LEU Centrus Energy Corp.
XNYS
104.15
Delayed
Stock quote, options chain, IV rank, technicals, AI analysis, and institutional ownership. Iron condor setups Expected move IV rank history Fibonacci levels Insider trading
Market data may be delayed, incomplete, or inaccurate. Not a recommendation to buy, sell, or hold any security. Verify quotes with your broker before trading. See Terms §17.
- 52-Week Range
- $102.16 – $402.00
- YTD
- -61.78%
- IV Rank (30D)
- 74.31
- Straddle Price
- $21.20
- P/C Vol Ratio
- 0.83
- Market Cap
- $2.2B
- Open
- $104.54
- Day Range
- $102.16 – $107.24
- Volume
- 790,497
- Prev Close
- $108.91
A blended fair-value estimate combining up to six valuation methods. Each method is weighted by how well it fits the company — DCF down-weights for unprofitable names; DDM only fires for steady dividend payers; comparables down-weight when peer multiples disagree.
- DCF (quality-aware) — projects free cash flow with a horizon that scales to business quality. True compounders (quality 6/6) get 10 years explicit + 10 years fade before terminal; cyclical/struggling names (quality 0-1) get a 5-year terminal cliff. Quality is scored from ROE, gross margin, growth, FCF margin, debt load, and FCF consistency — the same factors that drive market premium for compounders.
- Market-Implied Growth (in Model Inputs) — reverse-DCF that answers "what growth rate is the market pricing in?". Lets you sanity-check the deviation: if implied growth is plausible for the business, the model's bearish flag may be wrong; if implausible, the market may be over-extrapolating.
- DDM (Gordon Growth Dividend Model) — values the stream of future dividends. Only used when trailing yield ≥ 2% and dividend payments are stable — below that the dividend is a token payout and Gordon (which values only the dividend stream) systematically underprices growth names, so those route to DCF + comparables + market anchor instead.
- P/E, EV/EBITDA, P/B, P/S — applies the peer-group median multiple to this company's per-share metric. Peers come from the same set as the "Related symbols" card. Earnings/sales metrics are forward-tilted by the company's recent revenue growth (capped at 25%) so they're comparable to peers' growth-embedded multiples — mimics how analysts use NTM rather than TTM. Per-multiple weights are biased by company quality (e.g. P/B down-weighted for asset-light tech).
- Market Anchor (SMA50) — the 50-day moving average, weighted by recent trading-range stability (tighter Bollinger bands → higher weight). Captures information fundamentals miss (forward consensus, sentiment, supply/demand) — but only when recent trading is steady enough that the market has converged on a view. During wild breakouts or breakdowns the anchor's weight collapses.
- Options Expected (B-L 30d) — the risk-neutral expected stock price at 30-day options expiration, derived from the full implied-volatility surface via Breeden-Litzenberger (second derivative of call price wrt strike → implied PDF, then E[S_T]). Forward-looking, captures all options-implied information (smile, skew, term structure) in one number. Weighted by chain liquidity. SP500-only at present (pre-computed daily). Backtest evidence: adds modest alpha across most bucket × holding combos.
- Blended value — weighted average. Confidence reflects how many methods fired and how tight peer dispersion is.
- Deviation pill — green when blended FV ≥ 10% above current price (undervalued); red when ≥ 10% below; grey otherwise.
| 10-yr Treasury (rf) | 5.15% |
| Beta vs SPY | 1.31 |
| Cost of Equity (CAPM) | 12.27% (VRP-adj) |
| WACC | 9.94% |
| Volatility Risk Premium | +11.6pp (IV − HV30), ERP adj +43bps |
| Effective Tax Rate | 21.0% |
| Rev. Growth (YoY, DCF input) | +30.0% |
| DCF Horizon | 5 years explicit + fade |
| Forward Tilt (NTM/TTM) | ×1.10 (applied to P/E, EV/EBITDA, P/S) |
| Free Cash Flow (TTM) | $-0.2B |
| Return on Equity (TTM) | 5.7% |
| Book / Price | 36.6% — banking bias active (P/B is primary) |
| Gross Margin (TTM) | 23.7% |
| FCF Margin (TTM) | -34.6% |
| Debt / Equity | 1.39 |
| Quality Score | 1/6 — cyclical/struggling (5y DCF) |
| SMA 50 | $156.14 (Market Anchor value) |
| SMA 20 / Bollinger Mid | $133.91 |
| Bollinger Width / SMA20 | 30.1% (drives anchor stability) |
| Net Debt | $-0.7B |
| Market Cap | $2B |
| Method | Implied Price | Weight | Detail |
|---|---|---|---|
| DCF | n/a | 0% | |
| DDM (Gordon) | n/a | 0% | |
| Peer P/E | n/a | 0% | |
| Peer EV/EBITDA | n/a | 0% | |
| Peer P/B | $76.64 | 10% | median 1.9× · 4 peers |
| Peer P/S | $2557.26 | 10% | median 104.2× · 3 peers |
| Market Anchor (SMA50) | $156.14 | 44% | stability 64% (BB-width) |
| Options Expected (B-L 30d) | $105.42 | 35% | 29 strikes · skew +0.19 |

- Industry (SIC)
- MINING & QUARRYING OF NONMETALLIC MINERALS (NO FUELS) (1400) · industry map
- Exchange
- XNYS
- Market Cap
- $2.2B
- Employees
- 467
- List Date
- 1998-07-23
- CIK
- 0001065059
- Next Earnings
- 2026-11-04 (After-Close)
- EPS Forecast
- $0.35 (1 est.)
- Headquarters
- Bethesda, MD
- Homepage
- https://www.centrusenergy.com
Centrus Energy Corp is engaged in the supply of nuclear fuel and services for the nuclear power industry. It operates through the Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) and Technical Solutions segments. The LEU segment has two components which include the sale of separative work units and uranium. The Technical Solutions segment provides engineering, design, and manufacturing services to government and private sector customers. The majority of the firm's revenue is derived from the LEU segment. It has a business presence in the U.S. and other countries, of which prime revenue is generated in the U.S.
Each spoke is this symbol's rank within its sector (0–100; the dotted ring marks the sector median at 50). Higher is more constructive for a long. One spoke — News sentiment — is an absolute reading, not a sector rank. Grayed spokes have no data. A fuller shape is a summary, not a recommendation.
| Month | '21 | '22 | '23 | '24 | '25 | '26 | Avg |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jan | -4.83% | -17.57% | 22.79% | -4.98% | 11.14% | 2.12% | 1.44% |
| Feb | 6.53% | 4.65% | 6.18% | -20.92% | 10.82% | -24.18% | -2.82% |
| Mar | -1.78% | -21.70% | -26.82% | 0.22% | -25.94% | -16.54% | -15.43% |
| Apr | -4.74% | -15.34% | -10.86% | -1.69% | 6.75% | 15.18% | -1.78% |
| May | -11.20% | -11.51% | 4.50% | 15.26% | 78.53% | -11.70% | 10.65% |
| Jun | 11.66% | 1.23% | 13.37% | -9.22% | 47.04% | -11.18% | 8.82% |
| Jul | -10.57% | 24.02% | 15.55% | 4.27% | 27.67% | 6.40% | 11.22% |
| Aug | 25.15% | 53.21% | 28.06% | -2.77% | -3.17% | -7.23% | 15.54% |
| Sep | 31.27% | -11.09% | 15.62% | 52.91% | 52.08% | -17.12% | 20.61% |
| Oct | 37.12% | 14.00% | -3.39% | 73.62% | 10.98% | -25.13%* | 17.87% |
| Nov | -8.36% | -18.87% | -4.30% | -16.92% | -24.40% | -- | -14.57% |
| Dec | -7.23% | -12.97% | 10.84% | -19.23% | -3.42% | -- | -6.40% |
| Total | 61.09% | -30.34% | 76.66% | 39.91% | 289.41% | -64.25% | 62.08% |
Quick-reference for reading the values below. Indicators combine to confirm a view — no single one is a trade signal on its own.
- SMA 20 / 50 / 200 — price above = uptrend, below = downtrend. SMA 50 crossing SMA 200 is the golden/death cross.
- EMA 12 / 26 — faster-reacting averages; 12 above 26 is short-term bullish.
- MACD — bullish when MACD > signal (green badge), bearish when below. Divergence from price often precedes reversals.
- ADX (14) — trend strength regardless of direction. <20 range, 20–25 weak trend, 25–50 trend, >50 strong trend.
- +DI / −DI — +DI > −DI favors bulls; the reverse favors bears. Read alongside ADX.
- RSI (14) — <30 oversold, >70 overbought. 40–60 is neutral; trending names can stay extreme.
- Stochastic %K / %D — <20 oversold, >80 overbought. %K crossing %D is an early momentum signal.
- Williams %R — inverted scale: <−80 oversold, >−20 overbought.
Oscillators work best in range-bound markets; in strong trends they give premature reversal signals.
- Bollinger Bands — price at upper band = overbought, lower = oversold. Narrow bands (squeeze) often precede expansion.
- OBV — cumulative volume; rising OBV confirms uptrend, falling OBV confirms downtrend. Divergence from price is a warning.
- Vol SMA 20 / Vol ROC — today's volume vs. 20-day average. Positive ROC with price move = conviction.
- ATR / True Range — average daily $ move; sizing and stop-loss reference.
- HV 20 / 30 / 60 — realized (historical) volatility. Compare to IV on the options cards: IV > HV = rich premium.
Confluence matters: trend + momentum + volume agreeing carries far more weight than any single indicator. For how these feed the spread scanner score, see the algorithm docs →
Trend Indicators
Momentum Oscillators
Volume & Volatility
Data Summary
COMPREHENSIVE STOCK ANALYSIS REPORT
SYMBOL: LEU (Centrus Energy Corp.)
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Overall Assessment: BEARISH | Confidence Level: 7/10
Centrus Energy (LEU) presents a high-risk, oversold technical setup conflicting sharply with deteriorating fundamental momentum and extreme volatility. The stock has cratered 69% from recent highs (trading at $104.91 vs. historical context), triggering classic oversold indicators (RSI 28.01, Stochastic %K 4.78) that typically precede relief bounces rather than sustained recoveries. However, this technical desperation is occurring amid significantly negative volume flows, collapsing momentum (MACD -12.74 deeply in bearish territory), and price action that has decisively broken below all major moving averages. The $4.5 billion backlog and nuclear supply chain tailwinds provide some fundamental support, but the recent negative news (late October sell-off) combined with a 69% drawdown suggests deeper concerns about execution, valuation resets, or market repositioning within the nuclear sector complex.
Key Drivers: Extreme overbought conditions creating technical bounce potential; nuclear industry tailwinds and large backlog offsetting near-term weakness; earnings catalyst (Nov 4) could reignite volatility.
Primary Risks: Structural downtrend below all major moving averages; negative volume flows and OBV deterioration; beta of 3.52 amplifies sector/market drawdowns; high historical volatility (HV60 76.3%) creates outsized risk exposure.
Investment Thesis: LEU exhibits classic distressed technical signals (oversold RSI, extreme stochastic readings) that may attract tactical buyers seeking relief bounces, but the breakdown below the $102.76 lower Bollinger Band and decisively negative volume structure suggest institutional liquidation rather than accumulation. A relief bounce toward $120-130 is technically possible, but the primary trend remains down until price recaptures the SMA 50 ($154.54) with supporting volume.
Recent News Sentiment Impact: Mixed-to-negative. The October 22 and 20 Motley Fool pieces offering bullish framing ("millionaire status," comparative favorability vs. BWX) coincide with the recent sell-off, suggesting these articles failed to arrest the decline. The October 11 headline explicitly referencing the 69% drawdown appears to have marked capitulation weakness. The negative momentum persists despite positive media narrative, indicating technical/institutional factors are overwhelming news sentiment.
TECHNICAL ANALYSIS
Trend Direction
| Timeframe | Status | Key Evidence | |-----------|--------|--------------| | Short-term (1-4 weeks) | BEARISH | Price $104.91 deeply below SMA 20 ($131.79, -20.4%), SMA 50 ($154.54, -32.2%), and SMA 200 ($191.42, -45.2%). EMA 12 ($121.17) also above price. Downtrend intact with no near-term reversal setup. | | Medium-term (1-3 months) | BEARISH | 69% decline from recent highs. Price action below all major moving averages with accelerating negative slope. EMA 26 ($133.91) well above current price, confirming structural weakness. | | Long-term (3-12 months) | BEARISH | Price below 200-day MA ($191.42) by 45.2%, marking a multi-month breakdown. Nuclear tailwinds may support eventual recovery, but downtrend remains the dominant structure. |
Support/Resistance Levels
CRITICAL LEVELS:
- Immediate Support: $102.76 (Lower Bollinger Band) — Price is at this level. Breakdown below signals capitulation continuation.
- Secondary Support: $100-102 (psychological round number, 69% drawdown inflection)
- Near-term Resistance: $121.17 (EMA 12) — Relief bounce target; +15.4% upside
- Secondary Resistance: $131.79 (SMA 20) — +25.7% upside; psychological test of 20-day MA
- Major Resistance: $154.54 (SMA 50) — +47.3% upside; critical long-term recovery hurdle
- Historical Resistance: $191.42 (SMA 200) — +82.5% upside; would signal major trend reversal
Interpretation: Current price at lower BB band suggests mean reversion is mathematically probable, but must confirm with volume support and price consolidation. Without such confirmation, a flush through $102.76 to $100 is plausible.
Momentum Signals
RSI (14): 28.01 — OVERSOLD EXTREME
- Reading <30 is textbook oversold territory, typically preceding 3-7 day bounce attempts.
- However, extreme oversold readings can persist in strong downtrends; not a reliable lone reversal signal.
- Interpretation: Supports near-term bounce probability, but does NOT confirm downtrend exhaustion without price and volume confirmation.
MACD: -12.74 (Line) / -2.45 (Signal) / -10.29 (Histogram) — DEEPLY BEARISH
- MACD line below signal line with negative histogram: bearish crossover territory.
- Histogram magnitude (-10.29) indicates strong bearish momentum with no signs of diminishment.
- The MACD line is significantly below the signal line, suggesting momentum has not yet stabilized.
- Interpretation: Momentum is deteriorating, not improving. This conflicts with oversold RSI and creates a divergence warning. Institutional selling appears to be accelerating rather than capitulating.
Stochastic %K & %D: 4.78 / 5.00 — EXTREME OVERSOLD
- Both readings near 0 (lowest possible levels) indicate panic selling conditions.
- Stochastic crossover above 20 would be first bullish signal.
- Interpretation: Reinforces extreme oversold condition and increases near-term bounce probability.
Williams %R: -98.37 — MAXIMUM OVERSOLD EXTREME
- Reading near -100 (lowest possible) confirms extreme selling pressure.
- Interpretation: Provides additional confirmation of oversold state; increases bounce probability further.
Critical Signal Conflict: The extreme oversold readings (RSI 28, Stochastic 4.78, Williams -98.37) create a textbook bounce setup, BUT the deeply negative MACD (-12.74 line, -10.29 histogram) suggests momentum is deteriorating rather than stabilizing. This divergence is bearish: the extremes may indicate capitulation flushing rather than smart money accumulation.
Bollinger Bands Position
Upper: $160.82 | Middle (SMA 20): $131.79 | Lower: $102.76 | Width: 44.06
- Price $104.91 is currently trading at the lower Bollinger Band, having recently flushed toward $102.76.
- Band width of 44.06 is moderate; not indicating an extreme squeeze, but not expanded either.
- Interpretation: Touching the lower band suggests mean reversion is probabilistically favored in next 3-5 days, but sustained moves below the band indicate momentum exhaustion is not yet confirmed. Band provides statistical framework: 95% of price action should remain within bands; touching lower band suggests ~15-20% probability of mean reversion bounce within 1-2 weeks.
Volume Analysis
Volume SMA 20: 811,114 shares
- Recent volume context not explicitly provided, but volume data is available.
On-Balance Volume (OBV): -14,857,248.93 — SEVERE NEGATIVE DIVERGENCE
- Deeply negative OBV indicates cumulative selling volume has dramatically exceeded buying volume over recent periods.
- This is the most bearish volume signal possible.
- Interpretation: Institutional liquidation or panic retail selling is driving this decline. Negative OBV at oversold RSI levels is particularly concerning: it suggests selling is NOT capitulating but rather accelerating.
Volume Rate of Change: -81.31% — COLLAPSE
- Volume has declined 81.31% relative to recent averages.
- Low volume on declines can indicate either capitulation (exhaustion) or reduced institutional interest (setting up further downside).
- Interpretation: The decline in volume alongside extreme oversold readings is NEGATIVE. Capitulation bounces typically occur on high volume; low volume during oversold extremes suggests the decline is being ignored by buyers and may continue on even lower volume.
Summary: Volume structure is severely negative. OBV at historic lows combined with declining volume trends suggest institutional aband
| Earnings Date | Timing | Expected Move | Actual Move | Ratio | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021-03-18 | After-Close | 9.44% | 4.79% | 0.51x | Within |
| 2021-05-11 | After-Close | 6.00% | 4.71% | 0.79x | Within |
| 2021-11-10 | After-Close | 15.79% | 14.87% | 0.94x | Within |
| 2022-03-10 | After-Close | 17.79% | 16.40% | 0.92x | Within |
| 2022-05-05 | After-Close | 16.51% | 6.42% | 0.39x | Within |
| 2022-08-04 | After-Close | 16.54% | 17.29% | 1.05x | Exceeded |
| 2022-11-08 | After-Close | 13.31% | 31.42% | 2.36x | Exceeded |
| 2023-02-21 | After-Close | 12.35% | 13.92% | 1.13x | Exceeded |
| 2023-05-08 | After-Close | 13.89% | 5.21% | 0.38x | Within |
| 2023-08-03 | After-Close | 11.50% | 20.61% | 1.79x | Exceeded |
| 2023-11-07 | After-Close | 8.45% | 10.93% | 1.29x | Exceeded |
| 2024-02-08 | After-Close | 12.35% | 1.83% | 0.15x | Within |
| 2024-05-07 | After-Close | 11.35% | 4.90% | 0.43x | Within |
| 2024-08-06 | After-Close | 18.33% | 17.50% | 0.95x | Within |
| 2024-10-28 | After-Close | 20.08% | 11.79% | 0.59x | Within |
| 2025-02-06 | After-Close | 21.91% | 33.13% | 1.51x | Exceeded |
| 2025-05-07 | After-Close | 15.93% | 22.01% | 1.38x | Exceeded |
| 2025-08-05 | After-Close | 16.11% | 8.70% | 0.54x | Within |
| 2025-11-05 | After-Close | 20.78% | 14.72% | 0.71x | Within |
| 2026-02-10 | After-Close | 16.72% | 20.69% | 1.24x | Exceeded |
| 2026-05-05 | After-Close | 15.99% | 12.27% | 0.77x | Within |
| 2026-08-05 | After-Close | 17.53% | 5.12% | 0.29x | Within |
Earnings calendar: this week’s reports with expected vs actual moves →
LEU Options Activity & IV Rank
LEU IV rank history, 52-week IV rank and IV percentile →
Volatility Metrics
Options Flow
ATM Options Pricing
Chain Summary
Each spread is ranked by a composite score built in three stages. Full documentation →
score = P(profit) × (credit / spread_width)
P(profit) from short leg delta (1 − |delta|), penalised above 85%. Credit uses mid-price to handle illiquid chains fairly.
RR and BF (30-delta) from the persisted per-symbol skew snapshot — wing strikes picked by real greeks.delta, not a moneyness proxy. Put skew boosts bull puts, penalises bear calls. High butterfly boosts iron condors. Calendars are skew-neutral.
- RSI <40 bullish / >60 bearish
- MACD crossover + histogram trend
- Price vs SMA 50 & SMA 200
- Stochastic %K <20 / >80
- Williams %R <−80 / >−20
- Blended ATR + straddle expected-move penalty
- Bollinger Band signal (+ counter-trend penalty)
- BB width — vol contraction boost for ICs
- IV rank ≥ 75 → strong boost for credit spreads
- IV rank < 25 → penalty (selling cheap vol)
- Min open interest across all legs
- OI < 100 → −0.10 · OI < 500 → −0.05
score = base_score × skew_multiplier × tech_multiplier
Both multipliers are shown per spread. Beta is informational only — ATR already captures realized vol. Full algorithm documentation →
Enter a ticker to scan for optimal spread opportunities.
Evaluates all bull put, bear call, iron condor, and calendar spread combinations using GPU-accelerated analysis.
Estimated net dealer gamma is at the 23rd percentile of this name's own daily history, within its typical range. This describes current positioning; it is not a forecast or a trading signal.
Net dealer gamma is an estimate of the aggregate gamma held by options market makers across this name's option chain, weighted by open interest. Dealer positions aren't public, so it uses a standard simplifying assumption: dealers are treated as long the calls and short the puts that are open. Actual dealer books can differ.
Gamma percentile ranks today's estimate against this name's own daily history, from 0% (the lowest reading on record) to 100% (the highest). Raw gamma scales with how much open interest a chain carries, so it isn't comparable across names; the percentile is. The badge marks the bottom 20% as low and the top 20% as high.
Tilts run from −1 to +1 and show how lopsided the estimated dealer exposure is. GEX tilt compares call gamma with put gamma. Vanna tilt describes how the hedge would shift if implied volatility changed, and charm tilt how it would shift with the passage of time.
This card describes estimated positioning and where it sits historically. It is not a forecast of price direction or volatility and not a trading signal. Market-wide view: Dealer positioning screener.
IV(put wing) − IV(ATM), in vol pointsHow much the OTM put trades above (or below) the at-the-money strike. Measures the height of the put-side tail relative to ATM — i.e. how expensive crash insurance is on this name.
- Positive (typical) — wing IV > ATM IV. Standard equity put skew: portfolios bid up crash protection, so OTM puts trade richer than ATM.
- Near zero or negative (unusual) — wing IV ≤ ATM IV. Flat or inverted put side. Common when there's no fear demand, in tightly mean-reverting names, or right after an earnings catalyst clears.
- Percentile vs own 3-yr history: high = wings rich (good time to sell wing premium); low = wings cheap (good time to buy protection).
- Not directional — high or low wings don't predict up or down moves. It's a price tag on tail insurance, not a forecast.
IV(call wing) − IV(put wing), equal delta on each sideWhich side of the smile is the market paying up for? Measures the tilt of the surface — call skew vs put skew at matched deltas.
- Negative (typical) — puts richer than calls. Standard equity behavior: hedging demand makes puts carry a premium. Most large-caps sit in the −1 to −5 vol-point range.
- Strongly negative (< −5 pts) — heavy downside hedging, elevated fear, or an upcoming catalyst (earnings, FDA, macro event). Worth flagging.
- Positive — calls richer than puts. Unusual for equities; signals bullish momentum, short-squeeze positioning, or takeover/M&A speculation.
- Near zero — symmetric surface. Market sees roughly equal up/down risk. Rare for large-caps; more common in commodities and FX.
Wing-vs-ATM tells you how expensive the tails are. Risk Reversal tells you which side is favored. Combined:
- High wing percentile + deeply negative RR → strong put bid; stress or major event priced in. Owning protection costs a premium; selling put premium is dangerous.
- Low wing percentile + near-zero RR → complacency; insurance cheap and balanced. Good environment to add cheap downside hedges.
- Positive RR + elevated wings → call-side fear-of-missing-out; common in squeeze setups. Upside calls expensive, downside puts not bid.
Percentile is the rank of today's reading within ~3 years of this symbol's own history. High percentile = wings are rich relative to history; not a directional signal. Skew is read off the chain in real time, not from CBOE SKEW.
Enter a ticker to render the implied volatility surface.
Enter a ticker to render the implied volatility smile.
Risk Metrics
Analysis Details
Data Points: 251
Period: 252 trading days
High volatility - stock moves more than market
| Investor | Value | Share of their portfolio | Rank | Q/Q shares | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Millennium Management Hedge fund Izzy Englander | $54.6M | #574 of 3716 | +7764.3% | 13F | |
| Renaissance Technologies Hedge fund Jim Simons | $47.1M | #353 of 3138 | +74.7% | 13F | |
| Rockefeller Capital Management Family office Rockefeller family | $12.3M | #647 of 4729 | +13.8% | 13F | |
| Citadel Hedge fund Ken Griffin | $8.8M | #1678 of 6285 | -33.3% | 13F | |
| Bridgewater Associates Hedge fund Ray Dalio | $3.5M | #558 of 997 | +11.9% | 13F |
Hedge funds, activists, holding companies and family offices we track, from their latest 13F (quarter-end value) and Form 4 filings in the last 3 years. Family offices · all institutions
LEU Institutional Ownership (13F)
Latest filings — 2026-09-30Institutional managers with $100M+ AUM file Form 13F-HR quarterly, due 45 days after quarter end. Holdings are reported gross at quarter-end market value — they are a snapshot, not a real-time position.
- Shares — long equity positions in this name, aggregated across share classes.
- Calls / Puts — notional value of long call / put exposure where this ticker is the underlying.
- % of Float — holder's reported shares divided by the latest diluted shares outstanding. Sums above 100% indicate large custodian / prime broker positions where the same shares are reported by multiple filers.
- Custodian badge — filers with more than 5,000 holdings are typically broker-dealers / custodians reporting customer-held shares, not active managers.
Each filer is counted once at its latest 13F-HR filing. New filings are ingested on a weekly cadence.
| # | Filer | Notional Value | % of Total | Period |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Citadel Advisors LLC Custodian | $112.20M | 16.75% | 2026-06-30 |
| 2 | Jane Street Group, LLC Custodian | $105.52M | 15.75% | 2026-06-30 |
| 3 | Cubist Systematic Strategies, LLC | $99.16M | 14.80% | 2025-09-30 |
| 4 | Wolverine Trading, LLC Custodian | $90.39M | 13.49% | 2025-09-30 |
| 5 | Susquehanna International Group, LLP Custodian | $90.15M | 13.46% | 2026-06-30 |
| 6 | IMC-Chicago, LLC Custodian | $34.04M | 5.08% | 2026-06-30 |
| 7 | Walleye Trading LLC | $34.01M | 5.08% | 2026-06-30 |
| 8 | D. E. Shaw & Co., Inc. Custodian | $26.62M | 3.97% | 2026-06-30 |
| 9 | GROUP ONE TRADING LLC Custodian | $23.62M | 3.53% | 2026-06-30 |
| 10 | Squarepoint Ops LLC | $15.34M | 2.29% | 2026-06-30 |
| 11 | PEAK6 LLC | $12.83M | 1.91% | 2026-06-30 |
| 12 | UBS Group AG Custodian | $6.04M | 0.90% | 2026-06-30 |
| 13 | Simplex Trading, LLC Custodian | $5.66M | 0.84% | 2026-06-30 |
| 14 | Point72 Asset Management, L.P. | $4.80M | 0.72% | 2026-06-30 |
| 15 | CAPITAL FUND MANAGEMENT S.A. | $4.20M | 0.63% | 2026-06-30 |
| 16 | HAP TRADING, LLC | $1.59M | 0.24% | 2025-09-30 |
| 17 | Two Sigma Investments, LP Custodian | $1.48M | 0.22% | 2026-06-30 |
| 18 | Millennium Management LLC Custodian | $1.04M | 0.16% | 2026-06-30 |
| 19 | TUDOR INVESTMENT CORP ET AL | $671.48K | 0.10% | 2026-06-30 |
| 20 | Ausdal Financial Partners, Inc. | $334.74K | 0.05% | 2026-06-30 |
| 21 | B. Riley Wealth Advisors, Inc. | $167.39K | 0.03% | 2026-09-30 |
| 22 | OSAIC HOLDINGS, INC. Custodian | $6.20K | <0.01% | 2026-06-30 |
| # | Filer | Notional Value | % of Total | Period |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Susquehanna International Group, LLP Custodian | $173.78M | 28.89% | 2026-06-30 |
| 2 | Jane Street Group, LLC Custodian | $138.43M | 23.01% | 2026-06-30 |
| 3 | Citadel Advisors LLC Custodian | $92.90M | 15.44% | 2026-06-30 |
| 4 | Wolverine Trading, LLC Custodian | $39.70M | 6.60% | 2025-09-30 |
| 5 | IMC-Chicago, LLC Custodian | $24.81M | 4.12% | 2026-06-30 |
| 6 | Cubist Systematic Strategies, LLC | $24.50M | 4.07% | 2025-09-30 |
| 7 | Squarepoint Ops LLC | $22.73M | 3.78% | 2026-06-30 |
| 8 | Walleye Trading LLC | $20.04M | 3.33% | 2026-06-30 |
| 9 | DLD Asset Management, LP | $16.73M | 2.78% | 2026-06-30 |
| 10 | UBS Group AG Custodian | $9.30M | 1.55% | 2026-06-30 |
| 11 | GROUP ONE TRADING LLC Custodian | $7.42M | 1.23% | 2026-06-30 |
| 12 | Simplex Trading, LLC Custodian | $6.65M | 1.11% | 2026-06-30 |
| 13 | PEAK6 LLC | $6.04M | 1.00% | 2026-06-30 |
| 14 | D. E. Shaw & Co., Inc. Custodian | $4.26M | 0.71% | 2026-06-30 |
| 15 | CAPITAL FUND MANAGEMENT S.A. | $3.56M | 0.59% | 2026-06-30 |
| 16 | Two Sigma Investments, LP Custodian | $3.19M | 0.53% | 2026-06-30 |
| 17 | Point72 Asset Management, L.P. | $1.98M | 0.33% | 2026-06-30 |
| 18 | TUDOR INVESTMENT CORP ET AL | $1.85M | 0.31% | 2026-06-30 |
| 19 | Balyasny Asset Management L.P. | $1.24M | 0.21% | 2026-06-30 |
| 20 | Walleye Capital LLC | $1.07M | 0.18% | 2026-06-30 |
| 21 | Tidal Investments LLC | $604.33K | 0.10% | 2026-06-30 |
| 22 | Millennium Management LLC Custodian | $470.04K | 0.08% | 2026-06-30 |
| 23 | Lido Advisors, LLC | $235.02K | 0.04% | 2026-06-30 |
| 24 | Philadelphia Investment Partners, LLC | $3.36K | <0.01% | 2026-06-30 |
LEU Insider Trading (Form 4)
Latest: 2026-08-13| Filed | Reporter | Role | Action | Shares | Avg Price | Net $ | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-13 | Todd M Tinelli | SVP, CFO & Treasurer | Mixed | +250 | $189.19 | -$39.0K | EDGAR |
| 2026-07-14 | Neal Kanth Nagarajan | SVP, Head Investor Relations | — | — | — | EDGAR | |
| 2026-06-23 | Ray A. Rothrock | Director | Award (A) | +757 | — | EDGAR | |
| 2026-06-23 | Mikel H Williams | Director | Award (A) | +757 | — | EDGAR | |
| 2026-06-23 | William J Madia | Director | Award (A) | +757 | — | EDGAR | |
| 2026-06-23 | Kirkland H Donald | Director | Award (A) | +757 | — | EDGAR | |
| 2026-06-23 | Tina W Jonas | Director | Award (A) | +757 | — | EDGAR | |
| 2026-06-22 | Todd M Tinelli | SVP, CFO & Treasurer | Grant (A) | +561 RSU | — | EDGAR | |
| 2026-06-22 | Richard Dingley Emery III | SVP, GC, CCO & Corp Sec | Grant (A) | +396 RSU | — | EDGAR | |
| 2026-06-22 | Patrick Sidney Brown | SVP, FIELD OPERATIONS | Grant (A) | +462 RSU | — | EDGAR | |
| 2026-06-22 | Neal Kanth Nagarajan | SVP, Head Investor Relations | Grant (A) | +449 RSU | — | EDGAR | |
| 2026-06-22 | Amir Vadim Vexler | President and CEO | Grant (A) | +1,712 RSU | — | EDGAR | |
| 2026-06-22 | Yanhong Dai | PRINCIPAL ACCOUNTING OFFICER | Grant (A) | +110 RSU | — | EDGAR | |
| 2026-06-22 | John M A Donelson | SVP, Sales & Chief Mktg Off | Grant (A) | +490 RSU | — | EDGAR | |
| 2026-05-11 | Todd M Tinelli | SVP, CFO & Treasurer | Sell (S) | −306 | $203.55 | -$62.3K | EDGAR |
LEU Insider Holdings
12 insiders · @ $104.15| # | Insider | Role | Shares | Disclosed Exposure | Lifetime OM Net | Filings | Last Filed |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | William J Madia | Director | 57,788 | $6.02M | $0 | 16 | 2026-06-23 |
| 2 | Mikel H Williams | Director | 52,536 | $5.47M | $0 | 15 | 2026-06-23 |
| 3 | Tina W Jonas | Director | 15,773 | $1.64M | $0 | 7 | 2026-06-23 |
| 4 | Larry B Cutlip | SVP, FIELD OPERATIONS | 11,321 | $1.18M | -$1.41M | 13 | 2025-04-02 |
| 5 | Kirkland H Donald | Director | 8,988 | $936.1K | $0 | 6 | 2026-06-23 |
| 6 | Bradley J Sawatzke | Director | 5,949 | $619.6K | $0 | 5 | 2025-06-24 |
| 7 | Amir Vadim Vexler | President and CEO | 4,392 | $457.4K | $0 | 4 | 2026-06-22 |
| 8 | Stephanie L. O'Sullivan | Director | 3,840 | $399.9K | $0 | 2 | 2025-06-24 |
| 9 | Ray A. Rothrock | Director | 2,915 | $303.6K | $0 | 3 | 2026-06-23 |
| 10 | Patrick Sidney Brown | SVP, FIELD OPERATIONS | 2,841 | $295.9K | $0 | 2 | 2026-06-22 |
LEU Board & Officers
As of SEC filings through Aug 13, 2026Directors 8
- William J Madia · since Feb 8, 2008
- Mikel H Williams · since Oct 24, 2013
- Tina W Jonas · since Jun 17, 2020
- Bradley J Sawatzke · since Aug 10, 2021
- Kirkland H Donald · since Aug 10, 2021
- Ray A. Rothrock · since Jun 20, 2024
- Stephanie L. O'Sullivan · since Aug 6, 2024
- Amir Vadim Vexler · listed since Dec 2024
Officers 8
- Amir Vadim Vexler · President & CEO · since Jan 1, 2024
- Todd M Tinelli · SVP, CFO & Treasurer · since Aug 11, 2025
- John M A Donelson · SVP, Sales & Chief Mktg Off · listed since May 2025
- Kevin J Harrill · Controller & CAO · since Mar 31, 2022
- Patrick Sidney Brown · SVP, Field Operations · since Aug 1, 2025
- Richard Dingley Emery III · SVP, GC, CCO & Corp Sec · since Oct 6, 2025
- Yanhong Dai · Principal Accounting Officer · since Jun 18, 2026
- Neal Kanth Nagarajan · SVP, Head Investor Relations · listed since Jun 2026
Changes in the last 10 years (42)
| Jun 22, 2026 | Neal Kanth Nagarajan listed as SVP, Head Investor Relations (previously SVP and Head of Investor Rel.) in SEC filings |
| Jun 18, 2026 | Yanhong Dai became Principal Accounting Officer |
| Oct 6, 2025 | Richard Dingley Emery III became SVP, GC, CCO & Corp Sec |
| Aug 11, 2025 | Todd M Tinelli became SVP, CFO & Treasurer |
| Aug 1, 2025 | Patrick Sidney Brown became SVP, Field Operations |
| May 15, 2025 | John M A Donelson listed as SVP, Sales & Chief Mktg Off (previously SVP, Sales & Chief Mktg Officr) in SEC filings |
| Dec 6, 2024 | Amir Vadim Vexler first listed as a director in an SEC filing |
| Nov 25, 2024 | Neal Kanth Nagarajan became SVP and Head of Investor Rel. |
| Oct 16, 2024 | The company announced the departure of Larry B Cutlip as SVP, Field Operations in an SEC filing |
| Aug 6, 2024 | Stephanie L. O'Sullivan became a director |
| Jun 20, 2024 | Ray A. Rothrock became a director |
| Feb 26, 2024 | John M A Donelson listed as SVP, Sales & Chief Mktg Officr (previously SVP, Sales & Chief Mktg Offcr.) in SEC filings |
| Jan 1, 2024 | Amir Vadim Vexler became President & CEO |
| Dec 29, 2023 | The company announced the departure of Daniel B Poneman from the board in an SEC filing |
| Dec 15, 2023 | The company announced the departure of Neil S Subin from the board in an SEC filing |
| Oct 11, 2023 | Morris Bawabeh reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Oct 11, 2023 | Kulayba LLC reported in an SEC filing no longer being a 10% owner |
| Aug 31, 2023 | The company announced the departure of Philip O Strawbridge as SVP, CFO, CAO & Treasurer in an SEC filing |
| Aug 12, 2023 | Shahram Ghasemian became SVP, GC, CCO and Corp. Sec'y |
| Jun 22, 2023 | W T Jagodinski reported in an SEC filing no longer being a director |
| Mar 28, 2023 | John M A Donelson listed as SVP, Sales & Chief Mktg Offcr. (previously SVP, Sales & Chief Mrktg Ofr.) in SEC filings |
| Apr 4, 2022 | Dennis John Scott listed as Svp,gen Couns,cco& Corp. Sec'y (previously Vp,gen Couns, Cco & Corp Sec'y) in SEC filings |
| Mar 31, 2022 | Kevin J Harrill became Controller & CAO |
| Nov 15, 2021 | The company announced the departure of John C Dorrian as Controller & Chief Acctg Ofcr. in an SEC filing |
| Aug 12, 2021 | Neil S Subin no longer listed as a 10% owner in SEC filings |
| Aug 10, 2021 | Kirkland H Donald became a director |
| Aug 10, 2021 | Bradley J Sawatzke became a director |
| Apr 22, 2021 | Daniel B Poneman first listed as President & CEO in an SEC filing |
| Apr 21, 2021 | John C Dorrian became Controller & Chief Acctg Ofcr. |
| Mar 26, 2021 | Larry B Cutlip listed as SVP, Field Operations (previously VP, Field Operations) in SEC filings |
| Mar 25, 2021 | John M A Donelson listed as SVP, Sales & Chief Mrktg Ofr. (previously VP, Marketing, Sales & Power) in SEC filings |
| Feb 1, 2021 | Daniel B Poneman no longer listed as President & CEO in SEC filings |
| Feb 1, 2021 | Daniel B Poneman first listed as a director in an SEC filing |
| Aug 25, 2020 | Neil S Subin first listed as a 10% owner in an SEC filing |
| Jun 17, 2020 | Tina W Jonas became a director |
| Sep 30, 2019 | Philip O Strawbridge became SVP, CFO, CAO & Treasurer |
| Apr 10, 2019 | Daniel B Poneman listed as President & CEO (previously Chief Strategic Officer) in SEC filings |
| May 18, 2018 | Neil S Subin no longer listed as a 10% owner in SEC filings |
| Jan 22, 2018 | Neil S Subin first listed as a 10% owner in an SEC filing |
| Sep 7, 2017 | Tetsuo Iguchi became a director |
| Aug 2, 2017 | Neil S Subin became a director |
| Feb 7, 2017 | Kulayba LLC first on file as a 10% owner |
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Not reported recently (6)
- Daniel B Poneman · Last reported as President & CEO in an SEC filing dated Dec 22, 2023
- Shahram Ghasemian · Last reported as SVP, GC, CCO and Corp. Sec'y in an SEC filing dated Aug 14, 2023
- Dennis John Scott · Last reported as Svp,gen Couns,cco& Corp. Sec'y in an SEC filing dated Apr 13, 2023
- Michael Diament · Last reported as a director in an SEC filing dated Jun 19, 2020
- Patricia J Jamieson · Last reported as a director in an SEC filing dated Jun 19, 2020
- Tetsuo Iguchi · Last reported as a director in an SEC filing dated Sep 14, 2017
LEU Proposed Insider Sales (Form 144)
Latest: 2026-05-11What is Form 144? A notice of intent to sell restricted or control stock under Rule 144. Affiliates (officers, directors, 10%+ owners) and holders of restricted shares must file Form 144 when planning to sell more than 5,000 shares or $50,000 in any 3-month rolling window.
How it relates to Form 4: Form 144 is filed before the trade (up to 90 days in advance); Form 4 is filed within 2 business days after the trade executes. Not every Form 144 results in a sale — the filer may cancel or delay. Look for the corresponding Form 4 on the Insider Activity card to confirm a sale actually happened.
10b5-1 plans: Trades made under a pre-scheduled Rule 10b5-1 plan are not discretionary — they execute automatically on dates set months earlier, regardless of news. High 10b5-1 percentages mean less per-filing signal value, though cumulative selling volume still matters.
"Notice value": Aggregate market value the filer wrote into the Form 144 — i.e. the size of the planned sale, not necessarily the executed dollars. An amended notice (Form 144/A) replaces the original it amends, and cancelled notices are dropped, so neither is double-counted above. A filed value that is clearly inconsistent with the share count at the stock's price (a filer typo) shows as a dash and is left out of the totals.
Source & freshness: Sourced from public Form 144 filings. Refreshed daily; new filings typically appear here the morning after they are filed.
| Filed | Filer | Role | Shares | Notice Value | Planned Sale | Broker | Plan | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-11 | TINELLI TODD M | Officer, SVP, CFO & Treasurer | 306 | $62.3K | 2026-05-11 | Georgeson Securities Corporation | — | EDGAR |
| 2025-10-01 | Kevin Harrill | Former Affiliate | 3,884 | $1.28M | 2025-10-01 | UBS Financial Services Inc | — | EDGAR |
| 2025-08-26 | CUTLIP LARRY B | Officer, SVP FIELD OPERATIONS | 11,309 | $2.35M | 2025-08-26 | CITIGROUP GLOBAL MARKETS | — | EDGAR |
| 2025-07-15 | SAWATZKE BRADLEY J | Director, Former Director | 5,949 | $1.27M | 2025-07-15 | Citigroup Global Markets Inc | — | EDGAR |
| 2024-02-15 | Donelson John M A | Officer, SVP, Sales & Chief Marketing Officer | 16,073 | $750.0K | 2024-02-14 | Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC | — | EDGAR |
| 2024-02-09 | PONEMAN DANIEL B | Officer, FORMER PRESIDENT AND CEO | 215,025 | $11.83M | 2024-02-12 | GEORGESON SECURITIES CORPORATION | — | EDGAR |
| 2023-10-02 | Kulayba LLC | 13% Stockholder | 151,276 | $9.04M | 2023-10-02 | Middlegate Securities Inc | — | EDGAR |
| 2023-08-31 | Walter Thomas Jagodinski | Former Director | 5,000 | $238.1K | 2023-08-31 | UBS Financial Services Inc | — | EDGAR |
| 2023-08-22 | Walter Thomas Jagodinski | Former Director | 8,514 | $374.6K | 2023-08-22 | UBS Financial Services Inc | — | EDGAR |
| 2023-08-17 | Walter Thomas Jagodinski | Other: Former Director | 15,000 | $606.0K | 2023-08-17 | Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC | — | EDGAR |
| # | ETF | Provider | Weight | $ Exposure | ETF AUM | As Of |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | URA Global X Uranium ETF | Global X | 2.36% | $117.8M | — | 2026-10-21 |
| 2 | NLR VanEck Uranium and Nuclear ETF | VanEck | 3.33% | $104.9M | $3.2B | 2026-10-20 |
| 3 | IJR iShares Core S&P Small-Cap ETF | iShares (BlackRock) | 0.09% | $93.8M | $103.1B | 2026-10-20 |
| 4 | VTI Vanguard Morningstar Total Stock Market ETF | Vanguard | 0.00% | $85.7M | — | 2026-09-30 |
| 5 | XME State Street® SPDR® S&P® Metals & Mining ETF | SPDR (State Street) | 2.00% | $76.0M | $3.8B | 2026-10-20 |
| 6 | IWM iShares Russell 2000 ETF | iShares (BlackRock) | 0.07% | $51.9M | $75.1B | 2026-10-20 |
| 7 | VXF Vanguard Extended Market ETF | Vanguard | 0.03% | $30.3M | — | 2026-09-30 |
| 8 | IJT iShares S&P Small-Cap 600 Growth ETF | iShares (BlackRock) | 0.26% | $19.6M | $7.6B | 2026-10-20 |
| 9 | SPSM State Street® SPDR® Portfolio S&P 600™ Small Cap ETF | SPDR (State Street) | 0.12% | $19.3M | $15.7B | 2026-10-20 |
| 10 | SCHA Schwab U.S. Small-Cap ETF | Nport | 0.07% | $16.7M | — | 2026-05-31 |
| 11 | IWO iShares Russell 2000 Growth ETF | iShares (BlackRock) | 0.11% | $15.5M | $13.6B | 2026-10-20 |
| 12 | VTWO Vanguard Russell 2000 ETF | Vanguard | 0.09% | $15.1M | — | 2026-09-30 |
| 13 | VDE Vanguard Energy ETF | Vanguard | 0.11% | $14.5M | — | 2026-09-30 |
| 14 | SLYG State Street® SPDR® S&P 600™ Small Cap Growth ETF | SPDR (State Street) | 0.26% | $12.0M | $4.6B | 2026-10-20 |
| 15 | NUKZ Range Nuclear Renaissance Index ETF | Nport | 1.27% | $11.3M | — | 2026-05-31 |
| 16 | DFAS Dimensional US Small Cap ETF | Dimensional | 0.03% | $10.1M | — | 2026-10-20 |
| 17 | VIOO Vanguard S&P Small-Cap 600 ETF | Vanguard | 0.16% | $9.5M | — | 2026-09-30 |
| 18 | DFAC Dimensional US Core Equity 2 ETF | Dimensional | 0.01% | $6.4M | — | 2026-10-20 |
| 19 | DFMC Dimensional US Micro Cap ETF | Dimensional | 0.07% | $5.2M | — | 2026-10-20 |
| 20 | IWN iShares Russell 2000 Value ETF | iShares (BlackRock) | 0.02% | $3.4M | $13.7B | 2026-10-20 |
| 21 | AIPO Defiance AI & Power Infrastructure ETF | Nport | 0.43% | $3.2M | — | 2026-05-31 |
| 22 | ITOT iShares Core S&P Total U.S. Stock Market ETF | iShares (BlackRock) | 0.00% | $2.7M | $97.4B | 2026-10-20 |
| 23 | VIOG Vanguard S&P Small-Cap 600 Growth ETF | Vanguard | 0.26% | $2.6M | — | 2026-10-20 |
| 24 | VTWG Vanguard Russell 2000 Growth ETF | Vanguard | 0.14% | $2.3M | — | 2026-09-30 |
| 25 | SRVR Pacer Data & Infrastructure Real Estate ETF | Nport | 0.51% | $2.0M | — | 2026-04-30 |
Quarterly filings sourced from SEC 10-Q / 10-K reports. TTM tiles aggregate the most recent four quarters; bars show the last ~12 quarters oldest → newest.
- Revenue — top-line sales. Look for consistent YoY growth; seasonal businesses need same-quarter comparisons (Q4 '24 vs Q4 '23).
- Net Income — bottom-line profit after all expenses. Can be volatile from one-time items; red bars = net loss.
- Diluted EPS — net income per share assuming options/converts are exercised. Direct input to the P/E ratio.
- Operating Cash Flow — cash generated from core operations, before capex and financing. Harder to manipulate than net income; growing OCF is a quality signal.
- Sequential growth — quarter-over-quarter trend. Accelerating bars are a momentum signal.
- YoY growth — compare to the same quarter a year earlier to remove seasonality.
- Quality — OCF should roughly track Net Income over time. Large divergence (net income ≫ OCF) flags accruals risk.
- Margins — scan the bar ratios: Net Income / Revenue tells you margin trend without needing a separate chart.
TTM (trailing-twelve-month) smooths seasonality and is used for the P/E calculation. Filings appear 30–90 days after the period closes.
Quarterly figures (12 quarters)
| Quarter | Period End | Revenue | Net Income | Diluted EPS | Op. Cash Flow |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Q2 '26 | 2026-06-30 | $176.10M | $16.80M | $0.77 | $18.40M |
| Q1 '26 | 2026-03-31 | $76.70M | $10.00M | $0.45 | $-35.10M |
| Q4 '25 | 2025-12-31 | $146.20M | $17.80M | $0.74 | $-48.40M |
| Q3 '25 | 2025-09-30 | $74.90M | $3.90M | $0.19 | $10.10M |
| Q2 '25 | 2025-06-30 | $154.50M | $28.90M | $1.59 | $52.80M |
| Q1 '25 | 2025-03-31 | $73.10M | $27.20M | $1.60 | $36.50M |
| Q4 '24 | 2024-12-31 | $151.60M | $53.70M | $3.27 | $57.90M |
| Q3 '24 | 2024-09-30 | $57.70M | $-5.00M | $-0.30 | $-33.20M |
| Q2 '24 | 2024-06-30 | $189.00M | $30.60M | $1.89 | $7.00M |
| Q1 '24 | 2024-03-31 | $43.70M | $-6.10M | $-0.38 | $5.30M |
| Q4 '23 | 2023-12-31 | $103.60M | $56.30M | $3.62 | $17.90M |
| Q3 '23 | 2023-09-30 | $51.30M | $8.20M | $0.52 | $-24.00M |
Ratios derived from TTM financials and the current market price, sampled daily. History chart shows how expensive the stock is today relative to its own recent past.
- P/E — price / TTM earnings. Rough market rule: 10–15 value, 15–25 market, >30 growth/premium. Negative when earnings are negative.
- P/B — price / book value. Useful for financials and asset-heavy names; meaningless for asset-light software.
- P/S — price / TTM revenue. Useful when earnings are negative or noisy (early-stage growth).
- EV/EBITDA — capital-structure-neutral. <10 cheap, 10–15 reasonable, >20 rich. Good for comparing across leverage profiles.
- EV/Sales — like P/S but accounts for debt + cash. Compare within sector.
- ROE — return on equity. >15% strong, >25% exceptional. Caution: high leverage inflates ROE.
- ROA — return on assets. Leverage-neutral; >5% solid, >10% exceptional.
- Div Yield — annual dividend / price. Compare to 10Y Treasury; sustained yield >6% often signals distress.
- FCF Yield — free cash flow / market cap. >5% is attractive; negative means burning cash.
- Debt/Equity — leverage. <1 conservative, >2 aggressive. Sector-dependent (utilities naturally high, tech low).
- Current Ratio — short-term liquidity. >1.5 comfortable, <1 raises short-term solvency flags.
- Compare current level to the 3-year band: near the high end = relatively expensive; near the low = relatively cheap.
- Multiples expanding while earnings are flat = sentiment-driven rally.
- Multiples compressing while earnings grow = value coming from fundamentals.
Regulatory short-interest reports publish on a bi-weekly settlement cadence; short-volume is reported daily by the trade-reporting facilities. Float is derived from insider-ownership filings.
- Short Interest — total shares currently sold short as of the settlement date. Lags real time by ~8 business days.
- SI % of Float — short interest / free float. The key crowding metric.
- Days to Cover — short interest / avg daily volume. How many full trading days it would take shorts to buy back. High DTC + catalyst = squeeze fuel.
- Short Vol Ratio — today's short-sale volume / total volume. Intraday selling pressure proxy (not the same as short interest).
- Free Float — shares available for public trading (total shares minus insider / restricted).
- Float % — free float / shares outstanding. <50% = tightly held, more prone to squeezes.
- SI % of Float < 5% — typical, no particular signal.
- 5–15% — elevated; watch for catalysts (earnings, guidance, macro).
- 15–30% — heavily shorted; tight-float names in this range have produced notable squeezes historically.
- >30% — extreme; borrow is likely expensive and squeeze risk is material.
- Days to Cover > 5 combined with high SI% amplifies squeeze potential.
- Trend matters more than level. Rapidly rising short interest often precedes negative catalysts or heavy hedging.
- A sudden drop in SI after a rally may indicate a squeeze in progress.
Short interest is reported mid-month and end-of-month; short volume is daily.