy downside hedging, elevated fear, or an upcoming catalyst (earnings, FDA, macro event). Worth flagging.
- Positive — calls richer than puts. Unusual for equities; signals bullish momentum, short-squeeze positioning, or takeover/M&A speculation.
- Near zero — symmetric surface. Market sees roughly equal up/down risk. Rare for large-caps; more common in commodities and FX.
Wing-vs-ATM tells you how expensive the tails are. Risk Reversal tells you which side is favored. Combined:
- High wing percentile + deeply negative RR → strong put bid; stress or major event priced in. Owning protection costs a premium; selling put premium is dangerous.
- Low wing percentile + near-zero RR → complacency; insurance cheap and balanced. Good environment to add cheap downside hedges.
- Positive RR + elevated wings → call-side fear-of-missing-out; common in squeeze setups. Upside calls expensive, downside puts not bid.
Percentile is the rank of today's reading within ~3 years of this symbol's own history. High percentile = wings are rich relative to history; not a directional signal. Skew is read off the chain in real time, not from CBOE SKEW.
Enter a ticker to render the implied volatility surface.
Enter a ticker to render the implied volatility smile.
Risk Metrics
Analysis Details
Data Points: 251
Period: 252 trading days
Low volatility - stock moves less than market
| Investor | Value | Share of their portfolio | Rank | Q/Q shares | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Citadel Hedge fund Ken Griffin | $277.7M | #112 of 6285 | +1911.4% | 13F | |
| Millennium Management Hedge fund Izzy Englander | $36.2M | #778 of 3716 | +369.1% | 13F | |
| Bridgewater Associates Hedge fund Ray Dalio | $3.7M | #543 of 997 | +737.3% | 13F | |
| Rockefeller Capital Management Family office Rockefeller family | $652K | #1943 of 4729 | -33.0% | 13F |
Hedge funds, activists, holding companies and family offices we track, from their latest 13F (quarter-end value) and Form 4 filings in the last 3 years. Family offices · all institutions
COO Institutional Ownership (13F)
Latest filings — 2026-09-30Institutional managers with $100M+ AUM file Form 13F-HR quarterly, due 45 days after quarter end. Holdings are reported gross at quarter-end market value — they are a snapshot, not a real-time position.
- Shares — long equity positions in this name, aggregated across share classes.
- Calls / Puts — notional value of long call / put exposure where this ticker is the underlying.
- % of Float — holder's reported shares divided by the latest diluted shares outstanding. Sums above 100% indicate large custodian / prime broker positions where the same shares are reported by multiple filers.
- Custodian badge — filers with more than 5,000 holdings are typically broker-dealers / custodians reporting customer-held shares, not active managers.
Each filer is counted once at its latest 13F-HR filing. New filings are ingested on a weekly cadence.
| # | Filer | Notional Value | % of Total | Period |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Millennium Management LLC Custodian | $7.17M | 37.96% | 2026-06-30 |
| 2 | Susquehanna International Group, LLP Custodian | $6.31M | 33.40% | 2026-06-30 |
| 3 | Citadel Advisors LLC Custodian | $2.38M | 12.60% | 2026-06-30 |
| 4 | Wolverine Trading, LLC Custodian | $1.13M | 5.98% | 2025-09-30 |
| 5 | Walleye Trading LLC | $824.66K | 4.37% | 2026-06-30 |
| 6 | Jane Street Group, LLC Custodian | $602.36K | 3.19% | 2026-06-30 |
| 7 | Walleye Capital LLC | $473.29K | 2.51% | 2026-06-30 |
| # | Filer | Notional Value | % of Total | Period |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Susquehanna International Group, LLP Custodian | $7.78M | 52.85% | 2026-06-30 |
| 2 | Citadel Advisors LLC Custodian | $2.78M | 18.90% | 2026-06-30 |
| 3 | Wolverine Trading, LLC Custodian | $2.27M | 15.44% | 2025-09-30 |
| 4 | Walleye Trading LLC | $767.30K | 5.21% | 2026-06-30 |
| 5 | Walleye Capital LLC | $494.80K | 3.36% | 2026-06-30 |
| 6 | Jane Street Group, LLC Custodian | $337.04K | 2.29% | 2026-06-30 |
| 7 | Twin Tree Management, LP | $286.84K | 1.95% | 2026-06-30 |
COO Insider Trading (Form 4)
Latest: 2026-09-17| Filed | Reporter | Role | Action | Shares | Avg Price | Net $ | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 | Lawrence Erik Kurzius | Director | Buy (P) | +10,000 | $54.93 | $549.3K | EDGAR |
| 2026-09-15 | Lawrence Erik Kurzius | Director | Buy (P) | +10,000 | $53.91 | $539.1K | EDGAR |
| 2026-09-15 | Walter M Rosebrough Jr | Director | Buy (P) | +10,000 | $54.16 | $541.6K | EDGAR |
| 2026-09-15 | Paul A Keel | Director | Buy (P) | +4,701 | $53.18 | $250.0K | EDGAR |
| 2026-07-06 | Paul A Keel | Director | Grant (A) | +2,814 RSU | — | EDGAR | |
| 2026-04-21 | Walter M Rosebrough Jr | Director | Exer (M) | +832 | — | EDGAR | |
| 2026-04-06 | Lawrence Erik Kurzius | Director | Exer (M) | +3,322 | — | EDGAR | |
| 2026-04-06 | Cynthia L Lucchese | Director | Exer (M) | +3,322 | — | EDGAR | |
| 2026-04-06 | Teresa S Madden | Director | Exer (M) | +3,322 | — | EDGAR | |
| 2026-04-06 | Walter M Rosebrough Jr | Director | Grant (A) | +3,779 RSU | — | EDGAR | |
| 2026-04-06 | Barbara Carbone | Director | Exer (M) | +3,050 | — | EDGAR | |
| 2026-04-06 | Colleen Jay | Director | Exer (M) | +3,322 | — | EDGAR | |
| 2026-04-06 | Maria Rivas | Director | Exer (M) | +3,322 | — | EDGAR | |
| 2026-04-06 | Robert S Weiss | Director | Exer (M) | +3,654 | — | EDGAR | |
| 2026-02-13 | Albert G White III | President & CEO | Grant (A) | +184,069 opt | — | EDGAR |
COO Insider Holdings
17 insiders · @ $57.94| # | Insider | Role | Shares | Disclosed Exposure | Lifetime OM Net | Filings | Last Filed |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Robert S Weiss | Director | 550,459 | $31.89M | -$242.52M | 62 | 2026-04-06 |
| 2 | Albert G White III | President & CEO | 254,491 | $14.75M | -$57.24M | 60 | 2026-02-13 |
| 3 | Daniel G McBride | EVP & Chief Operating Officer | 170,503 | $9.88M | -$70.89M | 63 | 2026-01-12 |
| 4 | Holly R Sheffield | President, CSI | 48,917 | $2.83M | $597.5K | 24 | 2026-01-12 |
| 5 | Colleen Jay | Director | 39,907 | $2.31M | $0 | 15 | 2026-04-06 |
| 6 | William A Kozy | Director | 31,149 | $1.80M | $50.4K | 15 | 2025-04-03 |
| 7 | Lawrence Erik Kurzius | Director | 31,099 | $1.80M | $1.39M | 8 | 2026-09-17 |
| 8 | Brian G Andrews | EVP, CFO & Treasurer | 30,728 | $1.78M | -$5.26M | 27 | 2026-02-13 |
| 9 | Gerard H Warner III | President, CooperVision, Inc. | 25,357 | $1.47M | -$313.7K | 11 | 2026-01-12 |
| 10 | Walter M Rosebrough Jr | Director | 20,832 | $1.21M | $541.6K | 3 | 2026-09-15 |
COO Proposed Insider Sales (Form 144)
Latest: 2024-09-19What is Form 144? A notice of intent to sell restricted or control stock under Rule 144. Affiliates (officers, directors, 10%+ owners) and holders of restricted shares must file Form 144 when planning to sell more than 5,000 shares or $50,000 in any 3-month rolling window.
How it relates to Form 4: Form 144 is filed before the trade (up to 90 days in advance); Form 4 is filed within 2 business days after the trade executes. Not every Form 144 results in a sale — the filer may cancel or delay. Look for the corresponding Form 4 on the Insider Activity card to confirm a sale actually happened.
10b5-1 plans: Trades made under a pre-scheduled Rule 10b5-1 plan are not discretionary — they execute automatically on dates set months earlier, regardless of news. High 10b5-1 percentages mean less per-filing signal value, though cumulative selling volume still matters.
"Notice value": Aggregate market value the filer wrote into the Form 144 — i.e. the size of the planned sale, not necessarily the executed dollars. An amended notice (Form 144/A) replaces the original it amends, and cancelled notices are dropped, so neither is double-counted above. A filed value that is clearly inconsistent with the share count at the stock's price (a filer typo) shows as a dash and is left out of the totals.
Source & freshness: Sourced from public Form 144 filings. Refreshed daily; new filings typically appear here the morning after they are filed.
| Filed | Filer | Role | Shares | Notice Value | Planned Sale | Broker | Plan | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024-09-19 | Albert G. White III | Officer | 114,992 | $12.71M | 2024-09-19 | UBS Financial Services Inc | — | EDGAR |
| 2024-09-10 | Agostino Ricupati | Director | 1,601 | $172.9K | 2024-09-10 | UBS Financial Services Inc | — | EDGAR |
| 2024-09-05 | Brian G. Andrews | Officer | 24,788 | $2.62M | 2024-09-05 | UBS Financial Services Inc | — | EDGAR |
| 2024-09-04 | Daniel McBride | Officer | 114,992 | $12.13M | 2024-09-04 | UBS Financial Services Inc | — | EDGAR |
| 2024-06-04 | Gary and Catherine Petersmeyer Trust dated November 9, 1999 | Director | 300 | $28.2K | 2024-06-04 | UBS Financial Services Inc | — | EDGAR |
| 2024-04-18 | Gary and Catherine Petersmeyer Trust dated November 9, 1999 | Director | 1,106 | $99.8K | 2024-04-18 | UBS Financial Services Inc | — | EDGAR |
| 2024-04-09 | Gary and Catherine Petersmeyer Trust dated November 9, 1999 | Director | 500 | $49.2K | 2024-04-09 | UBS Financial Services Inc | — | EDGAR |
| 2024-04-04 | Gary and Catherine Petersmeyer Trust dated November 9, 1999 | Director | 1,005 | $100.4K | 2024-04-04 | UBS Financial Services Inc | — | EDGAR |
| 2024-03-18 | Agostino Ricupati | Officer | 54,724 | $5.52M | 2024-03-18 | UBS Financial Services Inc | — | EDGAR |
| 2024-03-07 | Robert Weiss | Director | 241,288 | $24.00M | 2024-03-07 | UBS Financial Services Inc | — | EDGAR |
| Filing Date | Accession | Link |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-04 | 0001628280-26-040823 | EDGAR |
| 2026-05-04 | 0001628280-26-029853 | EDGAR |
| 2026-04-08 | 0001628280-26-024273 | EDGAR |
| 2026-03-05 | 0001628280-26-015231 | EDGAR |
| 2026-02-04 | 0001193125-26-036476 | EDGAR |
| 2025-12-23 | 0001193125-25-331117 | EDGAR |
| 2025-12-12 | 0001628280-25-056796 | EDGAR |
| 2025-12-04 | 0001628280-25-055405 | EDGAR |
| 2025-08-27 | 0000711404-25-000046 | EDGAR |
| 2025-05-29 | 0000711404-25-000036 | EDGAR |
| Filing Date | Accession | Link |
|---|---|---|
| 2025-12-05 | 0001628280-25-055615 | EDGAR |
| 2024-12-06 | 0000711404-24-000074 | EDGAR |
| 2023-12-08 | 0000711404-23-000072 | EDGAR |
| 2022-12-09 | 0000711404-22-000053 | EDGAR |
| 2021-12-10 | 0000711404-21-000038 | EDGAR |
| 2020-12-11 | 0000711404-20-000042 | EDGAR |
| 2019-12-20 | 0000711404-19-000051 | EDGAR |
| 2018-12-21 | 0000711404-18-000047 | EDGAR |
| 2017-12-22 | 0000711404-17-000044 | EDGAR |
| 2016-12-22 | 0000711404-16-000042 | EDGAR |
| Filing Date | Accession | Link |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-05 | 0001628280-26-041305 | EDGAR |
| 2026-03-06 | 0001628280-26-015620 | EDGAR |
| 2025-08-28 | 0000711404-25-000051 | EDGAR |
| 2025-05-30 | 0000711404-25-000040 | EDGAR |
| 2025-03-07 | 0000711404-25-000015 | EDGAR |
| 2024-08-29 | 0000711404-24-000062 | EDGAR |
| 2024-05-31 | 0000711404-24-000043 | EDGAR |
| 2024-03-01 | 0000711404-24-000020 | EDGAR |
| 2023-08-31 | 0000711404-23-000045 | EDGAR |
| 2023-06-02 | 0000711404-23-000033 | EDGAR |
| # | ETF | Provider | Weight | $ Exposure | ETF AUM | As Of |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | VTI Vanguard Morningstar Total Stock Market ETF | Vanguard | 0.02% | $350.9M | — | 2026-09-30 |
| 2 | VOO Vanguard S&P 500 ETF | Vanguard | 0.02% | $289.6M | — | 2026-09-30 |
| 3 | VB Vanguard Morningstar Small-Cap ETF | Vanguard | 0.14% | $248.2M | — | 2026-09-30 |
| 4 | RSP Invesco S&P 500 Equal Weight ETF | Invesco | 0.18% | $178.4M | — | 2026-10-15 |
| 5 | VBR Vanguard Morningstar Small-Cap Value ETF | Vanguard | 0.25% | $161.5M | — | 2026-09-30 |
| 6 | IVV iShares Core S&P 500 ETF | iShares (BlackRock) | 0.02% | $149.1M | $879.6B | 2026-10-15 |
| 7 | SPY State Street® SPDR® S&P 500® ETF Trust | SPDR (State Street) | 0.02% | $138.4M | $823.1B | 2026-10-15 |
| 8 | DFAT Dimensional US Targeted Value ETF | Dimensional | 0.30% | $91.0M | — | 2026-10-15 |
| 9 | XLV State Street® Health Care Select Sector SPDR® ETF | SPDR (State Street) | 0.17% | $80.1M | $46.0B | 2026-10-15 |
| 10 | DFSV Dimensional US Small Cap Value ETF | Dimensional | 0.21% | $55.6M | — | 2026-10-15 |
| 11 | IWR iShares Russell Mid-Cap ETF | iShares (BlackRock) | 0.08% | $46.7M | $56.3B | 2026-10-15 |
| 12 | VHT Vanguard Health Care ETF | Vanguard | 0.15% | $33.7M | — | 2026-09-30 |
| 13 | SCHM Schwab U.S. Mid-Cap ETF | Nport | 0.22% | $32.5M | — | 2026-05-31 |
| 14 | SPYM State Street® SPDR® Portfolio S&P 500® ETF | SPDR (State Street) | 0.02% | $30.9M | $183.9B | 2026-10-15 |
| 15 | EQTY KOVITZ CORE EQUITY ETF | Nport | 2.01% | $28.7M | — | 2026-07-31 |
| 16 | DFAC Dimensional US Core Equity 2 ETF | Dimensional | 0.03% | $27.2M | — | 2026-10-15 |
| 17 | IWD iShares Russell 1000 Value ETF | iShares (BlackRock) | 0.03% | $25.0M | $83.7B | 2026-10-15 |
| 18 | FXH First Trust Health Care AlphaDEX® Fund | First Trust | 1.88% | $21.3M | $1.1B | 2026-10-15 |
| 19 | IVE iShares S&P 500 Value ETF | iShares (BlackRock) | 0.04% | $18.6M | $49.9B | 2026-10-15 |
| 20 | IWS iShares Russell Mid-Cap Value ETF | iShares (BlackRock) | 0.11% | $16.9M | $15.4B | 2026-10-15 |
| 21 | DFAS Dimensional US Small Cap ETF | Dimensional | 0.05% | $16.7M | — | 2026-10-15 |
| 22 | FMDE Fidelity Enhanced Mid Cap Core ETF | Fidelity | 0.19% | $16.4M | $8.5B | 2026-10-15 |
| 23 | ITOT iShares Core S&P Total U.S. Stock Market ETF | iShares (BlackRock) | 0.01% | $14.5M | $96.0B | 2026-10-15 |
| 24 | SPYV State Street® SPDR® Portfolio S&P 500® Value ETF | SPDR (State Street) | 0.04% | $14.1M | $37.8B | 2026-10-15 |
| 25 | RSPH Invesco S&P 500 Equal Weight Health Care ETF | Invesco | 1.40% | $13.0M | — | 2026-10-15 |
Quarterly filings sourced from SEC 10-Q / 10-K reports. TTM tiles aggregate the most recent four quarters; bars show the last ~12 quarters oldest → newest.
- Revenue — top-line sales. Look for consistent YoY growth; seasonal businesses need same-quarter comparisons (Q4 '24 vs Q4 '23).
- Net Income — bottom-line profit after all expenses. Can be volatile from one-time items; red bars = net loss.
- Diluted EPS — net income per share assuming options/converts are exercised. Direct input to the P/E ratio.
- Operating Cash Flow — cash generated from core operations, before capex and financing. Harder to manipulate than net income; growing OCF is a quality signal.
- Sequential growth — quarter-over-quarter trend. Accelerating bars are a momentum signal.
- YoY growth — compare to the same quarter a year earlier to remove seasonality.
- Quality — OCF should roughly track Net Income over time. Large divergence (net income ≫ OCF) flags accruals risk.
- Margins — scan the bar ratios: Net Income / Revenue tells you margin trend without needing a separate chart.
TTM (trailing-twelve-month) smooths seasonality and is used for the P/E calculation. Filings appear 30–90 days after the period closes.
Quarterly figures (12 quarters)
| Quarter | Period End | Revenue | Net Income | Diluted EPS | Op. Cash Flow |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Q3 '26 | 2026-07-31 | $1.07B | $432.80M | $2.24 | $341.70M |
| Q2 '26 | 2026-04-30 | $1.08B | $-77.90M | $-0.40 | $182.80M |
| Q1 '26 | 2026-01-31 | $1.02B | $130.80M | $0.66 | $260.90M |
| Q4 '25 | 2025-10-31 | $1.07B | $84.60M | $0.42 | $247.90M |
| Q3 '25 | 2025-07-31 | $1.06B | $98.30M | $0.49 | $261.40M |
| Q2 '25 | 2025-04-30 | $1.00B | $87.70M | $0.44 | $96.20M |
| Q1 '25 | 2025-01-31 | $964.70M | $104.30M | $0.52 | $190.60M |
| Q4 '24 | 2024-10-31 | $1.02B | $117.50M | $0.59 | $268.10M |
| Q3 '24 | 2024-07-31 | $1.00B | $104.70M | $0.52 | $207.50M |
| Q1 '25 | 2024-05-04 | $746.60M | $783.00K | $0.01 | $-19.68M |
| Q2 '24 | 2024-04-30 | $942.60M | $88.90M | $0.44 | $111.00M |
| Q4 '24 | 2024-02-03 | $754.35M | $-29.70M | $-0.44 | $-40.12M |
Ratios derived from TTM financials and the current market price, sampled daily. History chart shows how expensive the stock is today relative to its own recent past.
- P/E — price / TTM earnings. Rough market rule: 10–15 value, 15–25 market, >30 growth/premium. Negative when earnings are negative.
- P/B — price / book value. Useful for financials and asset-heavy names; meaningless for asset-light software.
- P/S — price / TTM revenue. Useful when earnings are negative or noisy (early-stage growth).
- EV/EBITDA — capital-structure-neutral. <10 cheap, 10–15 reasonable, >20 rich. Good for comparing across leverage profiles.
- EV/Sales — like P/S but accounts for debt + cash. Compare within sector.
- ROE — return on equity. >15% strong, >25% exceptional. Caution: high leverage inflates ROE.
- ROA — return on assets. Leverage-neutral; >5% solid, >10% exceptional.
- Div Yield — annual dividend / price. Compare to 10Y Treasury; sustained yield >6% often signals distress.
- FCF Yield — free cash flow / market cap. >5% is attractive; negative means burning cash.
- Debt/Equity — leverage. <1 conservative, >2 aggressive. Sector-dependent (utilities naturally high, tech low).
- Current Ratio — short-term liquidity. >1.5 comfortable, <1 raises short-term solvency flags.
- Compare current level to the 3-year band: near the high end = relatively expensive; near the low = relatively cheap.
- Multiples expanding while earnings are flat = sentiment-driven rally.
- Multiples compressing while earnings grow = value coming from fundamentals.
Regulatory short-interest reports publish on a bi-weekly settlement cadence; short-volume is reported daily by the trade-reporting facilities. Float is derived from insider-ownership filings.
- Short Interest — total shares currently sold short as of the settlement date. Lags real time by ~8 business days.
- SI % of Float — short interest / free float. The key crowding metric.
- Days to Cover — short interest / avg daily volume. How many full trading days it would take shorts to buy back. High DTC + catalyst = squeeze fuel.
- Short Vol Ratio — today's short-sale volume / total volume. Intraday selling pressure proxy (not the same as short interest).
- Free Float — shares available for public trading (total shares minus insider / restricted).
- Float % — free float / shares outstanding. <50% = tightly held, more prone to squeezes.
- SI % of Float < 5% — typical, no particular signal.
- 5–15% — elevated; watch for catalysts (earnings, guidance, macro).
- 15–30% — heavily shorted; tight-float names in this range have produced notable squeezes historically.
- >30% — extreme; borrow is likely expensive and squeeze risk is material.
- Days to Cover > 5 combined with high SI% amplifies squeeze potential.
- Trend matters more than level. Rapidly rising short interest often precedes negative catalysts or heavy hedging.
- A sudden drop in SI after a rally may indicate a squeeze in progress.
Short interest is reported mid-month and end-of-month; short volume is daily.