OMEX Odyssey Marine Exploration, Inc
XNAS 10.75 DelayedStock quote, options chain, IV rank, technicals, AI analysis, and institutional ownership. Iron condor setups Fibonacci levels Insider trading
Market data may be delayed, incomplete, or inaccurate. Not a recommendation to buy, sell, or hold any security. Verify quotes with your broker before trading. See Terms §17.
What changed
Recent filings, trades and moves- 52-Week Range
- $9.59 – $66.75
- YTD
- -80.28%
- Straddle Price
- $0.00
- P/C Vol Ratio
- 0.02
- Market Cap
- $0.0B
- Open
- $10.82
- Day Range
- $10.00 – $11.16
- Volume
- 30,143
- Prev Close
- $10.82
A blended fair-value estimate combining up to six valuation methods. Each method is weighted by how well it fits the company — DCF down-weights for unprofitable names; DDM only fires for steady dividend payers; comparables down-weight when peer multiples disagree.
- DCF (quality-aware) — projects free cash flow with a horizon that scales to business quality. True compounders (quality 6/6) get 10 years explicit + 10 years fade before terminal; cyclical/struggling names (quality 0-1) get a 5-year terminal cliff. Quality is scored from ROE, gross margin, growth, FCF margin, debt load, and FCF consistency — the same factors that drive market premium for compounders.
- Market-Implied Growth (in Model Inputs) — reverse-DCF that answers "what growth rate is the market pricing in?". Lets you sanity-check the deviation: if implied growth is plausible for the business, the model's bearish flag may be wrong; if implausible, the market may be over-extrapolating.
- DDM (Gordon Growth Dividend Model) — values the stream of future dividends. Only used when trailing yield ≥ 2% and dividend payments are stable — below that the dividend is a token payout and Gordon (which values only the dividend stream) systematically underprices growth names, so those route to DCF + comparables + market anchor instead.
- P/E, EV/EBITDA, P/B, P/S — applies the peer-group median multiple to this company's per-share metric. Peers come from the same set as the "Related symbols" card. Earnings/sales metrics are forward-tilted by the company's recent revenue growth (capped at 25%) so they're comparable to peers' growth-embedded multiples — mimics how analysts use NTM rather than TTM. Per-multiple weights are biased by company quality (e.g. P/B down-weighted for asset-light tech).
- Market Anchor (SMA50) — the 50-day moving average, weighted by recent trading-range stability (tighter Bollinger bands → higher weight). Captures information fundamentals miss (forward consensus, sentiment, supply/demand) — but only when recent trading is steady enough that the market has converged on a view. During wild breakouts or breakdowns the anchor's weight collapses.
- Options Expected (B-L 30d) — the risk-neutral expected stock price at 30-day options expiration, derived from the full implied-volatility surface via Breeden-Litzenberger (second derivative of call price wrt strike → implied PDF, then E[S_T]). Forward-looking, captures all options-implied information (smile, skew, term structure) in one number. Weighted by chain liquidity. SP500-only at present (pre-computed daily). Backtest evidence: adds modest alpha across most bucket × holding combos.
- Blended value — weighted average. Confidence reflects how many methods fired and how tight peer dispersion is.
- Deviation pill — green when blended FV ≥ 10% above current price (undervalued); red when ≥ 10% below; grey otherwise.
| 10-yr Treasury (rf) | 4.90% |
| Beta vs SPY | 1.06 |
| Cost of Equity (CAPM) | 10.75% (VRP-adj) |
| WACC | 9.39% |
| Volatility Risk Premium | +892.7pp (IV − HV30), ERP adj +50bps |
| Effective Tax Rate | 21.0% |
| Rev. Growth (YoY, DCF input) | +30.0% |
| DCF Horizon | 10 years explicit + fade |
| Forward Tilt (NTM/TTM) | ×1.10 (applied to P/E, EV/EBITDA, P/S) |
| Free Cash Flow (TTM) | $-0.0B |
| Return on Equity (TTM) | 67.1% |
| Book / Price | -332.1% |
| Gross Margin (TTM) | 100.0% |
| FCF Margin (TTM) | -7471.2% |
| Quality Score | 3/6 — normal (10y DCF) |
| SMA 50 | $16.50 (Market Anchor value) |
| SMA 20 / Bollinger Mid | $13.63 |
| Bollinger Width / SMA20 | 52.6% (drives anchor stability) |
| Net Debt | $-0.0B |
| Market Cap | $0B |
| Method | Implied Price | Weight | Detail |
|---|---|---|---|
| DCF | n/a | 0% | |
| DDM (Gordon) | n/a | 0% | |
| Peer P/E | n/a | 0% | |
| Peer EV/EBITDA | n/a | 0% | |
| Peer P/B | n/a | 0% | |
| Peer P/S | n/a | 0% | |
| Market Anchor (SMA50) | $16.50 | 100% | stability 78% (BB-width) |
| Options Expected (B-L 30d) | n/a | 0% |

- Industry (SIC)
- WATER TRANSPORTATION (4400) · industry map
- Exchange
- XNAS
- Market Cap
- $0.0B
- Employees
- 12
- List Date
- 1996-01-05
- CIK
- 0000798528
- Headquarters
- Tampa, FL
- Homepage
- https://www.odysseymarine.com
Odyssey Marine Exploration Inc is a deep-ocean exploration company. It discovers, validates, and develops high-value seafloor mineral resources and provides specialized mineral exploration, project development, and marine services to its clients. The company's subsea project portfolio contains multiple projects in various stages of development, such as the Phosagmex Project, a rich deposit of phosphate sands located seventy-ninety meters deep within the Mexican EEZ; two polymetallic nodule exploration license holders in the Cook Islands' EEZ; the Lihir Gold Project, a subsea area that contains…
Each spoke is this symbol's rank within its sector (0–100; the dotted ring marks the sector median at 50). Higher is more constructive for a long. One spoke — News sentiment — is an absolute reading, not a sector rank. Grayed spokes have no data. A fuller shape is a summary, not a recommendation.
| Month | '21 | '22 | '23 | '24 | '25 | '26 | Avg |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jan | 14.14% | 10.28% | -14.88% | 1.30% | -29.34% | -13.30% | -5.30% |
| Feb | -11.52% | 1.37% | 1.60% | -1.28% | -18.25% | -22.22% | -8.38% |
| Mar | -8.74% | 11.56% | 2.52% | -18.42% | 1.32% | -49.76% | -10.25% |
| Apr | -5.39% | -6.60% | -3.44% | -3.93% | 248.72% | 32.10% | 43.58% |
| May | 8.55% | -36.82% | 14.01% | 36.36% | -39.40% | -1.79% | -3.18% |
| Jun | -4.65% | -11.43% | 4.35% | -1.81% | 54.09% | -29.13% | 1.90% |
| Jul | -8.10% | -15.75% | 4.82% | -14.76% | 16.22% | -28.15% | -7.62% |
| Aug | -3.14% | 14.55% | 7.49% | -0.25% | 39.01% | 29.93% | 14.60% |
| Sep | 9.89% | -1.27% | -5.56% | -79.15% | -6.70% | -18.97% | -16.96% |
| Oct | -8.41% | -4.09% | 1.61% | -31.61% | 10.94% | -34.47% | -11.01% |
| Nov | -4.78% | 2.94% | 0.00% | -9.38% | 6.74% | -11.16%* | -2.61% |
| Dec | -12.46% | 25.57% | 32.86% | -3.38% | 3.16% | -- | 9.15% |
| Total | -32.60% | -23.00% | 46.31% | -88.86% | 250.93% | -86.28% | 11.08% |
Quick-reference for reading the values below. Indicators combine to confirm a view — no single one is a trade signal on its own.
- SMA 20 / 50 / 200 — price above = uptrend, below = downtrend. SMA 50 crossing SMA 200 is the golden/death cross.
- EMA 12 / 26 — faster-reacting averages; 12 above 26 is short-term bullish.
- MACD — bullish when MACD > signal (green badge), bearish when below. Divergence from price often precedes reversals.
- ADX (14) — trend strength regardless of direction. <20 range, 20–25 weak trend, 25–50 trend, >50 strong trend.
- +DI / −DI — +DI > −DI favors bulls; the reverse favors bears. Read alongside ADX.
- RSI (14) — <30 oversold, >70 overbought. 40–60 is neutral; trending names can stay extreme.
- Stochastic %K / %D — <20 oversold, >80 overbought. %K crossing %D is an early momentum signal.
- Williams %R — inverted scale: <−80 oversold, >−20 overbought.
Oscillators work best in range-bound markets; in strong trends they give premature reversal signals.
- Bollinger Bands — price at upper band = overbought, lower = oversold. Narrow bands (squeeze) often precede expansion.
- OBV — cumulative volume; rising OBV confirms uptrend, falling OBV confirms downtrend. Divergence from price is a warning.
- Vol SMA 20 / Vol ROC — today's volume vs. 20-day average. Positive ROC with price move = conviction.
- ATR / True Range — average daily $ move; sizing and stop-loss reference.
- HV 20 / 30 / 60 — realized (historical) volatility. Compare to IV on the options cards: IV > HV = rich premium.
Confluence matters: trend + momentum + volume agreeing carries far more weight than any single indicator. For how these feed the spread scanner score, see the algorithm docs →
Trend Indicators
Momentum Oscillators
Volume & Volatility
Data Summary
LLM Stock Analysis Report - OMEX
Executive Summary
Overall Assessment: BEARISH (Confidence Level: 6/10)
Key Drivers:
- High volatility (beta >1.5) and risk premium
- Recent negative news sentiment
- Technical indicators showing weakening trend strength
Primary Risks:
- Potential for further price decline due to high volatility and bearish momentum
- Risk of increased selling pressure if options market expectations are not met
Investment Thesis: OMEX is a highly volatile stock with a high risk profile, driven by recent negative news sentiment and technical weakness. While there may be short-term trading opportunities, the long-term outlook is uncertain.
Recent News Sentiment Impact: The positive news headline from The Motley Fool has been neutralized by the negative sentiment from Halper Sadeh LLC's investigation. The overall news sentiment remains bearish.
Technical Analysis
Trend Direction: Short-term: Bearish Medium-term: Weak trend Long-term: Neutral
Support/Resistance Levels:
- SMA 20: $1.10 (resistance)
- SMA 50: $1.07 (support)
- SMA 200: $1.78 (long-term resistance)
Momentum Signals: RSI interpretation: Neutral (48.55) - no sell signal MACD signal: Bullish momentum - positive Bollinger Bands position: Squeeze - potential breakout or mean reversion
Volume Analysis: Volume trends: Weak volume and institutional interest signals
News & Sentiment Analysis
Recent Headlines Summary:
- Positive news from The Motley Fool (5/1)
- Negative sentiment from Halper Sadeh LLC's investigation (4/15)
Sentiment Assessment: Bearish (negative sentiment dominates)
Catalyst Identification: None imminent, but earnings data may provide a catalyst
Market Narrative: Recent news has negatively impacted OMEX, with high volatility and bearish momentum dominating the technical landscape.
Risk & Volatility Assessment
Beta Interpretation: High risk relative to market (beta >1.5)
Volatility Regime: Current vs historical volatility levels - high volatility
Options Market Signals: IV rank: 80.3% (high) - shows historically high volatility Current IV: 330.5% Expected Move: $0.17 (27 DTE), 7-DTE: $0.17 Volume Flow: 302 calls vs 86 puts Open Interest: 10,831 calls vs 1,290 puts Put/Call Volume Ratio: 0.28 (bullish sentiment) Put/Call OI Ratio: 0.12
Downside Protection: Support levels and risk management considerations - SMA 50 ($1.07) and SMA 20 ($1.10)
Market Context & Positioning
Sector Performance: Relative strength vs sector/market - weak
Institutional Activity: Volume patterns suggesting institutional interest is low
Correlation Analysis: How stock moves relative to market (R-squared interpretation) OMEX has a high correlation with the market, but recent price action shows divergence
Relative Valuation: Position within trading range OMEX is trading below its long-term average and may be due for a mean reversion or breakout
Key Levels & Action Items
Critical Price Levels:
- SMA 20 ($1.10) - resistance
- SMA 50 ($1.07) - support
- SMA 200 ($1.78) - long-term resistance
Breakout/Breakdown Levels: None imminent, but earnings data may provide a catalyst
Time-Sensitive Catalysts: Earnings dates (none available)
Risk Management: Stop-loss levels and position sizing considerations - SMA 50 ($1.07) as a potential stop-loss level
OMEX Options Activity & IV Rank
Volatility Metrics
Options Flow · All expiries
ATM Options Pricing
Chain Summary
Each spread is ranked by a composite score built in three stages. Full documentation →
score = P(profit) × (credit / spread_width)
P(profit) from short leg delta (1 − |delta|), penalised above 85%. Credit uses mid-price to handle illiquid chains fairly.
Calendars: the long leg is valued at the short leg’s expiration (Black-Scholes at its current IV) across the range of prices the short leg’s IV implies, giving the best-case profit (R/R = that over the debit) and P(profit).
RR and BF (30-delta) from the persisted per-symbol skew snapshot — wing strikes picked by real greeks.delta, not a moneyness proxy. Put skew boosts bull puts, penalises bear calls. High butterfly boosts iron condors. Calendars are skew-neutral.
- RSI <40 bullish / >60 bearish
- MACD crossover + histogram trend
- Price vs SMA 50 & SMA 200
- Stochastic %K <20 / >80
- Williams %R <−80 / >−20
- Blended ATR + straddle expected-move penalty
- Bollinger Band signal (+ counter-trend penalty)
- BB width — vol contraction boost for ICs
- IV rank ≥ 75 → strong boost for credit spreads
- IV rank < 25 → penalty (selling cheap vol)
- Min open interest across all legs
- OI < 100 → −0.10 · OI < 500 → −0.05
score = base_score × skew_multiplier × tech_multiplier
Both multipliers are shown per spread. Beta is informational only — ATR already captures realized vol. Full algorithm documentation →
Scanning bull put, bear call, iron condor and calendar spreads…
Estimated net dealer gamma is at the 38th percentile of this name's own daily history, within its typical range. This describes current positioning; it is not a forecast or a trading signal.
Net dealer gamma is an estimate of the aggregate gamma held by options market makers across this name's option chain, weighted by open interest. Dealer positions aren't public, so it uses a standard simplifying assumption: dealers are treated as long the calls and short the puts that are open. Actual dealer books can differ.
Gamma percentile ranks today's estimate against this name's own daily history, from 0% (the lowest reading on record) to 100% (the highest). Raw gamma scales with how much open interest a chain carries, so it isn't comparable across names; the percentile is. The badge marks the bottom 20% as low and the top 20% as high.
Tilts run from −1 to +1 and show how lopsided the estimated dealer exposure is. GEX tilt compares call gamma with put gamma. Vanna tilt describes how the hedge would shift if implied volatility changed, and charm tilt how it would shift with the passage of time.
This card describes estimated positioning and where it sits historically. It is not a forecast of price direction or volatility and not a trading signal. Market-wide view: Dealer positioning screener.
IV(put wing) − IV(ATM), in vol pointsHow much the OTM put trades above (or below) the at-the-money strike. Measures the height of the put-side tail relative to ATM — i.e. how expensive crash insurance is on this name.
- Positive (typical) — wing IV > ATM IV. Standard equity put skew: portfolios bid up crash protection, so OTM puts trade richer than ATM.
- Near zero or negative (unusual) — wing IV ≤ ATM IV. Flat or inverted put side. Common when there's no fear demand, in tightly mean-reverting names, or right after an earnings catalyst clears.
- Percentile vs own 3-yr history: high = wings rich (good time to sell wing premium); low = wings cheap (good time to buy protection).
- Not directional — high or low wings don't predict up or down moves. It's a price tag on tail insurance, not a forecast.
IV(call wing) − IV(put wing), equal delta on each sideWhich side of the smile is the market paying up for? Measures the tilt of the surface — call skew vs put skew at matched deltas.
- Negative (typical) — puts richer than calls. Standard equity behavior: hedging demand makes puts carry a premium. Most large-caps sit in the −1 to −5 vol-point range.
- Strongly negative (< −5 pts) — heavy downside hedging, elevated fear, or an upcoming catalyst (earnings, FDA, macro event). Worth flagging.
- Positive — calls richer than puts. Unusual for equities; signals bullish momentum, short-squeeze positioning, or takeover/M&A speculation.
- Near zero — symmetric surface. Market sees roughly equal up/down risk. Rare for large-caps; more common in commodities and FX.
Wing-vs-ATM tells you how expensive the tails are. Risk Reversal tells you which side is favored. Combined:
- High wing percentile + deeply negative RR → strong put bid; stress or major event priced in. Owning protection costs a premium; selling put premium is dangerous.
- Low wing percentile + near-zero RR → complacency; insurance cheap and balanced. Good environment to add cheap downside hedges.
- Positive RR + elevated wings → call-side fear-of-missing-out; common in squeeze setups. Upside calls expensive, downside puts not bid.
Percentile is the rank of today's reading within ~3 years of this symbol's own history. High percentile = wings are rich relative to history; not a directional signal. Skew is read off the chain in real time, not from CBOE SKEW.
Loading the implied volatility surface…
Loading the implied volatility smile…
Risk Metrics
Analysis Details
Data Points: 251
Period: 252 trading days
High volatility - stock moves more than market
| Investor | Value | Share of their portfolio | Rank | Q/Q shares | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rockefeller Capital Management Family office Rockefeller family | $99K | #2996 of 4729 | -5.7% | 13F |
Hedge funds, activists, holding companies and family offices we track, from their latest 13F (quarter-end value) and Form 4 filings in the last 3 years. Family offices · all institutions
OMEX Institutional Ownership (13F)
Filings for 2026-06-30 · 22 already for 2026-09-30Institutional managers with $100M+ AUM file Form 13F-HR quarterly, due 45 days after quarter end. Holdings are reported gross at quarter-end market value — they are a snapshot, not a real-time position.
- Shares — long equity positions in this name, aggregated across share classes.
- Calls / Puts — notional value of long call / put exposure where this ticker is the underlying.
- % of Float — holder's reported shares divided by the latest diluted shares outstanding. Sums above 100% indicate large custodian / prime broker positions where the same shares are reported by multiple filers.
- Custodian badge — filers with more than 5,000 holdings are typically broker-dealers / custodians reporting customer-held shares, not active managers.
Each filer is counted once at its latest 13F-HR filing. New filings are ingested on a weekly cadence.
| # | Filer | Notional Value | % of Total | Period |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Citadel Advisors LLC Custodian | $168.89K | 37.75% | 2026-06-30 |
| 2 | IMC-Chicago, LLC Custodian | $88.34K | 19.74% | 2026-09-30 |
| 3 | Jane Street Group, LLC Custodian | $82.57K | 18.46% | 2026-06-30 |
| 4 | Susquehanna International Group, LLP Custodian | $68.42K | 15.29% | 2026-06-30 |
| 5 | Simplex Trading, LLC Custodian | $22.36K | 5.00% | 2026-09-30 |
| 6 | GROUP ONE TRADING LLC Custodian | $16.84K | 3.76% | 2026-06-30 |
| # | Filer | Notional Value | % of Total | Period |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Citadel Advisors LLC Custodian | $72.96K | 25.12% | 2026-06-30 |
| 2 | Susquehanna International Group, LLP Custodian | $66.39K | 22.85% | 2026-06-30 |
| 3 | Simplex Trading, LLC Custodian | $58.08K | 19.99% | 2026-09-30 |
| 4 | Jane Street Group, LLC Custodian | $37.93K | 13.06% | 2026-06-30 |
| 5 | GROUP ONE TRADING LLC Custodian | $36.91K | 12.70% | 2026-06-30 |
| 6 | IMC-Chicago, LLC Custodian | $18.24K | 6.28% | 2026-09-30 |
OMEX Insider Trading (Form 4)
Latest: 2026-07-02| Filed | Reporter | Role | Action | Shares | Avg Price | Net $ | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-07-02 | John D Longley Jr | President & COO | Award (A) | +4,167 | — | EDGAR | |
| 2026-07-02 | Mark Gordon | Chief Executive Officer | Mixed Tax −1,139 · Grant +4,167 |
+3,028 | $0.85 | -$969 | EDGAR |
| 2026-06-03 | Todd E Siegel | Director | Exer (M) | +20,000 | — | EDGAR | |
| 2026-06-03 | Jon D Sawyer | Director | Exer (M) | +20,000 | — | EDGAR | |
| 2026-06-03 | Larissa Tiffany Pommeraud | Director | Exer (M) | +20,000 | — | EDGAR | |
| 2026-06-03 | Mark B Justh | Director | Exer (M) | +20,000 | — | EDGAR | |
| 2026-05-18 | Larissa Tiffany Pommeraud | Director | Award (A) | +9,346 | — | EDGAR | |
| 2026-05-18 | Jon D Sawyer | Director | Award (A) | +9,346 | — | EDGAR | |
| 2026-04-22 | Todd E Siegel | Director | Award (A) | +31,475 | — | EDGAR | |
| 2026-04-22 | Larissa Tiffany Pommeraud | Director | Award (A) | +23,981 | — | EDGAR | |
| 2026-03-24 | Mark Gordon | Chief Executive Officer | Exer (M) | +150,000 | $0.41 | $62.1K | EDGAR |
| 2026-03-10 | Larissa Tiffany Pommeraud | Director | Award (A) | +6,803 | — | EDGAR | |
| 2026-02-10 | Larissa Tiffany Pommeraud | Director | Award (A) | +5,291 | — | EDGAR | |
| 2026-02-10 | Todd E Siegel | Director | Award (A) | +7,937 | — | EDGAR | |
| 2026-01-08 | Todd E Siegel | Director | Award (A) | +7,653 | — | EDGAR |
OMEX Insider Holdings
7 insiders · @ $10.75| # | Insider | Role | Shares | Disclosed Exposure | Lifetime OM Net | Filings | Last Filed |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Gallardo Juan Antonio Carlos Cortina | 10%+ Owner | 157,259 | $1.69M | -$1.68M | 2 | 2025-08-20 |
| 2 | Mark B Justh | Director | 35,201 | $378.4K | $955.8K | 35 | 2026-06-03 |
| 3 | Mark Gordon | Chief Executive Officer | 25,456 | $273.7K | -$632.7K | 39 | 2026-07-02 |
| 4 | Todd E Siegel | Director | 6,655 | $71.5K | $0 | 20 | 2026-06-03 |
| 5 | John D Longley Jr | President & COO | 6,179 | $66.4K | -$935.8K | 21 | 2026-07-02 |
| 6 | Jon D Sawyer | Director | 4,374 | $47.0K | $0 | 27 | 2026-06-03 |
| 7 | Larissa Tiffany Pommeraud | Director | 4,079 | $43.8K | $0 | 12 | 2026-06-03 |
OMEX Board & Officers
As of SEC filings through Jul 2, 2026Directors 5
- Mark Gordon · listed since May 2009
- Jon D Sawyer · since Nov 3, 2009
- Mark B Justh · since Jul 25, 2013
- Todd E Siegel · since Mar 8, 2021
- Larissa Tiffany Pommeraud · since Mar 1, 2025
Officers 2
- Mark Gordon · Chief Executive Officer · listed since Mar 2021
- John D Longley Jr · President & COO · listed since Feb 2020
10% owners 5
- Greywolf Advisors LLC (entity) · since Mar 2, 2026
- Greywolf Capital Management LP (entity) · since Mar 2, 2026
- Greywolf GP LLC (entity) · since Mar 2, 2026
- Greywolf Opportunities Master Fund II, L.P. (entity) · since Mar 2, 2026
- Jonathan Savitz · since Mar 2, 2026
Changes in the last 10 years (20)
| Mar 2, 2026 | Jonathan Savitz became a 10% owner |
| Mar 2, 2026 | Greywolf Opportunities Master Fund II, L.P. became a 10% owner |
| Mar 2, 2026 | Greywolf GP LLC became a 10% owner |
| Mar 2, 2026 | Greywolf Capital Management LP became a 10% owner |
| Mar 2, 2026 | Greywolf Advisors LLC became a 10% owner |
| Aug 20, 2025 | Gallardo Juan Antonio Carlos Cortina reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Apr 25, 2025 | Gallardo Juan Antonio Carlos Cortina became a 10% owner |
| Mar 1, 2025 | Larissa Tiffany Pommeraud became a director |
| May 26, 2023 | The company announced the departure of Laura Lionetti Barton from the board in an SEC filing |
| May 26, 2023 | The company announced the departure of Laura Lionetti Barton as Chief Business Officer in an SEC filing |
| May 3, 2022 | Jay Nudi reported in an SEC filing no longer being CFO/Treasurer |
| Jun 14, 2021 | Christopher Emlyn Jones became Chief Financial Officer |
| Mar 17, 2021 | John Addis became a 10% owner |
| Mar 17, 2021 | FourWorld Capital Management LLC became a 10% owner |
| Mar 10, 2021 | Mark Gordon listed as Chief Executive Officer (previously CEO & President) in SEC filings |
| Mar 10, 2021 | Laura Lionetti Barton listed as Chief Business Officer (previously EVP, Secretary, Corp Comm) in SEC filings |
| Mar 8, 2021 | Todd E Siegel became a director |
| Feb 14, 2020 | Laura Lionetti Barton first listed as a director in an SEC filing |
| Feb 14, 2020 | John D Longley Jr listed as President & COO (previously Chief Operating Officer) in SEC filings |
| Dec 22, 2017 | Jay Nudi listed as CFO/Treasurer (previously Interim CFO,Treasurer/PAO) in SEC filings |
Not reported recently (5)
- John Abbott · Last reported as a director in an SEC filing dated Apr 7, 2023
- James S Pignatelli · Last reported as a director in an SEC filing dated Mar 14, 2023
- Christopher Emlyn Jones · Last reported as Chief Financial Officer in an SEC filing dated Dec 13, 2022
- FourWorld Capital Management LLC · Last reported as a 10% owner in an SEC filing dated Mar 22, 2021
- John Addis · Last reported as a 10% owner in an SEC filing dated Mar 22, 2021
OMEX Proposed Insider Sales (Form 144)
Latest: 2025-10-20What is Form 144? A notice of intent to sell restricted or control stock under Rule 144. Affiliates (officers, directors, 10%+ owners) and holders of restricted shares must file Form 144 when planning to sell more than 5,000 shares or $50,000 in any 3-month rolling window.
How it relates to Form 4: Form 144 is filed before the trade (up to 90 days in advance); Form 4 is filed within 2 business days after the trade executes. Not every Form 144 results in a sale — the filer may cancel or delay. Look for the corresponding Form 4 on the Insider Activity card to confirm a sale actually happened.
10b5-1 plans: Trades made under a pre-scheduled Rule 10b5-1 plan are not discretionary — they execute automatically on dates set months earlier, regardless of news. High 10b5-1 percentages mean less per-filing signal value, though cumulative selling volume still matters.
"Notice value": Aggregate market value the filer wrote into the Form 144 — i.e. the size of the planned sale, not necessarily the executed dollars. An amended notice (Form 144/A) replaces the original it amends, and cancelled notices are dropped, so neither is double-counted above. A filed value that is clearly inconsistent with the share count at the stock's price (a filer typo) shows as a dash and is left out of the totals.
Source & freshness: Sourced from public Form 144 filings. Refreshed daily; new filings typically appear here the morning after they are filed.
| Filed | Filer | Role | Shares | Notice Value | Planned Sale | Broker | Plan | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025-10-20 | MARK D GORDON | Director, Officer | 30,000 | $111.8K | 2025-10-20 | Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC … | 10b5-1 | EDGAR |
| 2025-10-17 | MARK D GORDON | Director, Officer | 30,000 | $97.5K | 2025-10-17 | Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC … | 10b5-1 | EDGAR |
| 2025-10-16 | MARK D GORDON | Director, Officer | 30,000 | $111.9K | 2025-10-16 | Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC … | 10b5-1 | EDGAR |
| 2025-10-15 | MARK D GORDON | Director, Officer | 30,000 | $123.6K | 2025-10-15 | Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC … | 10b5-1 | EDGAR |
| 2025-10-14 | REV TR OF J D LONGLEY JR &W L LONGLEY U/A/D 1/15/2014 | Officer | 73,572 | $256.8K | 2025-10-14 | Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC … | 10b5-1 | EDGAR |
| 2025-10-14 | JOHN D LONGLEY JR. | Officer | 143,500 | $500.8K | 2025-10-14 | Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC … | 10b5-1 | EDGAR |
| 2025-10-14 | MARK D GORDON | Director, Officer | 30,000 | $104.7K | 2025-10-14 | Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC … | 10b5-1 | EDGAR |
| 2025-10-14 | JOHN D LONGLEY JR. | Officer | 6,500 | $18.3K | 2025-10-13 | Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC … | 10b5-1 | EDGAR |
| 2025-10-14 | MARK D GORDON | Director, Officer | 20,956 | $59.1K | 2025-10-13 | Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC … | 10b5-1 | EDGAR |
| 2025-10-14 | REV TR OF J D LONGLEY JR &W L LONGLEY U/A/D 1/15/2014 | Officer | 32,477 | $91.6K | 2025-10-13 | Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC … | 10b5-1 | EDGAR |
| Filing Date | Accession | Link |
|---|
Quarterly filings sourced from SEC 10-Q / 10-K reports. TTM tiles aggregate the most recent four quarters; bars show the last ~12 quarters oldest → newest.
- Revenue — top-line sales. Look for consistent YoY growth; seasonal businesses need same-quarter comparisons (Q4 '24 vs Q4 '23).
- Net Income — bottom-line profit after all expenses. Can be volatile from one-time items; red bars = net loss.
- Diluted EPS — net income per share assuming options/converts are exercised. Direct input to the P/E ratio.
- Operating Cash Flow — cash generated from core operations, before capex and financing. Harder to manipulate than net income; growing OCF is a quality signal.
- Sequential growth — quarter-over-quarter trend. Accelerating bars are a momentum signal.
- YoY growth — compare to the same quarter a year earlier to remove seasonality.
- Quality — OCF should roughly track Net Income over time. Large divergence (net income ≫ OCF) flags accruals risk.
- Margins — scan the bar ratios: Net Income / Revenue tells you margin trend without needing a separate chart.
TTM (trailing-twelve-month) smooths seasonality and is used for the P/E calculation. Filings appear 30–90 days after the period closes.
Quarterly figures (12 quarters)
| Quarter | Period End | Revenue | Net Income | Diluted EPS | Op. Cash Flow |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Q3 '26 | 2026-09-30 | $108.91K | $-4.64M | $-1.98 | $-6.00M |
| Q2 '26 | 2026-06-30 | $77.86K | $-9.31M | $-0.16 | $-4.67M |
| Q1 '26 | 2026-03-31 | $22.50K | $347.35K | $-0.04 | $-3.83M |
| Q4 '25 | 2025-12-31 | $22.74K | $-17.41M | $-0.34 | $-2.82M |
| Q3 '25 | 2025-09-30 | $60.98K | $-13.07M | $-7.86 | $-2.09M |
| Q2 '25 | 2025-06-30 | $135.00K | $-14.85M | $-0.48 | $-1.98M |
| Q1 '25 | 2025-03-31 | $135.00K | $2.24M | $0.01 | $-1.96M |
| Q4 '24 | 2024-12-31 | $136.15K | $-5.00M | $0.18 | $-1.77M |
| Q3 '24 | 2024-09-30 | $213.90K | $18.69M | $0.13 | $-1.55M |
| Q2 '24 | 2024-06-30 | $215.56K | $-1.53M | $-0.07 | $5.63M |
| Q1 '24 | 2024-03-31 | $203.06K | $3.50M | $-0.18 | $-1.67M |
| Q4 '23 | 2023-12-31 | $166.61K | $-8.22M | $-0.19 | $-1.94M |
Ratios derived from TTM financials and the current market price, sampled daily. History chart shows how expensive the stock is today relative to its own recent past.
- P/E — price / TTM earnings. Rough market rule: 10–15 value, 15–25 market, >30 growth/premium. Negative when earnings are negative.
- P/B — price / book value. Useful for financials and asset-heavy names; meaningless for asset-light software.
- P/S — price / TTM revenue. Useful when earnings are negative or noisy (early-stage growth).
- EV/EBITDA — capital-structure-neutral. <10 cheap, 10–15 reasonable, >20 rich. Good for comparing across leverage profiles.
- EV/Sales — like P/S but accounts for debt + cash. Compare within sector.
- ROE — return on equity. >15% strong, >25% exceptional. Caution: high leverage inflates ROE.
- ROA — return on assets. Leverage-neutral; >5% solid, >10% exceptional.
- Div Yield — annual dividend / price. Compare to 10Y Treasury; sustained yield >6% often signals distress.
- FCF Yield — free cash flow / market cap. >5% is attractive; negative means burning cash.
- Debt/Equity — leverage. <1 conservative, >2 aggressive. Sector-dependent (utilities naturally high, tech low).
- Current Ratio — short-term liquidity. >1.5 comfortable, <1 raises short-term solvency flags.
- Compare current level to the 3-year band: near the high end = relatively expensive; near the low = relatively cheap.
- Multiples expanding while earnings are flat = sentiment-driven rally.
- Multiples compressing while earnings grow = value coming from fundamentals.
OMEX vs Peers
Related companies, largest first| Company | Market cap | P/E | Revenue growth | YTD | IV rank |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RCL Royal Caribbean Group | $87.5B | 20.0 | +9.7% | +19.0% | 21 |
| CCL Carnival Corporation Ltd. | $39.8B | 13.6 | +5.2% | −0.4% | 50 |
| VIK Viking Holdings Ltd | $39.1B | — | — | +20.6% | 91 |
| CUK Carnival PLC | $38.1B | — | — | −10.5% | — |
| BIP Brookfield Infrastructure Partners L.P. | $18.2B | — | — | +15.7% | 20 |
| NCLH Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings Ltd. Ordi | $8.2B | 10.2 | +4.9% | −19.1% | 38 |
| KEX Kirby Corporation | $6.4B | 19.1 | +6.6% | +11.2% | 68 |
| MATX Matsons, Inc. | $6.3B | 14.0 | −0.2% | +67.9% | 31 |
| OMEX Odyssey Marine Exploration, Inc | $25M | — | −50.3% | −80.3% | — |
| Peer median | $28.1B | 14.0 | +5.2% | +13.4% | 38 |
P/E uses the latest reported trailing-12-month diluted EPS; "—" means no positive earnings or no data.
Regulatory short-interest reports publish on a bi-weekly settlement cadence; short-volume is reported daily by the trade-reporting facilities. Float is derived from insider-ownership filings.
- Short Interest — total shares currently sold short as of the settlement date. Lags real time by ~8 business days.
- SI % of Float — short interest / free float. The key crowding metric.
- Days to Cover — short interest / avg daily volume. How many full trading days it would take shorts to buy back. High DTC + catalyst = squeeze fuel.
- Short Vol Ratio — today's short-sale volume / total volume. Intraday selling pressure proxy (not the same as short interest).
- Free Float — shares available for public trading (total shares minus insider / restricted).
- Float % — free float / shares outstanding. <50% = tightly held, more prone to squeezes.
- SI % of Float < 5% — typical, no particular signal.
- 5–15% — elevated; watch for catalysts (earnings, guidance, macro).
- 15–30% — heavily shorted; tight-float names in this range have produced notable squeezes historically.
- >30% — extreme; borrow is likely expensive and squeeze risk is material.
- Days to Cover > 5 combined with high SI% amplifies squeeze potential.
- Trend matters more than level. Rapidly rising short interest often precedes negative catalysts or heavy hedging.
- A sudden drop in SI after a rally may indicate a squeeze in progress.
Short interest is reported mid-month and end-of-month; short volume is daily.