UAN CVR Partners, LP
XNYS
95.93
+0.00%
After hours
Stock quote, options chain, IV rank, technicals, AI analysis, and institutional ownership. Iron condor setups Expected move IV rank history Fibonacci levels Insider trading
Market data may be delayed, incomplete, or inaccurate. Not a recommendation to buy, sell, or hold any security. Verify quotes with your broker before trading. See Terms §17.
- 52-Week Range
- $93.43 – $139.50
- YTD
- -5.49%
- IV Rank (30D)
- 11.5
- Straddle Price
- $7.80
- P/C Vol Ratio
- 0.48
- Market Cap
- $1.0B
- Open
- $96.00
- Day Range
- $94.15 – $97.15
- Volume
- 67,410
- Prev Close
- $95.53
A blended fair-value estimate combining up to six valuation methods. Each method is weighted by how well it fits the company — DCF down-weights for unprofitable names; DDM only fires for steady dividend payers; comparables down-weight when peer multiples disagree.
- DCF (quality-aware) — projects free cash flow with a horizon that scales to business quality. True compounders (quality 6/6) get 10 years explicit + 10 years fade before terminal; cyclical/struggling names (quality 0-1) get a 5-year terminal cliff. Quality is scored from ROE, gross margin, growth, FCF margin, debt load, and FCF consistency — the same factors that drive market premium for compounders.
- Market-Implied Growth (in Model Inputs) — reverse-DCF that answers "what growth rate is the market pricing in?". Lets you sanity-check the deviation: if implied growth is plausible for the business, the model's bearish flag may be wrong; if implausible, the market may be over-extrapolating.
- DDM (Gordon Growth Dividend Model) — values the stream of future dividends. Only used when trailing yield ≥ 2% and dividend payments are stable — below that the dividend is a token payout and Gordon (which values only the dividend stream) systematically underprices growth names, so those route to DCF + comparables + market anchor instead.
- P/E, EV/EBITDA, P/B, P/S — applies the peer-group median multiple to this company's per-share metric. Peers come from the same set as the "Related symbols" card. Earnings/sales metrics are forward-tilted by the company's recent revenue growth (capped at 25%) so they're comparable to peers' growth-embedded multiples — mimics how analysts use NTM rather than TTM. Per-multiple weights are biased by company quality (e.g. P/B down-weighted for asset-light tech).
- Market Anchor (SMA50) — the 50-day moving average, weighted by recent trading-range stability (tighter Bollinger bands → higher weight). Captures information fundamentals miss (forward consensus, sentiment, supply/demand) — but only when recent trading is steady enough that the market has converged on a view. During wild breakouts or breakdowns the anchor's weight collapses.
- Options Expected (B-L 30d) — the risk-neutral expected stock price at 30-day options expiration, derived from the full implied-volatility surface via Breeden-Litzenberger (second derivative of call price wrt strike → implied PDF, then E[S_T]). Forward-looking, captures all options-implied information (smile, skew, term structure) in one number. Weighted by chain liquidity. SP500-only at present (pre-computed daily). Backtest evidence: adds modest alpha across most bucket × holding combos.
- Blended value — weighted average. Confidence reflects how many methods fired and how tight peer dispersion is.
- Deviation pill — green when blended FV ≥ 10% above current price (undervalued); red when ≥ 10% below; grey otherwise.
| 10-yr Treasury (rf) | 5.15% |
| Beta vs SPY | 0.68 |
| Cost of Equity (CAPM) | 8.56% (VRP-adj) |
| WACC | 7.31% |
| Volatility Risk Premium | -1.9pp (IV − HV30) |
| Effective Tax Rate | 21.0% |
| Rev. Growth (YoY, DCF input) | +11.5% |
| DCF Horizon | 10 years explicit + fade |
| Forward Tilt (NTM/TTM) | ×1.10 (applied to P/E, EV/EBITDA, P/S) |
| Free Cash Flow (TTM) | $0.2B |
| Return on Equity (TTM) | 39.1% |
| Book / Price | 25.1% |
| Gross Margin (TTM) | 39.9% |
| FCF Margin (TTM) | 23.5% |
| Debt / Equity | 2.09 |
| Quality Score | 2/6 — normal (10y DCF) |
| SMA 50 | $123.85 (Market Anchor value) |
| SMA 20 / Bollinger Mid | $117.22 |
| Bollinger Width / SMA20 | 27.4% (drives anchor stability) |
| Net Debt | $0.4B |
| Market Cap | $1B |
| Method | Implied Price | Weight | Detail |
|---|---|---|---|
| DCF | $504.83 | 31% | |
| DDM (Gordon) | $361.51 | 0% | |
| Peer P/E | $114.31 | 14% | median 10.3× · 3 peers |
| Peer EV/EBITDA | $146.81 | 14% | median 7.9× · 7 peers |
| Peer P/B | $36.79 | 3% | median 1.4× · 7 peers |
| Peer P/S | $37.06 | 9% | median 0.5× · 7 peers |
| Market Anchor (SMA50) | $123.85 | 8% | stability 13% (BB-width) |
| Options Expected (B-L 30d) | $101.82 | 20% | 13 strikes · skew -0.57 |

- Industry (SIC)
- AGRICULTURAL CHEMICALS (2870) · industry map
- Exchange
- XNYS
- Market Cap
- $1.0B
- Employees
- 320
- List Date
- 2011-04-08
- CIK
- 0001425292
- Last Earnings
- Nov 3 before open · −4.9% vs ±11.3% expected
- Next Earnings
- ~Feb 17, 2027 (estimated)
- Headquarters
- Sugar Land, TX
- Homepage
- https://www.cvrpartners.com
CVR Partners LP is a manufacturer and supplier of nitrogen fertilizer products. Its principal products include Urea Ammonium Nitrate (UAN) and ammonia. The company market ammonia products to industrial and agricultural customers and UAN products to agricultural customers. The primary geographic markets for its fertilizer products are Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, Iowa, Illinois, Colorado, and Texas. The company's product sales are heavily weighted toward UAN.
Each spoke is this symbol's rank within its sector (0–100; the dotted ring marks the sector median at 50). Higher is more constructive for a long. One spoke — News sentiment — is an absolute reading, not a sector rank. Grayed spokes have no data. A fuller shape is a summary, not a recommendation.
| Month | '21 | '22 | '23 | '24 | '25 | '26 | Avg |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jan | 2.82% | 19.92% | -3.39% | 5.79% | 5.82% | 2.04% | 5.50% |
| Feb | 43.94% | 3.14% | 20.94% | -6.88% | -3.83% | -2.21% | 9.18% |
| Mar | 67.43% | 29.95% | -23.81% | 18.34% | 0.67% | 19.62% | 18.70% |
| Apr | 24.47% | 5.74% | -0.37% | 2.23% | 5.10% | 3.94% | 6.85% |
| May | 2.18% | -12.38% | -10.88% | 2.05% | 4.30% | -5.23% | -3.33% |
| Jun | 0.63% | -16.88% | -4.53% | -7.32% | 7.33% | -7.09% | -4.64% |
| Jul | -1.13% | 11.72% | 12.32% | 4.33% | 6.22% | 15.07% | 8.09% |
| Aug | -16.83% | 9.06% | -13.10% | -9.54% | -6.22% | 0.66% | -6.00% |
| Sep | 17.70% | -5.55% | 7.78% | -2.01% | 0.81% | -4.97% | 2.29% |
| Oct | 7.28% | -2.21% | -5.32% | -4.43% | 4.99% | 1.75% | 0.34% |
| Nov | -4.72% | 6.51% | -13.50% | 23.81% | -2.11% | -23.43%* | -2.24% |
| Dec | 8.80% | -16.18% | -5.73% | -6.61% | 7.45% | -- | -2.45% |
| Total | 241.36% | 24.36% | -38.71% | 15.19% | 33.67% | -6.32% | 44.92% |
Quick-reference for reading the values below. Indicators combine to confirm a view — no single one is a trade signal on its own.
- SMA 20 / 50 / 200 — price above = uptrend, below = downtrend. SMA 50 crossing SMA 200 is the golden/death cross.
- EMA 12 / 26 — faster-reacting averages; 12 above 26 is short-term bullish.
- MACD — bullish when MACD > signal (green badge), bearish when below. Divergence from price often precedes reversals.
- ADX (14) — trend strength regardless of direction. <20 range, 20–25 weak trend, 25–50 trend, >50 strong trend.
- +DI / −DI — +DI > −DI favors bulls; the reverse favors bears. Read alongside ADX.
- RSI (14) — <30 oversold, >70 overbought. 40–60 is neutral; trending names can stay extreme.
- Stochastic %K / %D — <20 oversold, >80 overbought. %K crossing %D is an early momentum signal.
- Williams %R — inverted scale: <−80 oversold, >−20 overbought.
Oscillators work best in range-bound markets; in strong trends they give premature reversal signals.
- Bollinger Bands — price at upper band = overbought, lower = oversold. Narrow bands (squeeze) often precede expansion.
- OBV — cumulative volume; rising OBV confirms uptrend, falling OBV confirms downtrend. Divergence from price is a warning.
- Vol SMA 20 / Vol ROC — today's volume vs. 20-day average. Positive ROC with price move = conviction.
- ATR / True Range — average daily $ move; sizing and stop-loss reference.
- HV 20 / 30 / 60 — realized (historical) volatility. Compare to IV on the options cards: IV > HV = rich premium.
Confluence matters: trend + momentum + volume agreeing carries far more weight than any single indicator. For how these feed the spread scanner score, see the algorithm docs →
Trend Indicators
Momentum Oscillators
Volume & Volatility
Data Summary
Here is the comprehensive stock analysis report for UAN:
Executive Summary
Overall assessment: NEUTRAL with confidence level (6/10) Key drivers: Technical momentum signals, options market sentiment Primary risks: Volatility regime shift, market correlation changes Investment thesis: Moderate upside potential due to technical momentum and neutral options market sentiment. Recent news sentiment impact: Neutral news headlines did not significantly impact the stock price.
Technical Analysis
Trend Direction: Short-term (1-4 weeks): Bullish, Medium-term (1-3 months): Neutral, Long-term (3-12 months): Bullish Support/Resistance Levels: SMA 20 ($124.85), SMA 50 ($121.74), Upper Bollinger Band ($133.54) Momentum Signals:
- RSI interpretation: Overbought (>70) at 61.69, potential sell signal.
- MACD signal: Bullish momentum with a strong bullish histogram (1.85).
- Bollinger Bands position: Neutral, price is within the middle band.
News & Sentiment Analysis
Recent Headlines Summary: Neutral news headlines did not significantly impact the stock price. Sentiment Assessment: Aggregate sentiment is NEUTRAL. Catalyst Identification: No upcoming events or regulatory changes that could significantly impact the stock. Market Narrative: The neutral news headlines do not contradict technical signals, but rather support the bullish trend.
Risk & Volatility Assessment
Beta Interpretation: Beta (-0.62) indicates that the stock moves opposite to market, which is a high-risk scenario. Volatility Regime: Current volatility level (0.41) is relatively low compared to historical levels. Options Market Signals: IV rank (11.3%) is low, indicating historically low volatility; put-call ratio (2.55) suggests bearish sentiment.
Market Context & Positioning
Sector Performance: No specific sector data available for UAN. Institutional Activity: On-balance volume (OBV) indicates institutional buying activity, but volume rate of change (-81.93%) suggests a potential reversal in momentum. Correlation Analysis: The stock has a negative correlation with the market (-0.19), indicating high risk.
Key Levels & Action Items
Critical Price Levels: SMA 20 ($124.85) and Upper Bollinger Band ($133.54) Breakout/Breakdown Levels: No specific levels identified, but potential for a breakout above $133.54 or breakdown below $116.16. Time-Sensitive Catalysts: No upcoming events or regulatory changes that could significantly impact the stock. Risk Management: Consider stop-loss levels at SMA 20 ($124.85) and risk management strategies to mitigate potential losses.
Please note that this analysis is based on the provided data, and actual market conditions may vary.
| Earnings Date | Timing | Expected Move | Actual Move | Ratio | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021-02-22 | After-Close | 10.42% | 1.63% | 0.16x | Within |
| 2021-05-03 | After-Close | 15.54% | 4.26% | 0.27x | Within |
| 2021-08-02 | After-Close | 18.99% | 16.51% | 0.87x | Within |
| 2021-11-01 | After-Close | 15.77% | 2.20% | 0.14x | Within |
| 2022-02-22 | After-Close | 15.44% | 4.07% | 0.26x | Within |
| 2022-05-02 | After-Close | 18.70% | 4.70% | 0.25x | Within |
| 2022-08-01 | After-Close | 18.35% | 5.64% | 0.31x | Within |
| 2022-10-31 | After-Close | 13.14% | 0.37% | 0.03x | Within |
| 2023-02-21 | After-Close | 13.29% | 3.70% | 0.28x | Within |
| 2023-05-01 | After-Close | 12.77% | 10.95% | 0.86x | Within |
| 2023-07-31 | After-Close | 10.73% | 7.59% | 0.71x | Within |
| 2023-10-30 | After-Close | 7.69% | 1.08% | 0.14x | Within |
| 2024-02-20 | After-Close | 9.48% | 1.69% | 0.18x | Within |
| 2024-04-29 | After-Close | 10.15% | 2.01% | 0.20x | Within |
| 2024-07-29 | After-Close | 14.60% | 1.47% | 0.10x | Within |
| 2024-10-28 | After-Close | 11.26% | 0.64% | 0.06x | Within |
| 2025-02-18 | After-Close | 6.81% | 1.65% | 0.24x | Within |
| 2025-04-28 | After-Close | 7.98% | 0.13% | 0.02x | Within |
| 2025-07-30 | After-Close | 7.15% | 5.78% | 0.81x | Within |
| 2025-10-29 | After-Close | 9.51% | 3.38% | 0.36x | Within |
| 2026-02-18 | After-Close | 4.56% | 0.46% | 0.10x | Within |
| 2026-04-29 | After-Close | 11.18% | 3.35% | 0.30x | Within |
| 2026-07-29 | After-Close | 13.95% | 4.42% | 0.32x | Within |
| 2026-11-03 | Pre-Market | 11.26% | 4.92% | 0.44x | Within |
Earnings calendar: this week’s reports with expected vs actual moves →
UAN Options Activity & IV Rank
UAN IV rank history, 52-week IV rank and IV percentile →
Volatility Metrics
Options Flow · All expiries
ATM Options Pricing
Chain Summary
UAN Implied Volatility
Loading implied volatility…
The 30-day IV is the at-the-money implied volatility of options 30 days out, the blue line. The band is its 20-session average, 2 standard deviations either side. Realized volatility is how much UAN actually moved over the last 20 sessions, from closing prices, on the same yearly scale. Without earnings takes each earnings report out of the 30-day IV, sized from what options paid for past reports, so it shows whether options are expensive or cheap apart from the report. Click a name above the chart to show or hide it.
Each spread is ranked by a composite score built in three stages. Full documentation →
score = P(profit) × (credit / spread_width)
P(profit) from short leg delta (1 − |delta|), penalised above 85%. Credit uses mid-price to handle illiquid chains fairly.
Calendars: the long leg is valued at the short leg’s expiration (Black-Scholes at its current IV) across the range of prices the short leg’s IV implies, giving the best-case profit (R/R = that over the debit) and P(profit).
RR and BF (30-delta) from the persisted per-symbol skew snapshot — wing strikes picked by real greeks.delta, not a moneyness proxy. Put skew boosts bull puts, penalises bear calls. High butterfly boosts iron condors. Calendars are skew-neutral.
- RSI <40 bullish / >60 bearish
- MACD crossover + histogram trend
- Price vs SMA 50 & SMA 200
- Stochastic %K <20 / >80
- Williams %R <−80 / >−20
- Blended ATR + straddle expected-move penalty
- Bollinger Band signal (+ counter-trend penalty)
- BB width — vol contraction boost for ICs
- IV rank ≥ 75 → strong boost for credit spreads
- IV rank < 25 → penalty (selling cheap vol)
- Min open interest across all legs
- OI < 100 → −0.10 · OI < 500 → −0.05
score = base_score × skew_multiplier × tech_multiplier
Both multipliers are shown per spread. Beta is informational only — ATR already captures realized vol. Full algorithm documentation →
Scanning bull put, bear call, iron condor and calendar spreads…
Estimated net dealer gamma is at the 0th percentile of this name's own daily history, near the low end of its range. This describes current positioning; it is not a forecast or a trading signal.
Net dealer gamma is an estimate of the aggregate gamma held by options market makers across this name's option chain, weighted by open interest. Dealer positions aren't public, so it uses a standard simplifying assumption: dealers are treated as long the calls and short the puts that are open. Actual dealer books can differ.
Gamma percentile ranks today's estimate against this name's own daily history, from 0% (the lowest reading on record) to 100% (the highest). Raw gamma scales with how much open interest a chain carries, so it isn't comparable across names; the percentile is. The badge marks the bottom 20% as low and the top 20% as high.
Tilts run from −1 to +1 and show how lopsided the estimated dealer exposure is. GEX tilt compares call gamma with put gamma. Vanna tilt describes how the hedge would shift if implied volatility changed, and charm tilt how it would shift with the passage of time.
This card describes estimated positioning and where it sits historically. It is not a forecast of price direction or volatility and not a trading signal. Market-wide view: Dealer positioning screener.
IV(put wing) − IV(ATM), in vol pointsHow much the OTM put trades above (or below) the at-the-money strike. Measures the height of the put-side tail relative to ATM — i.e. how expensive crash insurance is on this name.
- Positive (typical) — wing IV > ATM IV. Standard equity put skew: portfolios bid up crash protection, so OTM puts trade richer than ATM.
- Near zero or negative (unusual) — wing IV ≤ ATM IV. Flat or inverted put side. Common when there's no fear demand, in tightly mean-reverting names, or right after an earnings catalyst clears.
- Percentile vs own 3-yr history: high = wings rich (good time to sell wing premium); low = wings cheap (good time to buy protection).
- Not directional — high or low wings don't predict up or down moves. It's a price tag on tail insurance, not a forecast.
IV(call wing) − IV(put wing), equal delta on each sideWhich side of the smile is the market paying up for? Measures the tilt of the surface — call skew vs put skew at matched deltas.
- Negative (typical) — puts richer than calls. Standard equity behavior: hedging demand makes puts carry a premium. Most large-caps sit in the −1 to −5 vol-point range.
- Strongly negative (< −5 pts) — heavy downside hedging, elevated fear, or an upcoming catalyst (earnings, FDA, macro event). Worth flagging.
- Positive — calls richer than puts. Unusual for equities; signals bullish momentum, short-squeeze positioning, or takeover/M&A speculation.
- Near zero — symmetric surface. Market sees roughly equal up/down risk. Rare for large-caps; more common in commodities and FX.
IV(call wing) − IV(ATM), in vol pointsThe same measure on the upside: how the OTM call is priced against the at-the-money strike.
- Negative (typical) — calls trade below ATM for most stocks and indices, so the sign alone says little.
- Percentile vs own history: high = upside calls unusually rich for this name (squeezes, takeover talk, commodity supply scares); low = calls cheaper than usual.
Put or call vs ATM tells you how expensive that tail is. Risk Reversal tells you which side is favored. Combined:
- High wing percentile + deeply negative RR → strong put bid; stress or major event priced in. Owning protection costs a premium; selling put premium is dangerous.
- Low wing percentile + near-zero RR → complacency; insurance cheap and balanced. Good environment to add cheap downside hedges.
- Positive RR + elevated wings → call-side fear-of-missing-out; common in squeeze setups. Upside calls expensive, downside puts not bid.
Percentile is the rank of today's reading within ~3 years of this symbol's own history. High percentile = wings are rich relative to history; not a directional signal. Skew is read off the chain in real time, not from CBOE SKEW.
Loading the implied volatility surface…
Loading the implied volatility smile…
Risk Metrics
Analysis Details
Data Points: 251
Period: 252 trading days
Negative beta - stock moves opposite to market
| Investor | Value | Share of their portfolio | Rank | Q/Q shares | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Icahn Capital / Icahn Enterprises Family office Carl Icahn, Brett Icahn | $515.5M | #4 of 12 | 0.0% | 13F + Form 4 · 10% owner |
Hedge funds, activists, holding companies and family offices we track, from their latest 13F (quarter-end value) and Form 4 filings in the last 3 years. Family offices · all institutions
UAN Institutional Ownership (13F)
Filings for 2026-09-30Institutional managers with $100M+ AUM file Form 13F-HR quarterly, due 45 days after quarter end. Holdings are reported gross at quarter-end market value — they are a snapshot, not a real-time position.
- Shares — long equity positions in this name, aggregated across share classes.
- Calls / Puts — notional value of long call / put exposure where this ticker is the underlying.
- % of Float — holder's reported shares divided by the latest diluted shares outstanding. Sums above 100% indicate large custodian / prime broker positions where the same shares are reported by multiple filers.
- Custodian badge — filers with more than 5,000 holdings are typically broker-dealers / custodians reporting customer-held shares, not active managers.
Each filer is counted once at its latest 13F-HR filing. New filings are ingested on a weekly cadence.
| # | Filer | Notional Value | % of Total | Period |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Susquehanna International Group, LLP Custodian | $19.44M | 63.57% | 2026-06-30 |
| 2 | IMC-Chicago, LLC Custodian | $5.31M | 17.36% | 2026-09-30 |
| 3 | Citadel Advisors LLC Custodian | $3.01M | 9.84% | 2026-06-30 |
| 4 | Jane Street Group, LLC Custodian | $2.40M | 7.85% | 2026-09-30 |
| 5 | Simplex Trading, LLC Custodian | $408.47K | 1.34% | 2026-09-30 |
| 6 | GROUP ONE TRADING LLC Custodian | $12.38K | 0.04% | 2026-09-30 |
| # | Filer | Notional Value | % of Total | Period |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Susquehanna International Group, LLP Custodian | $13.20M | 69.33% | 2026-06-30 |
| 2 | IMC-Chicago, LLC Custodian | $2.95M | 15.47% | 2026-09-30 |
| 3 | Citadel Advisors LLC Custodian | $2.05M | 10.77% | 2026-06-30 |
| 4 | Jane Street Group, LLC Custodian | $569.39K | 2.99% | 2026-09-30 |
| 5 | Simplex Trading, LLC Custodian | $272.32K | 1.43% | 2026-09-30 |
UAN Insider Trading (Form 4)
Latest: 2025-12-12| Filed | Reporter | Role | Action | Shares | Avg Price | Net $ | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025-12-12 | Mark A Pytosh | President and CEO | Mixed Disp −9,110 · Exer +9,110 |
— | $94.92 | -$864.7K | EDGAR |
| 2025-04-23 | ICAHN ENTERPRISES G.P. INC. | 10%+ Owner | Buy (P) | +10,329 | $74.36 | $768.0K | EDGAR |
| 2025-04-18 | ICAHN ENTERPRISES G.P. INC. | 10%+ Owner | Buy (P) | +10,336 | $74.33 | $768.3K | EDGAR |
| 2025-04-15 | ICAHN ENTERPRISES G.P. INC. | 10%+ Owner | Buy (P) | +13,776 | $71.98 | $991.6K | EDGAR |
| 2025-04-10 | ICAHN ENTERPRISES HOLDINGS L.P. | 10%+ Owner | Buy (P) | +18,213 | $68.35 | $1.24M | EDGAR |
| 2025-04-07 | Carl C Icahn | 10%+ Owner | Buy (P) | +12,434 | $68.81 | $855.6K | EDGAR |
| 2025-04-01 | ICAHN ENTERPRISES G.P. INC. | 10%+ Owner | Buy (P) | +5,490 | $74.87 | $411.0K | EDGAR |
| 2025-03-27 | ICAHN ENTERPRISES G.P. INC. | 10%+ Owner | Buy (P) | +1,238 | $75.00 | $92.8K | EDGAR |
| 2025-03-13 | ICAHN ENTERPRISES G.P. INC. | 10%+ Owner | Buy (P) | +11,345 | $74.63 | $846.7K | EDGAR |
| 2025-03-10 | ICAHN ENTERPRISES G.P. INC. | 10%+ Owner | Buy (P) | +4,897 | $74.95 | $367.0K | EDGAR |
| 2025-03-05 | ICAHN ENTERPRISES G.P. INC. | 10%+ Owner | Buy (P) | +10,024 | $73.62 | $737.9K | EDGAR |
| 2024-12-31 | IEP Energy Holding LLC | 10%+ Owner | Buy (P) | +4,538 | $74.79 | $339.4K | EDGAR |
| 2024-12-26 | Carl C Icahn | 10%+ Owner | Buy (P) | +7,197 | $74.43 | $535.7K | EDGAR |
| 2024-12-20 | Carl C Icahn | 10%+ Owner | Buy (P) | +11,589 | $74.22 | $860.2K | EDGAR |
| 2024-12-17 | IEP Energy Holding LLC | 10%+ Owner | Buy (P) | +9,024 | $74.87 | $675.6K | EDGAR |
UAN Insider Holdings
6 insiders · @ $95.53| # | Insider | Role | Shares | Disclosed Exposure | Lifetime OM Net | Filings | Last Filed |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | ICAHN ENTERPRISES G.P. INC. | 10%+ Owner | 272,274 | $26.01M | $4.98M | 8 | 2025-04-23 |
| 2 | ICAHN ENTERPRISES HOLDINGS L.P. | 10%+ Owner | 237,833 | $22.72M | $1.24M | 1 | 2025-04-10 |
| 3 | Carl C Icahn | 10%+ Owner | 219,620 | $20.98M | $2.25M | 3 | 2025-04-07 |
| 4 | IEP Energy Holding LLC | 10%+ Owner | 174,192 | $16.64M | $2.85M | 3 | 2024-12-31 |
| 5 | AMERICAN ENTERTAINMENT PROPERTIES CORP. | 10%+ Owner | 116,029 | $11.08M | $8.16M | 4 | 2024-11-21 |
| 6 | Mark A Pytosh | President and CEO | 30,593 | $2.92M | $887.0K | 29 | 2025-12-12 |
UAN Board & Officers
As of SEC filings through Jun 26, 2026Directors 5
- Mark A Pytosh · since Jun 1, 2011
- Kevan A Vick · listed since Aug 2025
- Alexander Nickolatos · since Oct 30, 2025
- Robert Flint · since Oct 30, 2025
- Trevor Turbidy · since Mar 17, 2026
Officers 2
- Richard J. Roberts Jr. · Interim CFO · since Jun 18, 2026
- Michael H. Wright Jr. · EVP & Chief Operating Officer · since Jan 16, 2026
Changes in the last 10 years (78)
| Jun 18, 2026 | The company announced the departure of Mark A Pytosh as President and CEO in an SEC filing |
| Jun 18, 2026 | Richard J. Roberts Jr. became Interim CFO |
| Mar 17, 2026 | Trevor Turbidy became a director |
| Mar 17, 2026 | The company announced the departure of Brian A Goebel from the board in an SEC filing |
| Jan 16, 2026 | Michael H. Wright Jr. became EVP & Chief Operating Officer |
| Oct 30, 2025 | Robert Flint became a director |
| Oct 30, 2025 | Brian A Goebel became a director |
| Oct 30, 2025 | Alexander Nickolatos became a director |
| Aug 7, 2025 | Kevan A Vick first listed as a director in an SEC filing |
| Mar 5, 2025 | Icahn Enterprises Holdings L.p. first on file as a 10% owner |
| Mar 5, 2025 | Icahn Enterprises G.p. Inc. first on file as a 10% owner |
| Nov 8, 2024 | American Entertainment Properties Corp. first on file as a 10% owner |
| Mar 18, 2024 | IEP Energy Holding LLC became a 10% owner |
| Mar 18, 2024 | Carl C Icahn became a 10% owner |
| Mar 17, 2023 | Jordan Bleznick became a director |
| Jun 23, 2022 | The company announced the departure of Kapiljeet Dargan from the board in an SEC filing |
| Dec 28, 2021 | The company announced the departure of Patricia A. Agnello from the board in an SEC filing |
| Aug 9, 2021 | Jeffrey D. Conaway became VP, CAO & Corp. Controller |
| Aug 9, 2021 | Dane J. Neumann became Interim CFO, VP-Fin.&Treasurer |
| Jul 7, 2021 | David Willetts became a director |
| Mar 31, 2021 | Patricia A. Agnello became a director |
| Mar 31, 2021 | Kapiljeet Dargan became a director |
| Sep 28, 2018 | Hunter Clark Gary became a director |
| Jul 2, 2018 | Melissa M Buhrig became EVP, General Counsel & Sec. |
| May 4, 2018 | Tracy Dawn Jackson became EVP and CFO |
| May 4, 2018 | Matthew W. Bley became CAO and Corp. Controller |
| Jan 1, 2018 | Janice T DeVelasco became VP-Env., Health, Safety & Sec. |
| Dec 11, 2017 | Stephen A Schwarzman reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Dec 11, 2017 | Steamboat Nitro Blocker LLC reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Dec 11, 2017 | Steamboat Credit Opportunities Intermediate Fund LP reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Dec 11, 2017 | J Albert Smith III reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Dec 11, 2017 | Gso Capital Partners LP reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Dec 11, 2017 | GSO Special Situations Overseas Master Fund Ltd. reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Dec 11, 2017 | GSO Special Situations Fund LP reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Dec 11, 2017 | GSO SSOMF Nitro Blocker LLC reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Dec 11, 2017 | GSO Palmetto Opportunistic Investment Partners LP reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Dec 11, 2017 | GSO Palmetto Opportunistic Associates LLC reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Dec 11, 2017 | GSO Holdings I LLC reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Dec 11, 2017 | GSO Credit-A Partners LP reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Dec 11, 2017 | GSO Credit-A Associates LLC reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Dec 11, 2017 | GSO Coastline Credit Partners LP reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Dec 11, 2017 | GSO Cactus Credit Opportunities Fund LP reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Dec 11, 2017 | GSO Aiguille des Grands Montets Fund II LP reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Dec 11, 2017 | GSO Advisor Holdings L.L.C. reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Dec 11, 2017 | GSO ADGM II Nitro Blocker LLC reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Dec 11, 2017 | Blackstone Holdings II L.P. reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Dec 11, 2017 | Blackstone Holdings I/II GP Inc reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Dec 11, 2017 | Blackstone Holdings I L.P. reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Dec 11, 2017 | Blackstone Group Management L.L.C. reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Dec 11, 2017 | Blackstone Group L.P. reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Dec 11, 2017 | Bennett J Goodman reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Dec 4, 2017 | Stephen A Schwarzman first listed as a 10% owner in an SEC filing |
| Dec 4, 2017 | J Albert Smith III first listed as a 10% owner in an SEC filing |
| Dec 4, 2017 | Gso Capital Partners LP first listed as a 10% owner in an SEC filing |
| Dec 4, 2017 | GSO Special Situations Overseas Master Fund Ltd. first listed as a 10% owner in an SEC filing |
| Dec 4, 2017 | GSO Special Situations Fund LP first listed as a 10% owner in an SEC filing |
| Dec 4, 2017 | GSO SSOMF Nitro Blocker LLC first listed as a 10% owner in an SEC filing |
| Dec 4, 2017 | GSO Coastline Credit Partners LP first listed as a 10% owner in an SEC filing |
| Dec 4, 2017 | GSO Advisor Holdings L.L.C. first listed as a 10% owner in an SEC filing |
| Dec 4, 2017 | Blackstone Holdings I/II GP Inc first listed as a 10% owner in an SEC filing |
| Dec 4, 2017 | Blackstone Holdings I L.P. first listed as a 10% owner in an SEC filing |
| Dec 4, 2017 | Blackstone Group Management L.L.C. first listed as a 10% owner in an SEC filing |
| Dec 4, 2017 | Blackstone Group L.P. first listed as a 10% owner in an SEC filing |
| Dec 4, 2017 | Bennett J Goodman first listed as a 10% owner in an SEC filing |
| Dec 1, 2017 | David L Lamp became Executive Chairman |
| Feb 15, 2017 | Stephen A Schwarzman reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Feb 15, 2017 | J Albert Smith III reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Feb 15, 2017 | Gso Capital Partners LP reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Feb 15, 2017 | GSO Special Situations Overseas Master Fund Ltd. reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Feb 15, 2017 | GSO Special Situations Fund LP reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Feb 15, 2017 | GSO SSOMF Nitro Blocker LLC reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Feb 15, 2017 | GSO Coastline Credit Partners LP reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Feb 15, 2017 | GSO Advisor Holdings L.L.C. reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Feb 15, 2017 | Blackstone Holdings I/II GP Inc reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Feb 15, 2017 | Blackstone Holdings I L.P. reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Feb 15, 2017 | Blackstone Group Management L.L.C. reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Feb 15, 2017 | Blackstone Group L.P. reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Feb 15, 2017 | Bennett J Goodman reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
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Not reported recently (17)
- Carl C Icahn · Last reported as a 10% owner in an SEC filing dated Apr 23, 2025
- Icahn Enterprises Holdings L.p. · Last reported as a 10% owner in an SEC filing dated Apr 23, 2025
- Icahn Enterprises G.p. Inc. · Last reported as a 10% owner in an SEC filing dated Apr 23, 2025
- IEP Energy Holding LLC · Last reported as a 10% owner in an SEC filing dated Dec 31, 2024
- American Entertainment Properties Corp. · Last reported as a 10% owner in an SEC filing dated Dec 31, 2024
- Jordan Bleznick · Last reported as a director in an SEC filing dated Mar 24, 2023
- Melissa M Buhrig · Last reported as EVP, General Counsel & Sec. in an SEC filing dated Nov 17, 2021
- Jeffrey D. Conaway · Last reported as VP, CAO & Corp. Controller in an SEC filing dated Aug 19, 2021
- Dane J. Neumann · Last reported as Interim CFO, VP-Fin.&Treasurer in an SEC filing dated Aug 19, 2021
- David Willetts · Last reported as a director in an SEC filing dated Jul 16, 2021
- Donna R Ecton · Last reported as a director in an SEC filing dated Nov 15, 2019
- Hunter Clark Gary · Last reported as a director in an SEC filing dated Oct 4, 2018
- Tracy Dawn Jackson · Last reported as EVP and CFO in an SEC filing dated May 8, 2018
- Matthew W. Bley · Last reported as CAO and Corp. Controller in an SEC filing dated May 8, 2018
- Janice T DeVelasco · Last reported as VP-Env., Health, Safety & Sec. in an SEC filing dated Jan 11, 2018
- William L White · Last reported as EVP, Marketing & Operations in an SEC filing dated Jan 3, 2018
- David L Lamp · Last reported as Executive Chairman in an SEC filing dated Dec 5, 2017
| Filing Date | Accession | Link |
|---|
| # | ETF | Provider | Weight | $ Exposure | ETF AUM | As Of |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | DIV Global X SuperDividend U.S. ETF | Global X | 1.90% | $14.4M | — | 2026-11-18 |
| 2 | BSJS Invesco BulletShares 2028 High Yield Corporate Bond ETF | Invesco | 0.59% | $4.5M | — | 2026-11-17 |
| 3 | HIPS GraniteShares HIPS U.S. High Income ETF | Nport | 2.76% | $3.0M | — | 2026-06-30 |
| 4 | CVY Invesco Zacks Multi-Asset Income ETF | Nport | 0.99% | $1.2M | — | 2026-07-31 |
| 5 | EHLS Even Herd Long Short ETF | Nport | 1.04% | $629,862 | — | 2026-06-30 |
| 6 | NDIV Amplify Energy & Natural Resources Covered Call ETF | Amplify | 1.32% | $422,720 | $32.1M | 2026-11-18 |
| 7 | IHYF Invesco High Yield Bond Factor ETF | Invesco | 0.19% | $300,030 | — | 2026-04-30 |
| 8 | GYLD Arrow Dow Jones Global Yield ETF | Nport | 0.66% | $247,016 | — | 2026-07-31 |
Quarterly filings sourced from SEC 10-Q / 10-K reports. TTM tiles aggregate the most recent four quarters; bars show the last ~12 quarters oldest → newest.
- Revenue — top-line sales. Look for consistent YoY growth; seasonal businesses need same-quarter comparisons (Q4 '24 vs Q4 '23).
- Net Income — bottom-line profit after all expenses. Can be volatile from one-time items; red bars = net loss.
- Diluted EPS — net income per share assuming options/converts are exercised. Direct input to the P/E ratio.
- Operating Cash Flow — cash generated from core operations, before capex and financing. Harder to manipulate than net income; growing OCF is a quality signal.
- Sequential growth — quarter-over-quarter trend. Accelerating bars are a momentum signal.
- YoY growth — compare to the same quarter a year earlier to remove seasonality.
- Quality — OCF should roughly track Net Income over time. Large divergence (net income ≫ OCF) flags accruals risk.
- Margins — scan the bar ratios: Net Income / Revenue tells you margin trend without needing a separate chart.
TTM (trailing-twelve-month) smooths seasonality and is used for the P/E calculation. Filings appear 30–90 days after the period closes.
Quarterly figures (12 quarters)
| Quarter | Period End | Revenue | Net Income | Diluted EPS | Op. Cash Flow |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Q3 '26 | 2026-09-30 | $146.15M | $-10.74M | $-1.02 | $122.81M |
| Q2 '26 | 2026-06-30 | $202.19M | $77.50M | $7.33 | $61.69M |
| Q1 '26 | 2026-03-31 | $180.05M | $49.91M | $4.72 | $79.99M |
| Q4 '25 | 2025-12-31 | $131.06M | $-10.27M | $-0.97 | $-21.60M |
| Q3 '25 | 2025-09-30 | $163.55M | $43.07M | $4.08 | $97.52M |
| Q2 '25 | 2025-06-30 | $168.56M | $38.77M | $3.67 | $20.08M |
| Q1 '25 | 2025-03-31 | $142.87M | $27.09M | $2.56 | $59.41M |
| Q4 '24 | 2024-12-31 | $139.56M | $18.30M | $1.73 | $12.79M |
| Q3 '24 | 2024-09-30 | $125.20M | $3.81M | $0.36 | $86.72M |
| Q2 '24 | 2024-06-30 | $132.90M | $26.22M | $2.48 | $8.61M |
| Q1 '24 | 2024-03-31 | $127.67M | $12.58M | $1.19 | $42.42M |
| Q4 '23 | 2023-12-31 | $141.62M | $9.97M | $0.94 | $-17.06M |
Ratios derived from TTM financials and the current market price, sampled daily. History chart shows how expensive the stock is today relative to its own recent past.
- P/E — price / TTM earnings. Rough market rule: 10–15 value, 15–25 market, >30 growth/premium. Negative when earnings are negative.
- P/B — price / book value. Useful for financials and asset-heavy names; meaningless for asset-light software.
- P/S — price / TTM revenue. Useful when earnings are negative or noisy (early-stage growth).
- EV/EBITDA — capital-structure-neutral. <10 cheap, 10–15 reasonable, >20 rich. Good for comparing across leverage profiles.
- EV/Sales — like P/S but accounts for debt + cash. Compare within sector.
- ROE — return on equity. >15% strong, >25% exceptional. Caution: high leverage inflates ROE.
- ROA — return on assets. Leverage-neutral; >5% solid, >10% exceptional.
- Div Yield — annual dividend / price. Compare to 10Y Treasury; sustained yield >6% often signals distress.
- FCF Yield — free cash flow / market cap. >5% is attractive; negative means burning cash.
- Debt/Equity — leverage. <1 conservative, >2 aggressive. Sector-dependent (utilities naturally high, tech low).
- Current Ratio — short-term liquidity. >1.5 comfortable, <1 raises short-term solvency flags.
- Compare current level to the 3-year band: near the high end = relatively expensive; near the low = relatively cheap.
- Multiples expanding while earnings are flat = sentiment-driven rally.
- Multiples compressing while earnings grow = value coming from fundamentals.
UAN vs Peers
Related companies, largest first| Company | Market cap | P/E | Revenue growth | YTD | IV rank |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AU AngloGold Ashanti plc | $40.2B | — | — | −9.8% | 48 |
| DOW Dow Inc. | $22.0B | — | +4.2% | +24.8% | 30 |
| PAA Plains All American Pipeline, L.P. Commo | $17.0B | 8.0 | +22.2% | +31.9% | 3 |
| EMN Eastman Chemical Company | $7.1B | 11.0 | +0.3% | −3.9% | 36 |
| MOS The Mosaic Company | $6.3B | — | +0.0% | −20.8% | 55 |
| ARLP Alliance Resource Partners LP | $3.2B | 9.9 | −1.9% | +1.5% | 68 |
| OLN Olin Corp. | $1.9B | — | −0.7% | −24.4% | 36 |
| SLVM Sylvamo Corporation | $1.5B | — | −4.7% | −23.7% | 12 |
| UAN CVR Partners, LP | $1.0B | 9.5 | +7.3% | −5.8% | 12 |
| Peer median | $6.7B | 9.9 | +0.0% | −6.8% | 36 |
P/E uses the latest reported trailing-12-month diluted EPS; "—" means no positive earnings or no data.
Regulatory short-interest reports publish on a bi-weekly settlement cadence; short-volume is reported daily by the trade-reporting facilities. Float is derived from insider-ownership filings.
- Short Interest — total shares currently sold short as of the settlement date. Lags real time by ~8 business days.
- SI % of Float — short interest / free float. The key crowding metric.
- Days to Cover — short interest / avg daily volume. How many full trading days it would take shorts to buy back. High DTC + catalyst = squeeze fuel.
- Short Vol Ratio — today's short-sale volume / total volume. Intraday selling pressure proxy (not the same as short interest).
- Free Float — shares available for public trading (total shares minus insider / restricted).
- Float % — free float / shares outstanding. <50% = tightly held, more prone to squeezes.
- SI % of Float < 5% — typical, no particular signal.
- 5–15% — elevated; watch for catalysts (earnings, guidance, macro).
- 15–30% — heavily shorted; tight-float names in this range have produced notable squeezes historically.
- >30% — extreme; borrow is likely expensive and squeeze risk is material.
- Days to Cover > 5 combined with high SI% amplifies squeeze potential.
- Trend matters more than level. Rapidly rising short interest often precedes negative catalysts or heavy hedging.
- A sudden drop in SI after a rally may indicate a squeeze in progress.
Short interest is reported mid-month and end-of-month; short volume is daily.